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Executive Summary 
 
The Australian Stock Exchange (‘ASX’) demutualised on 13 October 1998. A day later, it 
listed on its own market. This monograph examines the reasons for and outcomes of the 
demutualisation process on the basis of interviews with current and former ASX directors, 
managers and former members. The interviews are supplemented with extensive access to a 
wide range of ASX produced reports and documents. The analysis reveals that increasing 
competition and the inherent inefficiencies of a mutual structure were the main reasons for 
ASX’s demutualisation, consistent with research from the insurance and banking industries. 
There is evidence that the change in organisational structure has improved ASX as a business 
and increased stakeholder value.  




On 14 October 1998, the Australian Stock Exchange (‘ASX’) listed following its members’ 
vote to convert from a mutual structure to a stock-based company, thus changing the 
distribution of ownership and control. In a stock-based company, the common shareholders 
are the residual claimants of the corporation. The shareholders’ residual claim is unrestricted 
and may be sold without reference to other shareholders.  In a mutual organisation, the 
owners are also customers of the organization and are unable to freely dispose of their stakes. 
Further, in mutuals the rights to profits or losses reside with its customers and so the 
customers share risks that the organization has not diversified away.  The conversion from a 
mutual structure to a stock-based company was thus a very significant change in corporate 
governance for ASX.  
 
ASX is the first exchange in the world to list on its own market.
1
 The move has been a 
success for ASX and its stakeholders by several measures. By October 1999, the shares were 
trading at over two times the initial opening price.
2
 At the end of its first year as a public 
company, ASX announced a record profit with operating profit after tax 126% above the 
previous financial year. 
 
The change in ASX’s corporate structure and its subsequent positive performance raises 
several questions, addressed in this monograph. What were the pressures that prompted the 
change from a mutual structure, which is common for stock exchanges, to a stock-based 
company?
3
  Secondly, how was the process managed, given that gains and losses from the 
change were not borne equally or proportionately among the stakeholders of the mutual 
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 The Stockholm Stock Exchange was not the first as it is a subsidiary of a listed company, OM Gruppen. In 
fact, the Swedish government passed legislation to prevent the SSE from listing on its own market as it 
considered such a scenario to be “inappropriate” [Offer Document for the Stockholm Stock Exchange (1992)]. 
2
 The share price peaked on 16 March 1999 at $16.18 or a 281% rise from the initial opening price. 
3
 A stock-based company refers to a company limited by shares. 
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structure?  Thirdly, how have the corporate governance structures of ASX evolved since 
demutualisation?  
 
Answers to the above questions are of interest to stakeholders in other stock exchanges. 
Globalisation of financial markets has intensified competition across exchanges.4 Alliances 
and consolidations are occurring in attempts to attract more investors on the basis of lower 
transaction costs, more products and increased liquidity. Specific examples include the 
merger of the American Stock Exchange (‘AMEX’) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (‘NASDAQ’), the merger of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange with the Pacific Exchange and in Europe, the formation of Euronext out of 
the Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris Exchanges. In Australia, ASX has signed an agreement 
with NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX and SGX which will provide joint trading of securities on 
reciprocal markets. ASX has stated that global alliances should allow for the exchange to 
move to 20 hour trading days.5 
 
In the years following the ASX listing, a number of the world’s major exchanges such as the 
London Stock Exchange (‘LSE’), NASDAQ and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
(‘SEHK’) have followed ASX and demutualised. Many other exchanges such as NYSE are 
considering a new structure in order to remain competitive in the face of regulatory and 
technological changes that threaten their viability in the global environment. The question 
thus arises  should these exchanges follow ASX’s model?  
 
1.1 Economic Significance of Stock Exchanges 
Stock exchanges have a vital role in the economy. Between 1993 and 2000, ASX mediated 
over $157.2 billion
6
 of funds from savers to productive enterprises through initial public 
offerings and other capital raising activities.
7
 By the end of the 1999 financial year, the value 
of the market was equivalent to 88.6% of the national gross domestic product. The central 
role of exchanges in allocating capital underlines the importance of exchanges having 
appropriate organisational structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Further, in 
                                                 
4
 Cross-exchange equity trading increased from US$0.3 trillion in 1988 to US$2.3 trillion at the end of 1995 
[Smith and Sofianos (1997)]. Factors that have contributed to the globalisation of securities markets include: the 
deregulation of stock exchanges, improved technology and capital mobility, the Internet and increases in 
contributions towards superannuation funds. 
5
 ASX Press Release – 17 June 1999.  This comment was made in regard to the NASDAQ alliance. 
6
 In this study, all currency is in Australian dollars except where otherwise stated. 
7
 Australian Stock Exchange Fact Book (1999). 
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Australia, over 57% of the adult population have exposure to the Australian share market 
either through direct ownership or indirect means such as managed funds.
8
 The chairman of 
ASX, Maurice Newman, was thus underlining a non-controversial proposition when he said 
“economic growth and employment prospects are enhanced by efficient capital markets 




1.2 Analytical Framework 
 
In analyzing ASX’s change in corporate structure we draw principally on agency theory. The 
key premise of agency theory is that organizational structure affects employees’ (ie, agents) 
incentives to act in the interest of the stakeholders (ie, principals) who hire them.
10
   Different 
industry conditions may require different organizational forms for optimal performance. A 
literal interpretation of this view implies there is a uniquely optimal form of organisation for 
each industry. Casual observation indicates this is not the case.
11
 However, the agency 
perspective can serve to identify the pressures on an organisation to adapt and the likely 
consequences of that adaptation. We adopt the view that the agency perspective may not 
explain all aspects of the demutualisation of ASX but it is likely to yield several significant 
insights. If the change has been successful, the members, ASX listed companies and stock 
market investors (‘investors’) will all have benefited from the change in organisational 
structure.  
 
1.3 Original Contributions 
This study entails the use of a unique data source: ten interviews with current and former 
ASX directors, managers and former members.
12
 The interviews are supplemented with a 
wide range of internally produced reports and documents from ASX. The monograph thus 
provides a detailed history of the lengthy process undertaken by ASX in becoming the first 
                                                 
8
 ASX Fact book 2001 
9
 Australian Stock Exchange Listing Memorandum (1998). 
10
 The agency perspective was developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and further developed by Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Hansmann (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994). 
11
 Stock-based companies and mutual organisations regularly coexist in the same industry  the insurance and 
banking industries are good examples. In terms of stock exchanges, the majority have remained as mutuals. 
Apart from ASX, the only exchanges to have changed to a corporate structure are: Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(1993), Helsinki Stock Exchange (1995), Copenhagen Stock Exchange (1996), Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
(1997) and Borsa Italiana (1997), Singapore Stock Exchange (2000), Hong Kong Stock Exchange (2000), 
London  Stock Exchange (2001), Euronext (2001) and Nasdaq(2001). 
12
 Some of the people interviewed asked if they could remain anonymous. This wish has been respected. Others 
were willing to speak for the record and thus have been identified, where appropriate. 
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exchange in the world to list on its own market. We also add to previous research by 
assessing whether the theory and evidence from the demutualisation of companies in the 
banking and insurance industries is relevant to stock exchanges.  
 
Besides the organisational structure literature, this study contributes to the large and growing 
body of corporate governance research. At present, there is little evidence of how corporate 
governance systems in mutuals adapt in a change to a stock company based structure. Have 
ASX’s corporate governance mechanisms evolved in ways that are predicted by the prior 
literature? If the mechanisms have adjusted, over what time period has this process occurred?  
 
1.4 Summary of Main Findings  
The reasons for the demutualisation of ASX are generally consistent with the theory and 
evidence from the insurance and banking industries. The main reasons for demutualisation 
were rapidly increasing competition and inefficiencies arising from a collective decision 
making process. Comparison with international exchanges from the Asia-Pacific indicates 
that ASX has benefited from an increase in its efficiency as a result of the change in 
organisational structure.  
 
Our evidence indicates that mutual corporate governance mechanisms adapt to changes in 
organisational structure in predictable ways. Interestingly, the changes in board composition 
and board size have occurred progressively since demutualisation. In contrast, an analysis of 
changes in managerial remuneration indicates that executive and managing director 
remuneration packages were altered prior to the demutualisation decision in October 1996. 
One interpretation is that mutual organisations adopt some of the characteristics of a stock-
based company in an attempt to improve the performance of the business. When this fails, 
management will seek to change the organisational structure appropriately.  
 
From the stakeholder’s perspective, the main beneficiaries since demutualisation have been 
the former members of ASX. In the long term, however, there is a possibility that 
stockbroking organisations will suffer from a decline in profitability. To date, there is only 
weak evidence to suggest that ASX listed companies and investors have benefited from the 
change in organisational structure. However, the analysis is limited due to the short time 
frame post-demutualisation covered in this monograph. This is of particular importance 
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considering ASX is moving to introduce a number of new initiatives that should benefit both 
ASX listed companies and investors in the future.   
 
The rest of the monograph is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the processes and 
negotiations that led to ASX’s decision to demutualise. Section 3 reviews the relevant 
literature on the reasons for demutualisation and identifies the changes in circumstances that 
prompted ASX to reconsider its organisational structure. The economic consequences and 
outcomes of the process are evaluated by comparing the critical financial and qualitative 
attributes of ASX before and after demutualisation. Section 5 changes undertaken by ASX 
since demutualisation and critiques them from the ccrporate governance perspective. Section 
6 examines whether any benefits have accrued to the stakeholders of ASX as a result of the 
change in organisational structure. Section 7 canvases the options that were available to 
management to adapt to the changes in circumstances. It also provides predictions about the 
future direction of ASX and the stockbroking industry. Section 8 comprises concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.0 Historical Perspective  
2.1 Origins of ASX 
All major stock exchanges began as mutual organisations. Why? The events surrounding the 
formation of the Sydney Stock Exchange in the late nineteenth century suggest that self-
regulation was an important element in the success and early growth of Australian equity 
markets. Salsbury and Sweeney’s (1988) history of the Sydney Stock Exchange  (summarised 
below) indicates that the requisite self-regulation was most efficiently provided via a mutual 
structure. 
 
During the mining boom of 1872 the number of stockbrokers in Sydney increased from 22 to 
131. Stockbrokers were able to perform three functions simultaneously. A stockbroker could 
act as an agent for clients, buy and sell shares on his own account and also ‘float’ new 
companies for a fee. The large potential for a conflict of interest in the execution of these 
functions meant that the trustworthiness of stockbrokers was an important issue that needed 
to be resolved in order to facilitate trade.  
 
Press reports from that period confirm that lack of public confidence in the integrity of 
stockbrokers was a potential deterrent to trade. On 6 September 1872, an article in The 
 9  
Sydney Morning Herald expressed strong public dissatisfaction with the conduct of 
stockbrokers and their industry.
13
 The criticisms focused mainly on the ‘sloppy’ methods 
used to trade shares. Situations arose where prospectuses for companies raising new capital 
either omitted important information or blatantly lied. Stockbrokers were commonly accused 
of buying or selling shares without disclosing whether they were acting as an agent or as a 
principal.  
 
In a number of instances, dissatisfaction with stockbrokers led to legal disputes between 
stockbrokers and their clients. In Garret versus Bird, the Chief Justice, Sir Alfred Stephen 
argued in his judgement that the laws were ineffective in appropriately regulating the 
stockbroking profession. He concluded that “the law in this colony in relation to stockbrokers 
is very defective – more so than that in force in any other country. Every judge upon this 
bench has had cases under his observation, in which it was impossible to say that frauds had 
not been perpetrated – owing to the want of regulations, such as exists in London and some 
other towns in England”.
14
 Given the ‘defective’ regulatory environment at the time, 
stockbrokers needed to regulate themselves to protect the integrity of the market and thereby 
protect and promote their business. 
 
In December 1872, a New South Wales Shareholders’ Bill was introduced to State Parliament 
in an attempt to regulate the stockbroking industry. However, the Shareholders’ Bill was 
defeated without any significant debate [Salsbury and Sweeney (1988)]. There was no other 
attempt by the government to impose regulations. In fact, until the introduction of the New 
South Wales Securities Act 1975, the Sydney Stock Exchange was completely self-regulating 
[Aitken (1990)]. 
 
Formalised self-regulation began in 1887 when the Sydney Stock Exchange developed its 
own rules as a legal framework for share trading. The rules restricted membership of the 
exchange to those who met certain criteria based on honesty and efficiency. This was a 
mechanism used by the stockbroking industry to ensure that the public perceived that 
stockbrokers were of good fame and character and acted with the highest business integrity. 
The exchange also adopted rules that regulated companies’ prospectuses and accounting 
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 Cited in Salsbury and Sweeney (1988). 
14
 Cited in Salsbury and Sweeney (1988). 
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practices (i.e., listing requirements).
15
 As a mutual, the Sydney Stock Exchange board was 
able to operate a miniature legal system, with its own rules governing securities trading and 
resolving trade related disputes [Salsbury and Sweeney (1988)].   
 
Aitken (1990) identifies the similarities between the development of the Melbourne Stock 
Exchange and the Sydney Stock Exchange. Aitken observes that apart from the initial attempt 
in 1891 to introduce the Shareholders’ Bill, the government allowed the stockbroking 
industry to remain self-regulatory until 1937. At this point, Victorian State Parliament passed 
the Stock and Sharebrokers Act 1937. However, the Stock and Sharebrokers Act 
complemented the efforts of the stockbrokers to self-regulate rather than override the 




In the US, Banner (1998) shows that the success of the NYSE can be attributed, in large part, 
to the ability of members to regulate themselves. Banner contends that the self-regulatory 
function was enhanced by the lack of enforceability in the New York courts of “time bargain” 
transactions. These transactions involved two members reaching an agreement to transfer and 
pay for a given quantity of stock at a given price on a specific date in the future. To enhance 
public confidence, the NYSE members imposed restrictions on admission to the exchange to 
ensure that the members were of the highest integrity, which provided some assurance of the 
creditworthiness of those persons trading. Existing members were the only people who could 
propose new members. A person was only accepted after a secret ballot of all the members: 
three negative votes were enough to deny admission. Similar to the Sydney Stock Exchange, 
a number of legislative bills that would have changed the way business was conducted on the 
NYSE came close to passing. However, the bills failed to gain the necessary support. This 
allowed the NYSE to continue its self-regulatory function until 1968 [Aitken (1990)]. 
 
It is pertinent here to note that a self-regulating legal system can operate effectively only 
when the parties affected by the decisions agree to abide by its rules and regulations. This 
agreement is most effective when all members have an equal vote, as facilitated by a mutual 
structure.  As the barriers to entry increase and the law becomes more developed then the 
need for self-regulation as a mutual decreases.  In due course, external legislation came closer 
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 It was not until 1890 that the listing requirements became formalised. Further, it was in 1911 that the 
exchange published a full list of these requirements [Aitken (1990)]. 
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to supplanting self-regulation by the members of the Australian stock exchanges. In large 
part, this was because self-regulation itself became a vehicle for abuse of market power. In 
time, the Sydney Stock Exchange came to act as a closed cartel, artificially restricting supply  
via unduly restrictive membership. For example, until 1984 the Exchange operated with a fee 
structure which ensured large commissions, especially on large trades. It then lost an action 
under the Trade Practices Act and fixed fees were replaced by negotiated fees. Aitken and 
Swan (1993) report results of an investigation that showed  investors gained by about 60% of 
the gross revenue of brokers from deregulation of minimum charges. 
 
2.2 Formation of ASX 
ASX was formed on 1 April 1987 by an act of the Commonwealth Parliament sponsored by 
the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities. This resulted in the merging of the six 
regional stock exchanges, i.e., Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart. 
Part of this process involved the abolition of the seat system that characterised each of the 
regional exchanges.
17
 The seat system had been used by exchanges throughout the world to 
ration the available space on the trading floor [Salsbury and Sweeney (1988)].  
 
Between 1980 and 1982, many of the Sydney Stock Exchange members resisted the 
proposals to remove the seat system. In particular, smaller companies mounted stubborn 
resistance. However, the then Trade Practices Commission (since subsumed under the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) indicated that, unless the seat system 
were abolished, ‘outsiders’ would be given access to the Sydney Stock Exchange whether the 
members concurred or not. The seat redemption plan passed overwhelmingly in early 1983 
with the members agreeing that they risked losing the entire value of their seat unless the 
change was implemented. On 1 July 1983, the Sydney Stock Exchange members were given 
the option of retiring and receiving a $20,000 cash payment or remaining as a member and 
receiving $50,000 paid in two installments over a six year period.
18
 The abolition of the seat 
system meant that membership was no longer transferable [Salsbury and Sweeney (1988)].  
                                                                                                                                                        
16
 The rules outlined the procedures for trading shares and the admission requirements for all members. The 
rules also defined the role of stockbrokers and the scales of brokerage.  
17
 The term ‘seat’ refers to a seat and desk occupied by a stockbroker on a trading floor.  
18
 The price of seats in the Sydney Stock Exchange varied across time and economic conditions. During the 
1970’s the price for seats fluctuated between $7,500 and $87,000. Just prior to the announcement of the 
redemption in early 1983, a seat could be bought for approximately $20,000. There is evidence to suggest that 
the Melbourne Stock Exchange seat prices were closely related to the Sydney Stock Exchange. The other four 
regional stock exchange seats sold for a substantial discount. This was purely due to the discrepancies in the 
expected value of future benefits. 
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On formation, all the members who had joined one of the six regional exchanges prior to 13 
December 1985 (the day the initial decision to form ASX was made) automatically became 
members of ASX. After 13 December 1985 individuals and organisations could purchase 
membership in ASX for $25,000 and $250,000 respectively. Prospective members applying 
as individuals still had to meet qualifying criteria under Articles 36 to 40 of the Articles of 
Association. This was to ensure that the applicant was of “good fame and character” and of 
the highest business integrity. For a corporate applicant, the non-member directors and any 
substantial shareholders also needed to be recognised by the board as being of good fame and 
character. Although the seat system was abolished and statute had been introduced, ASX 
retained portions of its self-regulatory function to protect the integrity of the market. 
 
Table A1 shows that ASX initially comprised 693 members: 66 of these being organisations. 
By July 1996, the number of members had declined overall despite the number of corporate 
members having increased by over 45%. This is more than likely because the corporate 
members had the ability to license individuals to trade on their behalf. 
 
2.3 Proposals for Reform 
Following the formation of ASX, management put forward a number of proposals in an 
attempt to change the membership structure of the exchange. In December 1992, the board of 
ASX considered the following proposal: 
 
a) Introduce categories of voting and non-voting membership for natural persons; 
b) A reduced admission fee of: 
 $1,000 for non-voting natural person members; and 
 $25,000 for voting natural person and corporate members; 
c) A licence fee payable to ASX to carry on business on the exchange. Under the proposal, 
$50,000 was payable if the member organisation were a partnership of natural persons 
and $225,000 if the member organisation were a corporation; 
d) Members admitted after 1 April 1987 and prior to the effective date of any new structure 
and who had paid $25,000 were to receive a transferable credit of $24,000. A transferable 
credit was not intended to be a liability for ASX and could not be redeemed. It was 
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proposed that a register of entitlements to transferable credits be established and 
maintained by ASX. Prior to the tenth anniversary of the ‘effective date’,
19
 a transferable 
credit may have been applied towards payment of a new licence to trade fee. If this were 
the case, an application of this sort would constitute an election by the holder of the 
transferable credit to become a non-voting member. Any remaining transferable credits 
would lapse on the tenth anniversary of the effective date; and 
e) New natural person members would be required to have completed the Diploma course of 
the Securities Institute of Australia or the equivalent thereof. 
 
The proposal was initiated to provide members of ASX with flexibility in the organisation of 
their trading structure. It would have given an opportunity to members to choose between 
recovering some of the $25,000 admission fee over a ten-year period or retaining their right 
to vote. At the same time, management was hoping to encourage qualified persons to join 
ASX by removing the substantial admission fee. This would have provided a wider range of 
suitable people who would be available for election/appointment to ASX’s board and 
committees. This constituted recognition that running a modern exchange requires more than 
just trustworthiness. It requires managerial skills that are not necessarily possessed by people 
who would otherwise have the requisite attributes to be successful stockbrokers. In doing so, 
ASX was attempting to improve the efficiency of its own business as well as the 
stockbroking industry. These were the early signs that of recognition, by management at 
least, that the typical mutual structure was not entirely well adapted to meeting the needs of 
the stock exchange stakeholders. 
 
On 19 January 1993, an exposure draft of the proposal for change was distributed to all 
members seeking their views and suggestions. After an extensive consultation process,
20
 the 
board concluded that the proposal set out in the exposure draft would not have been passed 
by the required 75% of members. As a result, the board determined that management would 
consider a revised proposal which specified different membership fees depending on whether 
a natural person were a non-voting member, a voting member or a member corporation. The 
licence fee element of the proposal was abandoned. However, the board never asked the 
members to consider this variation of the 1993 proposal. It was not until 24 October 1994 that 
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 The effective date referred to the date of introduction of the new classification of members. 
20
 The consultation process included meetings in each state with the members, the Chairman of the respective 
state board and the Deputy Managing Director of ASX, Ronald Coppel.  
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a substantially revised proposal was put to the members. The 1994 proposal was based on the 
following: 
 
a) Membership was to be confined to corporations with the nine existing partnerships to be 
included as member corporations if they chose to incorporate; 
b) Corporations wishing to join in the future would be required to pay $250,000 to ASX to 
become a corporate member. This would not have been refundable; 
c) The number of votes gained by the member corporations would be weighted according to 
the consideration paid to ASX in the form of non-discretionary fees.
21
 Each member 
would have one vote and would receive an additional vote for each 1.1% of the total 
market turnover they provided. However, corporate members would be limited to 5% of 
the total vote. ASX research indicated that small and large stockbroking organisations 
would have experienced an increase in their voting power. On the other hand, the medium 
sized stockbroking organisations would have suffered under the new system;
22
  
d) Natural members were to be paid $25,000 to surrender their membership. This amount 
was equal to the current individual joining fee; and 
e) A Stock Exchange Institute was to be established in order to protect the interests of the 
stockbrokers. It was proposed that the Institute would be an independent body responsible 
for the continuing education of stockbrokers and promotion of high ethical standards 
throughout the stockbroking industry.  
 
There were a number of ostensible reasons for management wanting to change the structure 
of ASX. It was claimed that the close link between individual membership and the exchange 
no longer existed, which made the stockbroking profession seem irrelevant and outdated. 
Previously, individual membership had practical reasons for existence. For instance, prior to 
automation of the market, trading floor limits meant that access to the exchange had to be 
rationed through the sale of a fixed number of memberships.  Furthermore, the membership 
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 Non-discretionary fees comprised transaction fees, the administration fee for each member organisation, the 
share market summary fee and the contract fees charged by the Australian options market. 
22
 Stockbroking organisations with a turnover value of less than $200 million would have increased their voting 
power from 18.4% to 25%. On the other hand, stockbroking organisations with a turnover value of between 
$500 million and $1 billion would have seen their voting power reduced from 16.9% to 7.9%. Under the 
proposal, stockbroking organisations with turnover greater than $1 billion in value would have experienced an 
increase in their voting power from 33.4% to 52.3%. [“ASX proposal runs into strong resistance”, The 
Australian, 1 September 1994, p. 30]. It should be noted that these calculations assume that each member 
organisation in the same ‘size category’ would vote in the same manner. 
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of the regional stock exchanges consisted only of sole traders and partnerships, although the 
settlement with the Trade Practices Commission in 1984 provided for company membership 
as well as individual and partnership.  
 
However, by 1994 member corporations accounted for over 99% of the trading volume. 
Individual members did not have access to the market other than the access provided by the 
member corporations. Despite this, under the mutual structure all the members had equal 
voting rights. The irrelevance of individual membership was also emphasised by the fact that 
non-members held more than 80% of the capital of member corporations. 
 
The vote failed to gain the 75% majority required for the proposal to be implemented.
23
 
Discussions with former members indicate that the main reason the proposal was 
unsuccessful is that the members believed that their membership was worth substantially 
more than $25,000. At the time, members claimed that on a comparative valuation basis, 
Computershare Limited
24
 (‘Computershare’) was capitalised at $90 million. Yet at $25,000 
per (natural person) member, ASX was valued at only $13 million. The majority of the 
former members interviewed stated that if ASX had offered a slight premium for the 
redemption of their membership, the proposal would have passed. However, a director of 
ASX pointed out that it would have been highly unlikely that the Trade Practices 
Commission
25
 would have ratified such a proposal. ASX was a company limited by guarantee 
and therefore was unable to distribute its assets to its members. Another reason for the 
rejection of the proposal is that the new structure would have provided the large institutional 
stockbrokers with 52.3% of the voting power.
26
 Many of the smaller corporate members 
believed the larger stockbroking organisations would ignore the interests of other members 
and use their additional power to increase their own profitability.  
 
It should be noted that the protection of the integrity and reputation of the market did not 
feature in the debate. This was because members realised that market integrity would not be 
threatened as a large majority of ASX’s mutual characteristics would have been retained 
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 The motion gained 69% support from the members [“Old guard gives thumbs down to reform of ASX”, The 
Australian, 25 October 1994, p. 57]. 
24
 Computershare is an ASX listed technology company. Its primary businesses include the sale of computerised 
share trading equipment and the provision of share registry services. Although it was recognised that the 
comparison was not entirely accurate, it was the only company that was closely related to ASX’s business. 
25
 The Trade Practices Commission is now the Australian Competition and Consumers Commission. 
26
 “ASX proposal runs into strong resistance”, The Australian, 1 September 1994, p. 30. 
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under the proposal. For example, the collective decision making process would still have 
continued, although the voting would have been restricted to the corporate members. 
 
2.4 The Demutualisation Process 
At a board strategy meeting held on 31 July 1993 Gavin Campbell, the then Managing 
Director,
27
 gave a presentation to the board on the possibility of floating the exchange. The 
board rejected the proposal. At the time, it was considered that the proposal was too ‘radical’. 
One director of ASX stated “there were too many perceived obstacles”. However, in 1995 the 
board considered it “appropriate to reconsider ASX’s organisational and ownership structure, 
and to determine whether it provided the flexibility to meet the challenges that present 




As a result of the decision, the board formed a number of committees to discuss the relevant 
issues and options available to the exchange with regard to its ownership structure. These 
included a Governance Task Force consisting of members of ASX’s board and senior 
management. The Task Force was told to consider all options and not to limit their views 
according to current international models. As one member of the Task Force said, “we did 
not want the quick fix – we wanted the optimal governance structure”. A Reference Panel 
was also established to provide feedback from members on their views. The panel consisted 
of members from each state. At the same time, Hogan Stokes Pty Limited (‘Hogan Stokes’) 





On 24 September 1996, ASX distributed an explanatory memorandum as well as a report 
completed by Hogan Stokes commending the demutualisation process to the members. At a 
special general meeting on 18 October 1996, over 96% of the members endorsed the 
resolution.
30
 The proposed amendments to the Corporations Law were released in bill form 
                                                 
27
 For the purpose of this study, the terms ‘Managing Director’ and ‘Chief Executive Officer’ will be used 
interchangeably. 
28
 Australian Stock Exchange Listing Memorandum (1998). 
29
 Bruce Hogan and Nigel Stokes are the principals of Hogan Stokes. Prior to forming Hogan Stokes, Bruce 
Hogan was employed by Bankers Trust Australia over a 15 year period. In 1992, he became Joint Managing 
Director. Nigel Stokes was also an employee of Bankers Trust Australia. Previously, Nigel Stokes was a 
financial adviser to the NSW Government. 
30
 The resolution sought to alter the Articles of Association. As a result of the vote, Article 83 was inserted 
which gave the board a mandate to approach the government to change the legislation and allow ASX to convert 
to a stock-based company. 
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on 6 August 1997 for public comment. On 27 November 1997, the Commonwealth 
Parliament provided the necessary consent to allow ASX to convert to a stock-based 
company. The Corporations Law (ASX) Amendments Act (‘ASX Act 1997’) received royal 
assent and came into effect on 16 December 1997 [refer to Table A2.] 
 
2.5 Allocation of Shares 
At demutualisation, the board decided that it would issue 100,596,000 shares (at a par value 
of $1) by way of an appropriate capitalisation of reserves. The shares were divided equally 
among the 606 members giving each member 166,000 shares. The board considered a 
number of different options before deciding on an equal distribution of shares. These 
included a distribution based on length of membership, the type of membership (i.e., natural 
person or corporate member) and/or a distribution among the corporate members based on 
volume of transactions undertaken on ASX’s market. 
 
Between 1987 and 1996, natural person members paid subscription fees of between $300 and 
$400 per annum. Members paid no discretionary fees during this time period. It was decided 
that the difference between the amounts paid to the exchange from the members was not 
material and did not need to be recognised in the final allocation of shares.
31
 One ASX 
director also noted that “really (it was) the natural person members who had built the 
business. Individuals had made contributions to the regional stock exchange fidelity funds 
(now known as the National Guarantee Fund). Individuals had also sat on many different 
committees and had contributed many hours of their time”.  It should be noted that the board 
did not consider the length of membership for the members of the regional exchanges. This 
was because each of the members had their state memberships redeemed (via the abolishment 
of the seat system) prior to the formation of ASX in 1987.  
 
More importantly, the board of ASX considered the equal distribution the only workable 
option. The Hogan Stokes report and ASX had the view that an unequal distribution of shares 
was open to a legal challenge. ASX would have had the onus to prove that the unequal 
distribution was fair and also that the weight of legal precedent favouring equal distribution 
should not apply. The board believed that it would have failed to gain government support if 
                                                 
31
 Other companies that have demutualised have used the number of years of membership as the basis of 
determining the number of shares issued. The NRMA proposes to issue shares based on the length of time the 
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ASX attempted to distinguish between members when distributing the shares. Discussions 
held with former members confirmed that the equal distribution of shares was an important 
reason why the special resolution was able to pass with such a large majority. Many of them 
stated that if equal distribution had not been adopted then the focus of the arguments would 
have been on how the shares should be distributed and not the real issue, which was whether 
ASX should demutualise.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, there is no doubt that the 68 corporations that paid $250,000 for 
membership have been disadvantaged. The natural person members received the same 
number of shares having paid $25,000. The method of distribution and subsequent 
demutualisation has led to a significant transfer of wealth from the member corporations to 
the natural person members. At the initial listing price of $4.25 the total wealth transfer 




2.6  Summary 
In closing, the history of Australian stock exchanges to the formation of ASX may be 
summarised as follows.  The early growth of Australian equity markets depended investors 
perceiving that stockbrokers were both trust and credit worthy.  Government regulation in 
Australia, as elsewhere, was inadequate and so stockbrokers developed a system of self-
regulation. The mutual form of organization provided the most effective structure for self-
regulation.  However, although the one-member, one vote system in the mutual structure 
facilitates adherence to rules and regulations it constrains managerial flexibility and decision-
making autonomy.  The relative cost of constrained management decision-making increase 
over time as the barriers to entry to the stockbroking profession increased and the law became 
more developed, thus reducing the need for self-regulation.  The period spanning roughly 
1980 to 1998 may be seen as comprising the transition period from a self-regulatory system 
                                                                                                                                                        
person has been a member and the number of qualifying policies. This follows a similar method used by the 
AMP when it demutualised on 15 June 1998. 
32
 This calculation compared the benefits gained based on an even distribution of shares with the benefits that 
would have been gained if the issue of shares were weighted according to the membership fees paid to ASX. 
The estimation takes into account that only 165 of the 606 members (68 of the 165 were organisations with the 
remaining being natural person members) actually paid an admission fee. It should be noted that this does not 
mean that ASX should have weighted the issue of the shares based on the admission fees paid to the exchange – 
this is purely a calculation attempting to quantify the effect of the demutualisation on the wealth of the 
members. The main reason why this method of distribution would not have been possible is that 441 members 
were not required to pay for admission to ASX. Membership of ASX was granted automatically to the former 
members of the six regional exchanges.  
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via a mutual structure to the more common stock corporation structure.  Chapter three 
describes the motives and pressures inherent in this process in detail.  
 
3.0 ASX Demutualisation: Theory and Evidence 
The history of the Australian Stock Exchange shows that the mutual form of organization can 
be effective in some circumstances. To understand the reasons the members of the Australian 
Stock Exchange chose to demutualise, it is helpful to identify the developments that decrease 
the relative advantages of the mutual form of organization.  Six such developments have been 
identified in the literature: increase in intensity of competition, change in relative importance 
of management incentives, change in effectiveness of monitoring of management, demand 
for capital to fund expansion, change in members’ liabilities, and divergence of members’ 
interests.  Each of these developments and their applicability to ASX’s decision to 
demutualize are discussed in turn below.  
 
3.1 Increase in intensity of competition 
Kay (1991) and Hansmann (1985) observe that mutual structures are common in lines of 
business where the company has a natural monopoly or limited competition. In a natural 
monopoly, customer based ownership provides assurance to customers that the vendor will 
not use its monopoly power to extract economic rent from them. In essence, a mutual 
provides subsidised services for its residual claimants.  
 
As competition increases, the opportunity for companies to make a surplus diminishes (Kay, 
1991). Management cannot rely on monopoly returns but is forced to improve trading 
performance. At this point, the collective decision making process that characterises a mutual 
increases in cost as opportunities to adapt are lost.  Timeliness of response becomes more 
important to survival and management needs to have the flexibility to make decisions based 
on its own judgement.  In these circumstances, the efficiency of stock based organizations 
increase relative to that of mutual organizations (Masulis, 1987).  A consideration of ASX’s 
history and industry conditions shows that increased competition was indeed a spur to 
demutualisation.  The threat was international competition rather than domestic competition. 
 
At the creation of ASX in 1987, management benefited from a monopoly situation. For a 
stock exchange, being a monopoly provides not only the usual advantages from a captive 
market but is also helpful in enhancing market liquidity. Investors value liquidity and will 
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favour those exchanges that have higher liquidity as it enables securities to be bought and 
sold more easily at a lower cost [Harris (1990)].  ASX thus enjoyed (and continues to enjoy) 
considerable “first mover” benefit in terms of liquidity as any putative rivals will need to 
provide comparable liquidity in order to attract company listings and the provision of such 
liquidity is difficult when starting from scratch. 
 
Given the importance of first mover advantage in provision of liquidity it is not surprising 
that in the years prior to demutualisation little domestic competition emerged. There was only 
one proprietary trading system and the over-the-counter (‘OTC’) markets
33
 were yet to 
impinge on the trading volume in the derivatives market.
34
 However, ASX was not 
complacent about the threat of domestic competition emerging.  Both ASX and Hogan Stokes 
recognised that under Section 769 of the Corporations Law, the Finance Minister may 
approve any body corporate becoming a stock exchange. In an interview with Maurice 
Newman,
35
 he stated that “there was murmuring that regional stock exchanges were going to 
attempt to start again and we could not afford to take that risk”. In addition, the Sydney 
Futures Exchange (‘SFE’) had declared that it was looking to expand its product range to 
compete more directly with services provided by ASX. Despite this, discussions with former 
members provided little evidence to suggest that this was a serious concern at the time of 
voting.  
 
The evidence indicates that the former members were right in not rating existing domestic 
competition a serious concern. Since the decision to demutualise in 1996, there is little 
evidence that OTC markets have substantially impacted on ASX’s derivatives market, even 
though it is argued that some institutions prefer the OTC options market as their orders are 
assured of prompt execution and anonymity. Figures from the Bank of International 
Settlement show that turnover in the global OTC derivatives markets increased by 76% 
between 1996 and 1998.
36
 During the same period, the Australian OTC market turnover grew 
                                                 
33
 ASX offers put and call option contracts for over 50 of the leading stocks. The exchange also provides a range 
of warrants which include put and call warrants, instalment warrants and endowment warrants. The OTC 
financial markets focus on debt securities (government and non-government), foreign exchange, currency 
options, forward rate agreements, swaps and interest rate options. 
34
 Figure B1 fails to identify any clear downward trend in derivatives trading volume and/or operating revenue 
in the years prior to the demutualisation. 
35
 Maurice Newman has been Chairman of ASX since 1994 and a director of the exchange for ten years. He is 
also Chairman of Deutsche Bank group in Australia. 
36
 “Australia gains in international derivatives”, The Australian Financial Review, 24 October 1998, p. 6. 
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by 38%
37
 while ASX revenue derived from derivatives trading, clearing and settlement 
increased by 70% (see Table B1 and Figure B1). The increase in revenue was achieved 
despite an 18% decrease in the number of contracts traded and only an 11.6% increase in 
daily volume.  However, from 1998 there was strong growth in the number of contracts 
traded with 9,043 contracts being traded in 1999 and 11,649 in 2001 – a 28.8% increase. 
Impressively, the growth in the volume of contracts traded coincided with a slowdown in 
OTC market activity.  Specifically, growth in global OTC markets slowed since 1998 to 10%, 
which was 1% below the rate of growth experienced by Australian OTC markets over the 
same period.  
 
So much for existing domestic competition. What about the threat of such competition in the 
future? The threat is not merely hypothetical. Less than 18 months following demutualisation 
of ASX, the Newcastle Stock Exchange (‘NSX’) commenced trading as a fully automated 
stock market
38
, offering a range of funding alternatives for small, medium and regional 
enterprises.   However, NSX does not directly compete against ASX as it targets companies 
that need between $500,000 and $1,000,000 and which are unable to meet the listing 
requirements of ASX. ASX provides electronic clearing and settlement facilities for the 
exchange on a T+3 basis via the Clearing House Electronic Subregister System (‘CHESS’).   
 
In May 1999, Computershare Ltd, following its withdrawal of a proposed merger with the 
SFE, formed a strategic alliance with Bendigo Stock Exchange (BSX) that received formal 
approval to operate in early October 2000.  Similar to NSX, BSX aims to meet the needs of 
small capitalization companies. However, not one former member or director of ASX who 
was interviewed believed BSX would be a serious threat to ASX.  As one former member 
noted, “they (Computershare) will not gain the rate of return they require for the project to 
succeed”. Rob Thomas, CEO of Salomon Smith Barney (Australia), shares the scepticism of 
ASXs’ directors. He comments “it is highly unlikely that Australia would be able to sustain 
more than one internationally competitive exchange.  The market would become fragmented 
and liquidity would decline to unacceptable levels.  You just have to look overseas. Really, 
                                                 
37
 Australian Financial Markets Association  (1998), “The Australian financial markets report”. 
38
 NSX commenced trading on the 20
th
 March 2000. 
 22  





The extant research supports the above view, albeit indirectly. Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin and 
Netter (1999) review the outcomes from the merging of US regional stock exchanges. The 
authors report that the mergers increased the dollar volume of trading in the short term 
relative to a control sample consisting of exchanges not involved in a merger.
40
 In the long 
run, Arnold et al. (1999) find that the merging exchanges increase their market share and the 
bid-ask spreads of the merging exchanges narrow. These results underline the importance of 
liquidity in facilitating share trading and suggest that Australia, whose companies contribute 
just 1.57% of the world’s equities capitalisation,
41
 will not be able to sustain more than one 
substantial, internationally competitive exchange. 
 
Further support, if more is needed, that it is unreasonable to expect that Australia can support 
more than one domestic exchange come from the recent trend of mergers among 
geographically proximate exchanges.  These include
42
: 
 Copenhagen Stock Exchange and Swedish Stock Exchange  
 Deutsche Borse and London Stock Exchange 
 Amsterdam Exchange, Brussels Exchange and Parris Bourse to form Euronext  
 SSE/SIMEX to form SGX  
 HKSE/HKFE to form HKEX 
 AMEX and NASDAQ, followed by the merger of AMEX-NASDAQ with the 
Philadelphia Exchange and the Chicago Stock Exchange with Instinet.  
As noted by Arnold et al. (1999), mergers within the world’s financial market should be 
interpreted as a competitive response to a transforming marketplace. Based on this evidence, 
it is highly questionable that any exchange will be able to compete directly with ASX at a 
domestic level in the long-term. It would appear that the only way Australian regional 
exchanges will be sustainable in the long term is if they can capture a niche market.  
                                                 
39
 Swan and Westerholm (2004) examine the issue of exchange fragmentation. They find that while transaction 
costs are increased (but not a great deal) most estimates of trading activity increase. 
40
 The study analyses the effects of three mergers: the Philadelphia-Baltimore merger in March 1949, the 
Midwest merger in December 1949 and the Pacific merger in January 1957. The control sample consists of all 
the other registered stock exchanges that existed in the same period. 
41
 This is based on the Morgan Stanley Capital Investment World Index. Quoted in Seglun (2002). 
42
 Information obtained from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges Annual Reports, 1999-2001 as 
well as Monthly Newsletters. 
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If being the first mover has conferred ASX a perhaps unassailable advantage over its present 
and potential domestic competitors due to the importance of liquidity, this is not true for 
international competition. Unlike domestic competition, there is substantial evidence that 
international competition is real and growing. A former Chairman of the Sydney Stock 
Exchange, Jim Bain,
43
 noted as early as the mid 1980’s that Australia was about to face 
strong competition from overseas. He was quoted as saying “It is no longer Sydney versus 
Melbourne or Brisbane versus Perth but Australia versus the world”. He recognised that 
developments in communication technology had led to an increase in the level of capital 
mobility. To counter the threat Australia needed to provide “the best possible facilities” to 
ensure that ASX would be internationally competitive and prevent major Australian 




Mr Bain’s concerns were well founded. The experience of the Swedish Stock Exchange 
(SSE) shows that when an exchange becomes less competitive, in terms of trading costs, both 
companies and investors will turn elsewhere. In 1984 the Swedish government introduced a 
special 1% transfer tax on equity trading. When the tax was subsequently doubled in 1986, 
60% of the trading volume in the 11 most actively traded stocks migrated to London in an 
attempt to avoid the tax. At the time, this represented 30% of the total Swedish equity trading 
volume. By 1990, the proportion of total Swedish equity trading volume traded in London 
had risen to over 50% [Umlauf (1993)]. 
 
Mr Bain was not an isolated figure in recognising the threat posed by international 
competition. At the time of demutualisation, all of the former members who were interviewed 
recognised that international competition had the potential to significantly affect the 
profitability of ASX. One ASX director noted, “there is no doubt in my mind that 
competition from exchanges such as NASDAQ, Singapore and the NYSE is real – it becomes 
more and more obvious every day. We need to keep companies such as BHP and News 
                                                 
43
 Jim Bain was Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1987. 
44
 It is likely that these comments were prompted by a report produced by Chapman, Coppel, Lee and 
Marshman in December 1985 that was titled “Future Structure of Australian Associated Stock Exchanges and its 
Member Exchanges”. The report states that “in the near future Australian stock exchanges will experience 
severe competition from exchanges overseas. This competition will not be met successfully if Australian efforts 
are dissipated on historical state rivalries. Securities markets are national and international rather than 
intrastate”. 
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Corporation listed on ASX. Can you imagine what would happen if we started to lose 
companies of this calibre?”  
 
The NYSE, SEHK and the Stock Exchange of Singapore (‘SES’) were all actively promoting 
the listing of international stocks in the years leading to ASX demutualisation. This strategy 
proved successful for the NYSE. Between 1986 and the end of 1996, the number of non-US 
companies on the NYSE increased from 59 to 290 [Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999)].  Other 
exchanges that have the ability to attract Australian companies include the Vancouver Stock 
Exchange for mining stocks and NASDAQ for technology based companies. By 1996, 32 of 
the 50 largest Australian stocks (ranked on market capitalisation) were listed on both ASX 
and an overseas exchange
45
 and approximately 8.7% of the total turnover in ASX listed 
companies occurred on overseas exchanges.
46
 The overseas transactions were worth an 
estimated $17 billion. Furthermore, Panel A of Table B2 and Figure B2 show that the value 
of trading in ASX listed companies on international exchanges between 1992 and 1996 had 
increased by 71%.  
 
In the period after the demutualisation decision (1997-1999), the value of turnover in ASX 
listed companies that occurred on overseas exchanges continued to rise. For the 12 months 
ended 31 December 1999, trading in ASX listed companies on overseas exchanges is 
forecasted to be over $30 billion. This equates to a 77% rise from 1996 [refer to Panel A of 
Table B2, and Figure B2,]. In support, the 1997 ASX Institutional Investor Survey47 reported 
that 55% of respondents have traded Australian shares in overseas markets. As noted in the 
survey, this indicates that domestic institutions are willing to trade overseas if Australian 
markets become less competitive.  
 
Notwithstanding that the threat of overseas competition is real and that the amount of cross-
border trading will continue to increase with advances in technology, the evidence suggests 
                                                 
45
 Smith and Sofianos (1997) provide evidence to suggest that cross listing can actually provide substantial 
benefits for the home exchange. For the nine Australian stocks that co-listed on the NYSE between 1985 and 
1996, the value of trading on ASX increased from $145 million to $226 million per month per stock. Annual 
turnover also increased significantly. This suggests that trading in the US is not a substitute but rather a 
complement to home market trading. However, these results should be treated with caution as the authors fail to 
control for trading changes in the whole market. 
46
 This is based on data from NASDAQ, NYSE, NZSE, LSE and estimates for other international exchanges and 
the US OTC market. Adjustments have been made to account for double counting on NASDAQ and LSE. 
47
 The survey was sent to 62 largest institutional investors in Australia. The analysis provided in the report was 
based on responses from 30 domestic institutions. 
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that, to date, ASX has held its own. For instance, the proportion of the total value of trades 
that occurred on the NYSE in News Corporation has remained constant since 1994 (at 
approximately 45%). Moreover, the percentage of trading in ASX listed companies 
conducted on overseas exchanges has actually declined from 14.2% in 1992 to approximately 
9.1% in 1999 [refer to Panel B of Table B2, Figure B3, and Figure B4]48.  Further, there has 
been an increase in the number of international companies listed on ASX from 34 in 1991 to 
86 in December 2000. The market capitalisation of the overseas-based companies increased 
from $78 billion to $337 billion during the same time period. However, there is little room for 





In sum, the evidence indicates unambiguously that increased competition, principally from 
established exchanges overseas capitalising on advances in communications and allied 
technology, was a significant and warranted concern to ASX members and directors in the 
period leading to demutualisation.  The evidence also indicates that to cope effectively with 
the threat posed by increased competition ASX management would need more autonomy 
than typically available to managers under a mutual structure.  Prior to the advent of 
international competition as a significant force, ASX being structured as mutual would have 
served the members well since they could then enjoy the greater liquidity afforded by a single 
exchange whilst avoiding the excesses associated with a monopoly supplier of exchange 
services.  The rise of international competition reduced the threat of economic rents being 
extracted by ASX as a monopoly supplier and so eliminated a powerful argument in favour of 
a mutual form.  Under these circumstances, it made sense to do away with the constraint on 
managerial decision-making imposed by the mutual structure and convert to a stock-based 
organization.  
 
3.2 Management Incentives 
Providing managers with autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for optimal 
performance in competitive markets. Decision-making entails initiative and effort and 
managers need incentives to exercise both. In mutuals, there is little incentive for managers to 
                                                 
48
 This decline may not be as large as reported. Panel B of Table B2 shows that the percentage of trades on ASX 
that have an overseas condition code has declined from 4.5% in 1992 to 1.3% in 1999. This refers to the 
percentage of turnover that is recorded by ASX and by an international exchange. This is basically a form of 
double counting on the behalf of ASX. 
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maximise the value of the organisation. This is because management cannot be compensated 
by the granting of stock options or stock bonuses to align their interest with that of 
shareholders. The importance of options as an incentive-aligning device is evident in 
Murphy’s (1998) finding that 627 of the 1,000 largest US stock companies in 1992 granted 
options so as to provide a direct link between managerial rewards and shareholder wealth. In 
a mutual structure, the only way for management performance to be linked to performance is 
through the use of accounting-based data [Rasmusen (1988)]. The problem with this 
approach, from the members’ perspective, is that managers have incentives to manipulate the 
financial results to maximise their own utility
50
 [Watts and Zimmerman (1986)].  
 
Survival is the ultimate test of fitness and so the on-going survival of mutuals in some 
industries implies that, on balance, their costs and benefits are about equal to stock 
organizations in the industry sectors they appear. Nevertheless, managerial incentive to 
exercise initiative and effort is probably most important in markets undergoing change.  In 
stable markets where managerial tasks are well defined and the exercise of management 
initiative is not integral to survival, the absence of a direct link between management 
incentives and stakeholder outcomes might not be costly [Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 
1988, 1992, 1994)]. 
 
The increased international competition faced by ASX in the lead-up to demutualisation 
suggests that at least in the future it would be better for management to have its incentives 
more closely aligned with the organization’s stakeholders to motivate the exercise of 
initiative and effort.  As noted earlier, an effective way of aligning managers’ interests with 
stakeholders is through share-based compensation schemes. Such schemes entail a stock 
organization and so the potential to introduce stock-based management compensation was 
likely a motivating factor in the move to demutualisation.  
 
Some writers have expressed concern that demutualisation might be motivated by the self-
interest of managers. Hetherington (1969) argues that demutualisation is a process that may 
allow management to convert its de facto ownership into stock that forms a controlling block 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 The companies are Looksmart, Barbeques Galore, ResMed (through a US holding company), OLS Asia 
Holdings and Transcom International. 
50
 Manipulation of accounting information is usually carried out through discretionary adjustments in accruals or 
shifting earnings across periods. 
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of shares. This happens if management has the ability to structure the offer so that many 
shareholders are entitled to only a fraction of the shares available and that management will 
has the right to purchase shares not taken by the residual claimants. In support, Masulis 
(1987) reports that senior management and the board of directors generally realise large 
wealth gains from the demutualisation process. Losses are generally small and infrequent. 
Moreover, management tends to make a significant investment of between US$100,000 to 
US$7.4 million (median value of US$825,000) in stock.  
 
The ASX experience is consistent with Hetherington’s view. The Managing Director, 
Richard Humphry, stated in the ASX employee share prospectus that one of the major 
benefits resulting from the transformation from a mutual structure was that employees could 
become part owners in the organization in which they work. The employee share plan was 
approved and implemented at the 1998 AGM. Since demutualisation, ASX has approved and 
implemented two employee share plans. Scheme 1 gives permanent employees one parcel of 
ordinary shares having a market value of $1,000, while scheme 2 gives employees the ability 
to borrow interest free funds from ASX to buy stock up to 10% of their annual salary. 
Furthermore, ASX adopted a short-term and long-term incentive scheme for the Managing 
Director. The short-term performance-based incentive was based on the achievement of 
certain targets established in consultation with the nomination and remuneration committees. 
It would not exceed 50% of the base salary applicable to the year. The long-term incentive 
was designed to reflect the performance of the company. The Managing Director was issued 
with the equivalent of 165,999 shares for nominal consideration (a total of $3). The allocation 
occurred over three separate tranches – 1 March 2000, 1 March 2001 and 1 March 2002.  
Upon commencement of the incentive scheme, the board stated that there was no 
performance criterion that needed to be satisfied for the issue of shares to occur. 
 
In addition, ASX implemented a senior executive equity plan at the 1999 Annual General 
Meeting (‘AGM’).  To counter ‘short-termism’ the plan uses annual rolling three-year award 
periods. The performance measure used in the plan is total shareholder returns over the 
award, relative to a sample of similar companies listed in the insurance and finance index. 
This executive plan has been approved at all subsequent AGMs.  Other outcomes consistent 
with Hetherington’s observation that demutualisation is supported by a mutual’s managers if 
it offers an opportunity to maximise their own wealth is that ten of the 15 directors were 
members of ASX and benefited financially from demutualisation.  
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It is inappropriate to construe support for a proposal because it maximises one’s wealth as an 
untoward or malign development. After all, wealth maximisation is a cornerstone of neo-
classical economic explanations of organisational behaviour and the management of ASX in 
favour of demutualisation could rightly point out that while they might benefit from the 
proposal, other stakeholders would benefit as well through the better aligning of interests.  
Further, there were safeguards in place to prevent management transferring wealth from the 
members to themselves. Firstly, 75% of the members were required to ratify the change and, 
secondly, the Commonwealth Parliament had to approve the change through the adoption of 
the ASX Act 1997.  
 
3.3 Efficient monitoring of managers 
Under a company structure, if management under-performs, shareholders are able to enforce 
change. The change often takes the form of management dismissal. Even if ownership is 
diffuse, the transferable nature of shares allows institutions to use the market for corporate 
control to remedy the situation and there is evidence that changes in corporate control 
through takeovers lead to above normal levels of management turnover [Martin and 
McConnell (1991)]. Thus, the threat of a takeover is a significant constraint on managers 




In a mutual organization ownership rights are not freely transferable and, therefore, it cannot 
be easily taken over. Hence management is not disciplined by the threat of a takeover
52
 
[Mayers and Smith (1986); Rasmusen (1988); McNamara and Rhee (1992); Hart and Moore 
(1996); and Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997)] and there is no incentive for individuals or 
institutions to constantly monitor management as the benefits of improved management are 
unlikely to be reflected in the value of the members’ ownership claims. In support of this, 
Thomson (1997) observes that there is very little interaction between mutual owners and 
managers. She argues this is not surprising given that the one vote per member rule ensures 
that it is not possible for a member to single-handedly influence management’s decisions.  
 
                                                 
51
 Gilson (1989) documents that managers who are forced to leave their company are not employed by another 
exchange listed company in the subsequent three years. 
52
 The members of a mutual have the ability to remove management through a proxy fight. However, proxy 
fights are not very common as they usually prove to be expensive and time consuming. 
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Given the lack of close monitoring by shareholders and the absence of the disciplinary effects 
of the market for corporate control we expect that there is a higher probability that 
management becomes entrenched in a mutual organisation. In support, Mayers and Smith 
(1986) document that CEO turnover is substantially lower in mutual organisations relative to 
stock-based companies.
53
 In a similar study, McNamara and Rhee (1992) report that 24% of 
the 29 companies in their sample changed CEO’s in the year demutualisation was approved.
54
 
They also find greater management turnover during the periods after and immediately prior to 
the conversion. These findings are consistent with stock-based companies having improved 
opportunities and incentives to monitor management.  It is pertinent to note that the salutary 
disciplinary effects of an active market for corporate control is acknowledged in Australia’s 
Corporation Law. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is unlikely the prospect of increasing the disciplinary pressure 
on management was a motivation for demutualisation. The government nullified the takeover 
market by implementing a 5% shareholding limit on the exchange.
55
 The government 
believed that ASX has a critical role in the Australian economy and that it would not be in the 





Ironically, the restrictions are tighter for ASX than for other companies that have ownership 
constraints. For example, the four major banks have a 15% limit. Hogan Stokes also 
supported a limit that is consistent with the Bank (Shareholding) Act 1972. As the preceding 
discussion indicates, the ownership restriction impacts on the level of shareholder monitoring 
of management. The free rider problem provides lower incentives for shareholders to expend 
the necessary effort to monitor management effectively and permits management to become 
entrenched. There is (weak) evidence consistent with entrenchment.  The board of ASX 
agreed in 1999 that the employment contract of the Managing Director would be extended 
until at least 31
st
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exceed the set ownership level.  
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 “Free trade? No way, this is ASX”, The Australian Financial Review, 18 April 1997, p. 67. 
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The question of interest is whether, on balance, the 5% shareholding limit seriously impacts 
on the efficient operation of ASX. The nature of the risks that the Government sought to 
avoid by imposing a 5% ownership limit are not easily defined and assessed and so it is 
difficult to estimate the costs and benefits.  However, insofar that the principal benefits of not 
having a single majority owner of ASX accrue mainly to the investing public and other 
parties, the available evidence from companies that adopt “poison pills” to deter takeovers 
indicate it is reasonable to presume that the shareholders are worse-off with the limitation. 
Comment and Schwert (1995) examine the sharemarket reaction to 1,577 poison pills 
adopted by US companies between 1983 and 1991.
58
 They find there is a negative two per 
cent abnormal return on announcement of adoption of a poison pill if a control premium is 
already built into the target’s stock price at the time of the announcement.  
 
There are grounds for concluding that the Australian government’s fears about the adverse 
effects of allowing a single entity to control ASX are unwarranted. In 1998, the Swedish 
government allowed the SSE to merge with a leading Swedish technology company. The 
company, OM Gruppen, is listed on the SSE. The former CEO of the SSE, Bengt Ryden, 
stated that “special constraints or ceilings on ownership were not deemed to be necessary, 
since any attempt to take control of the exchange in the pursuit of private interests could 
quickly provoke investors and issuers to move to other market places”.
59
 Any concerns that 
private entities would not act in the best interests of their customers have proven to be 
unfounded. Since 1993, the trading volume on the SSE has increased 540%. In recognition of 
the market’s improved efficiency, foreign investment has increased by 522% over the same 
period.
60
 At the same time, trading fees have been cut by up to 66% and entry fees for 




The costs of the 5% shareholder limit should not be overstated.  Even stock companies 
without an ownership limit may have entrenched management because management has the 
ability to accumulate ownership as a means of insulating themselves from the corporate 
control market. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find that the frequency of hostile control 
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 A poison pill refers to the creation of securities that carry special rights that are exercisable by a triggering 
event. An example of a triggering event is an announcement of a tender offer. While the rights can take many 
different forms, it is recognised that poison pills make it more costly to acquire control of the target company. 
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activity declines from 0.13 for those companies with managerial ownership less than 5% to 
0.05 for companies with managerial ownership greater than 25%.
62
 The difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.
63
  Further, Garvey and Swan (1991) show that the 
threat of takeover is detrimental to a company which depends on ongoing loyalty and/or the 
development of intangible assets.  
 
It is not clear in what relevant respect ASX differs from other companies to warrant 
management protection from takeover so as to facilitate development of critical intangible 
assets, however, it is true that takeovers can be badly executed or ill-advised.  If ASX were to 
experience a disastrous takeover, the costs would not be borne by just the shareholders but all 
investors (as well as other stakeholders in listed companies) if the capital market suffered 
long-term damage to confidence. In closing this section, we may also note that while the 
ownership limit might reduce the level of shareholder oversight to well below the level it 
would otherwise be, the stock-based compensation provided to management continues to 
provide them incentive to maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
3.4 Capital Restrictions 
A potentially costly limitation of a mutual is that its capabilities to raise capital are restricted. 
The lack of clarity of the claims by the members in the assets and reserves means that 
financial institutions are less inclined to provide debt finance. It is common for management 
of a mutual to be restricted to contributions by its members. An advantage of a stock-based 
company is that management is able to obtain funds to expand the development of the 
business and/or provide reserves against adverse trading [Kay (1991)]. The capital raising 
constraints on mutuals are not absolute, they may be able to accumulate reserves that enable 
the business to develop and expand [Hansmann (1996)]. The problem is that it may take 
considerable time for this to occur and that during this period the business may forfeit 
opportunities to realise profits.  
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 Credit Suisse First Boston (1998), “The Toronto Stock Exchange – a blueprint for success”. 
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 These findings do not necessarily indicate that managerial entrenchment is inefficient. In fact, managerial 
entrenchment may be an efficient outcome if higher management equity ownership better aligns the interests of 
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capital. 
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In line with the above, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) find that improved access to capital 
markets was identified as the primary reason for demutualisation by all the UK financial 
institutions that have undertaken the process. In the US, McNamara and Rhee (1992) report 
that for 33 US legal reserve companies there was a large increase in capital and surplus after 
conversion from mutual to stock-based companies.  
 
Another perspective is that managers will not always use additional capital to maximise 
shareholder wealth. For example, managers may prefer to maximise company size based on 
the presumption that larger size will mean more pay. This is consistent with Baker, Jensen 
and Murphy’s (1988) finding that, on average, a 10% increase in sales results in a 3% 
increase in the level of management’s cash remuneration. The problem for shareholders is 
that performance is not necessarily correlated with the size of the company. Thus, in some 
circumstances mutuals will benefit from the restrictions placed on the flow of capital.  
 
On balance, the circumstances of ASX at the time of demutualisation suggest that the greater 
capital raising capabilities afforded by a stock-based company were a strong but not critical 
factor in the decision to demutualize. Larry Anthony, Federal MP, stated in Parliament “one 
of the principal reasons why it (ASX) needs to be demutualised is that ASX needs funds for 
further capital expansion”.
64
 His view is backed by Hart and Moore (1996) who contend the 
development of technology has meant that exchanges require more capital to remain 
competitive. Consistent with this, in the two years prior to demutualisation ASX spent  $42 
million on computer hardware and software
65
 and between 1997 and 2001, ASX  used $143 
million in funds on capital expenditure. Further, Hogan Stokes argued that access to capital 
could have become a problem in the long term with the potential establishment of other 
exchanges in Australia. They believed that in this scenario a mutual ASX may not necessarily 
have access to SIDA fund. Additionally, if domestic stockbrokers became able to trade 
Australian shares on other exchanges (domestically or internationally) a mutual ASX would 
also have had difficulty levying its members.  
 
Against the above, ASX stated explicitly that it did not demutualise to raise more capital.
66
 A 
credible signal that this was indeed the case came via ASX’s announcement that it would 
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 House of Representatives, Main Committee, Official Hansard, 27 November 1997, p. 11, 562.  
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 Also see Table B5 and Figure B5. 
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 Australian Stock Exchange Members’ Information Package (1996). 
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return $30 million or 30c a share to its shareholders via capital restructuring that would
67
 still 
leave it with $120 million in cash. In addition, ASX has not sought any additional debt or 
equity in the 3-year period following demutualisation. However, there is no doubt that 
management would have been restricted in its ability to raise finance promptly in response to 
changes in circumstances in the new competitive environment if it had retained its mutual 
structure. An example is the revision of the takeover bid for the SFE in 1999. Although ASX 
was not successful in its bid, it did give management the option of offering a cash and scrip 




3.5 Liability of Members 
O’Hara (1981) points out a difference in risk exposure between mutual and stock-based 
enterprises. She argues that because a mutual manager is unable to reap the full benefits from 
increased returns the manager’s incentive to take on risk is diminished. O’Hara also argues 
that mutual organizations are less able to absorb any adverse trading because of capital 
restrictions, and hence management will avoid risk taking.  
 
The issue of risk was of particular importance in ASX’s situation. Under Article 7 of ASX’s 
former Articles of Association, the board had the power to determine the levies and fees paid 
by members in order to fund the operation of the exchange. Further, the Article stated that the 
board could differentiate between member corporations and other members as to the amounts 
of levies. In the event of winding up, members had a guarantee liability not exceeding 
$1,000. Both Hogan Stokes and the Members’ Information Package argued that in the future 
a mutual ASX may be limited in its access to the Securities Industry Development Account 
(‘SIDA’) funding.
69
 For example, if domestic competition did arise, ASX would have had to 
compete for access to the SIDA funds. In Hogan Stokes’ opinion, the combination of the 
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 The return will be through a $20 million capital reduction and a $10 million special dividend to be paid in 
March 2000. The announcement follows Commonwealth Parliament passing the Taxation Laws Amendment 
(Demutualisation of Non-Insurance Mutual Entities) Act 1999 that will allow ASX to restructure its post-
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possibility that ASX would be confronted with higher business risks in the future and the lack 
of SIDA funding would increase the probability of the members being levied.  
 
Hogan Stokes identified two main factors that were associated with the increasing levels of 
risk. These were: 
 
(a) Larger scale investments in systems and equipment that are used for trading, clearing and 
information services.  
 
From Table B5, it can be seen that in the three years leading up to the demutualisation of 
the exchange (1994-1996), ASX spent almost $67.9 million on internally developed 
software and the purchase of other property and equipment. This represents a 124% 
increase from the period 1991 to 1993. The pattern is even more obvious when a four 
year rolling average is used [Figure B5]. Consistent with Hogan Stokes’ prediction, ASX 
has outlaid over $142 million for computer software, property and equipment in the years 
after the demutualisation decision (1997-2001). However Figure B5 does indicate that 
ASX has reduced capital expenditure since 1999. 
 
(b) The higher business risks associated with a more competitive climate. 
 
The problem for ASX is that its profitability is dependent upon trading volume and value 
of equities traded, the number and market capitalisation of listed entities and the number 
of new listings. Table B6 demonstrates that the main revenue divers for ASX were 
volatile during 1999. For example, the annual number of equity trades was 8.29 million, 
up 31.4% on the reported number of trades for the 12 months to 30 June 1998. This 
represents a 37% increase from the 6.07 million annual number of trades forecasted in the 
Information Memorandum. In the same period, the average fee per equity trade decreased 
from the forecast of $6.30 to $6.07.  
 
While it is difficult to quantify whether the level of risk associated with ASX’s business has 
changed, it is more likely that the recent volatility was a consequence of the cyclical nature of 
the industry rather than the changes in the global equity markets. From the figures presented 
in Table B7, it is reasonable to state that between 1989 and 2001 the key ASX revenue 
drivers have been highly cyclical and volatile. For example, during the period of 1991 and 
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1996 there was no consistency with the number of new companies that listed on the market. 
The number of new listings ranged from a low of 18 to a high of 169. As a consequence, 
ASX’s has reported vastly different operating results over the years. In the years ended 30 
June 1990 and 1991, the exchange reported an operating loss of $23.7 million and $8 million 




However, due to the short time period available post-demutualisation, no conclusive results 
can be provided. The short time frame also makes it difficult to determine whether ASX will 
be required to spend as much on computer software, property and equipment in the future. 
 
Furthermore, there is mixed evidence on whether the liability of the members was a serious 
consideration at the time of demutualisation. In the interviews conducted, both the former 
members and some of the directors of ASX dismissed the claim that the potential liability of 
the members was a serious concern. The consensus was that even if ASX did levy the natural 
person members, the corporate members would have paid on their behalf. However, Maurice 
Newman argued that the liability of the members was a serious consideration. He said, “it is 
true that in a bull market no member would have thought twice about his liability. However, 
in a bear market things change very quickly … Perhaps the large stockbroking companies 
would have paid on their behalf. Yet we had about 85 corporate members at the time and not 
all of them would have been able to pay for the individual members. It was also indicated to 
us that Treasury was considering taking SIDA away from our control … I believe that it 
would have been irresponsible for ASX to leave the question of members liability to chance”. 
 
Both the theory and empirical evidence imply that ASX’s operations would have involved 
lower risk prior to demutualisation. However, the evidence is not conclusive. Firstly, the only 
empirical study undertaken in this area was based on cross-sectional analysis. Thus there is 
no evidence to suggest how companies change their risk profile when they change 
organisational structure, nor whether this is an influencing factor in the decision to 
demutualise.  
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 The problems associated with the cyclical and volatile nature of the industry is compounded by the highly 
automated nature of the exchange. Generally, over 80% of ASX’s costs are fixed. This means that the impact of 
any small change in the main revenue drivers will be exaggerated. 
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3.6 Divergence of Members’ Interests 
According to Hart and Moore (1996) a stock-based company structure allows exchanges to 
make more timely and effective business decisions. The authors’ theoretical model shows 
that as membership of a mutual becomes more diverse, the efficiency gains of a stock-based 
company are magnified. Consistent with this notion, ASX stated in the Members’ 
Information Package that the interests of the members were diverging. The problem for ASX 
was that the benefits derived from a decision made in respect to the overall market place may 
not have accrued equally to all members. The problems associated with the divergence of the 
members’ interests were aggravated by the one vote per member rule.  
 
By 1996, the corporate members accounted for over 99% of the trading volume and received 
less than 15% of the total votes.
71
  Table B8 shows that the interests of the corporate 
members were also becoming more diverse. In 1987, the top ten stockbroking organisations 
had gained 56% of the market share
72
 and received 1.44% of the total votes available. The 
remaining corporate members had 44% of the market share and 8.08% of the votes. However, 
by 1996 the non-top ten stockbroking organisations had experienced a decline in market 
share yet their voting power had increased to over 14%. At the same time, the top ten 
stockbroking organisations’ voting power had remained constant. Table B9 demonstrates that 
the divergence of members’ interests was also based on geographic location.  
 
The facts cited above show the potential for divergence in members’ interests on particular 
issues. The extension of trading hours is specific example of a strategic decision that under 
the mutual structure would have been unlikely to gain the necessary 75% majority. The 
smaller stockbroking companies could argue that they would be unfairly disadvantaged as 
they do not have the financial capabilities to employ more stockbrokers and back office staff 
(who clear stock trades) to cater for the extended trading. In addition, Western Australian 
members would be further disadvantaged due to the time differences.  
 
Situations were also arising where the interests of ASX and specific members diverged. The 
Members’ Information Package argued that in the future ASX management would be 
required to initiate a greater number of changes in order to remain competitive, many of 
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 Market share is defined as the percentage of the total transactions that pass through a stockbroking 
organisation.  
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which would impose costs on the member organisations. Further, ASX could not guarantee 
that any of these changes would provide direct economic benefits to the member 
organisations. As a consequence of the divergence of interests, ASX believed that the 
collective decision making process would inhibit the development of the exchange. The 
Chairman of ASX, Maurice Newman, stated in an interview “while in the long term the 
interests of the stockbrokers and the exchange coincide, in the short term there were 
situations arising where our interests differed ... by demutualising, we are able to react to the 
rapidly changing environment – management is now able to use their own business 
judgement to make decisions”. 
 
In support, Hogan Stokes states “in a climate of growing competition between exchanges, 
mutual ownership will make it harder for ASX to make timely and effective strategic 
decisions”. Also, the Vice-Chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Jim Oliff, has 
recently come out in support of demutualisation as “we would end up with a leaner 




3.7 Summary  
Six developments have been identified as potential spurs to demutualisation: increase in 
intensity of competition, change in relative importance of management incentives, change in 
effectiveness of monitoring of management, demand for capital to fund expansion, change in 
members’ liabilities, and divergence of members’ interests.  Analysis of the relevance of each 
of these reasons to ASX’s position prior to demutualisation indicates that the threat of 
increased international competition was a substantial driver of demutualisation, along with 
the divergence of members’ interests that made it more difficult for ASX to respond in a 
timely and effective manner whilst it retained a mutual structure. More effective design of 
management incentive, better monitoring of management, likely increased demand for capital 
and changes in members’ liabilities were not obviously strong spurs to demutualisation.   
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5.0 Developments in ASX’s corporate governance post-demutualisation 
A key tenet of agency theory is that stakeholders implement control mechanisms to safeguard 
their interests.
74
 The monitoring, disciplining and control devices that shareholders use to 
ensure that managers acts in their interest are commonly referred to as corporate governance 
mechanisms. Five important governance mechanisms are board composition, board size, 
executive remuneration, blockholder monitoring and the market for corporate control.  In this 
chapter, we examine the impact of demutualisation on each of the five mechanisms.  In each 
case, the discussion is preceded by a review of the importance of each governance 
mechanism in safeguarding investors’ interests. The review is helpful because, as shown, 
theory is not always supported by the evidence.  
 
5.1 Board composition and firm performance 
The board is the ultimate source of authority in a stock company and so the relationship 
between board composition and company performance has attracted much research interest.  
The dimension of composition on which most research has focused is “independence”.  As 
Bhagat and Black (1999) observe, the common view is that the board’s principal task is to 
monitor management. An associated view is that only independent directors are vigilant 
monitors.  
 
The predominance among large US public companies of boards with a majority of 
independent, outside directors indicates the prevalence of the belief that board independence 
is value enhancing.
75
  However, independence is not without cost.  Executive directors and 
even non-executive directors with prior affiliations with the company are often better 
informed and thus better placed to oversee managers.  The extent to which a board should be 
independent to maximise shareholder value is therefore an empirical issue. The evidence, 
however, is mixed at best. 
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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf.  This involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent. Where the interests of the different parties diverge, the 
potential for conflicts of interest arises. To control the conflict, costs are incurred. These include structuring, 
monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among the agents. 
75
 This view is also held by many stakeholders in Australia. For instance, the Australian Investment Managers’ 
Association (‘AIMA’) contends that “every listed company should be constituted with a majority of individuals 
who qualify as independent directors”. See “Corporate governance: A guide for investment managers and 
corporations”, AIMA (1997). However, in 1996, only 40% of the top-100 companies had conformed to the 
recommendation [Stapledon and Lawrence (1996)]. 
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In an early study, Baysinger and Butler (1985) document that for a sample of 266 major US 
companies the proportion of independent non-executive directors is not related to company 
performance in the same year.
76
 However, the number of outside directors in 1970 is 
positively correlated with the return on equity ten years later. Even so, Baysinger and Butler 
do not suggest that boards should have a majority of independent directors. They report that 
companies with above average relative performance have boards consisting of approximately 
33% independent non-executive directors and so they conclude that that boards which have 
an equal mixture of the three different types of directors are more likely to be successful. 
Other studies, such as Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
report findings consistent with Baysinger and Butler.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the most persuasive evidence against a link between director 
independence and company performance comes from Bhagat and Black (1999) who review 
934 of the largest US companies from 1991.
77
 Bhagat and Black find that board 
independence, measured by the fraction of independent directors on a board, is negatively 
correlated with long-term performance and growth. The results persist after controlling for 
board size, company size, industry effects, CEO stock ownership, stock ownership by outside 
directors as well as the number and size of blockholders. Bhagat and Black also note that 
companies with independent directors making up over 70% of the composition of a board 
perform worse than those companies with more balanced boards.  
Importantly, Bhagat and Black assess whether the causation runs the other way (i.e., from 
poor performance to greater board independence). Their tests confirm that it is not poor past 
performance that leads to companies adding more outside directors. Based on all the results, 
Bhagat and Black (1999) argue that companies should adopt a more balanced approach to 
board composition. They suggest that a board should be composed of 55% independent non-
executive directors with the remaining board seats being made up of insiders and affiliated 
directors. 
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One issue with the studies that review the link between board independence and firm 
performance is that the benefits of independence may accrue principally in in discrete tasks 
with clear outcomes. In an early study that addresses this issue, Weisbach (1988) investigates 
the effect of board composition on CEO changes in 367 NYSE companies.
78
 He finds that  
boards with at least 60% independent directors are three times more than likely to replace a 
poorly performing CEO, as measured by stock price performance, than other types of 
boards.
79
 The results are similar when accounting measures of performance are used. 
Weisbach’s results support the view that management entrenchment at the cost of 
shareholders is less likely with more independent boards. 
 
Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) show that independent directors benefit target firm 
shareholders in takeover bids. Analysing 169 tender offers over 1989 to 1992, they find that 
targets with boards having a majority of independent directors extract 20% higher stock 
returns measured over the entire contest period.
80
 The independent board variable is also 
significantly positive for the multivariate regression models that incorporate the initial tender 
offer premium and any revisions of the offer.  
 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) examine the same issue from the bidding companies’ perspective, 
using a sample of 128 US tender offer bids made over the year  1980 to 1987. They find that 
tender offer bidders with a majority of independent directors earn about zero stock price 
returns. In contrast, bidders where insiders dominate the board suffer a statistically significant 
loss of 1.8%. Interestingly, Byrd and Hickman also find that the relationship between bidding 
companies’ abnormal stock returns and the percentage of independent directors is non-linear, 
implying that it is possible to have too many independent directors to benefit shareholders. 
This last finding is consistent with Bhagat and Black (1999) analysis. 
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 41  
Bhagat and Black (1999) comment that a problem with using board performance on discrete 
events to assess the value of director independence is that independence may be valuable in 
some situations but not in others.  It may well that when all aspects of performance are 
considered, board independence is less valuable than evaluations of performance in discrete 
tasks would lead one to believe. It is worth noting that there have been no studies reviewing 
board performance in specific tasks where specific company or industry knowledge might be 
expected to give directors an advantage. 
 
Given that investors take into account all aspects of performance when evaluating the 
appointment of independent directors, reviewing the share market reaction to such 
appointment is another way of assessing whether independent directors add value.  
Unfortunately, the results are inconclusive. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) review the share 
market reaction to 1,251 announcements by US companies of outside director appointments 
over the period  1981 to 1985. They report a statistically significant positive share price 
reaction (0.215%) for the two days surrounding an announcement. However, in a later study, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) examine 170 inside director announcements drawn from the 
Wall Street Journal (‘WSJ’) between 1981 to 1985. All the companies analysed were listed 





In sum, the evidence on board composition suggests that while having a substantial 
proportion of independent directors increases shareholder value, particularly in discrete tasks 
such as CEO replacement where board loyalty to management might be detrimental to 
shareholder interests, the optimal board comprises both independent and non-independent 
directors.  The value of non-independent directors probably lies in their  firm or industry 
specific knowledge that gives their boards a more informed basis for deliberations.  This 
point is important in evaluating ASX’s board. 
 
5.1.3 Optimal board composition in stock and mutual organisations 
Williamson (1983) is the first author to address the question whether organising as a stock or 
mutual will have an impact on board composition. He posits mutual organisations will 
appoint more outside directors than stock-based companies because restriction on the 
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transferability of ownership claims eliminates stock-based compensation and reduces 
monitoring by institutions, blockholders, and also reduces the disciplinary effect of the 
prospect of a hostile takeover. This implies that the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board should decline when a company changes from a mutual to a stock-based company 
because the greater effectiveness of other incentive aligning mechanisms allows the company 
to appoint more firm affiliated directors. This implication is known as the “substitution 
hypothesis”.  
 
Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997) review the board composition of 121 stock-based 
companies and 225 mutual life insurance companies in 1985 and find support for the 
substitution hypothesis. They report that the mean (median) fraction of non-executive 
directors for mutual organisations is 0.72 (0.78) and 0.44 (0.44) for the stock-based 
companies.
82
 The difference between both the mean and the median is significant.  Further, 
the authors conduct an OLS regression. The company type coefficient is significantly positive 
at the 1% level. The results imply that, if a typical company is a stock-based company, the 
outside directors would create a minority (48%). Yet if the same organisation is a mutual, 
non-executive directors would constitute a majority (64%).  
 
Mayers et al also analyse a sample of 50 property-casualty insurers that change from mutual 
to stock ownership between the period of 1920 and 1985. In line with theory, they report a 
significant reduction in the number of outside directors measured for three years prior to the 
demutualisation to three years after. The mean (median) fraction of outside directors for the 
companies converting from mutual to stock ownership falls from 0.71 (0.7) to 0.61 (0.67). 
This result is statistically significant at the 5% level.
83
 Based on the substitution hypothesis, it 
is expected that ASX will have a greater proportion of outside directors prior to 
demutualisation. 
 
5.1.4 ASX board composition pre- and post-demutualisation 
Under the mutual structure, the composition of ASX’s board was fixed in the Articles of 
Association to reflect the company’s mutual status.
84
 While 93% of the directors were non-
                                                 
82
 The sample consists of 121 stock-based companies and 225 mutual life insurance companies from 1985. 
83
 Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997) define an outside director as a non-executive, non-family director. 
However, the results are qualitatively the same when independent non-executive board members are analysed.  
84
 Article 8 of the former Articles of Association states that the board should consist of ten member directors, 
elected by the members, including one from each state; four non-member directors appointed by the board and 
subject to confirmation at the following AGM; and the Managing Director appointed by the board. 
 43  
executives, only 27% of the directors could be classified as independent.
85
 For a 12 month 
period post-demutualisation the board consisted of six senior members of the stockbroking 
community, four senior members of the business community and one executive. Contrary to 
the substitution hypothesis, the proportion of independent outside directors actually increased 
from 27% to 36% post-demutualisation. However, it is probable that this change reflected the 
unusually high need for ASX not to be seen as an entity catering to a narrow range of 
interests. Rob Thomas, CEO of Salomon Smith Barney (Australia) alluded to this concern 
when stating, in an interview, that “the more independent directors that are appointed to the 
board the more confidence investors, Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(‘ASIC’) and the government will gain in the management of ASX”.  
 
It is likely that, as theory suggests, the appointment of more outside directors has come at a 
cost, the cost being a reduction in level of exchange-specific expertise at the board level. A 
former member issued some concern that in the future the board may not have enough 
directors who understand the market on both a domestic and international scale. He said, 
“ASX is unique and probably needs to be treated differently than most publicly listed 
companies”.  However, aside from the political benefits of having a more diverse board, the 
appointment of outside directors also carried potential benefits.  One former member noted 
“the change will allow for people to join the board that have greater experience in operating a 
public company”. Maurice Newman stated “while I don’t want to take anything away from 
the stockbroker directors that have served on the board, I do believe ASX will benefit from 
the change in composition. We now have an equal proportion of directors who have vast 
experience with other publicly listed companies and institutional investors …whether we 
have the optimal composition – well, that is a different question. A question that I don’t 
believe anyone has the answer.” 
 
                                                 
85
 This study uses the Australian Investment Managers’ Association definitions for independent non-executive 
directors as its benchmark. This definition is qualitatively the same as the definitions used in prior research. The 
Australian Investment Managers’ Association states an independent non-executive director has the following 
characteristics: (a) is not a substantial shareholder of a company or an officer of or otherwise associated directly 
or indirectly with a substantial shareholder of the company; (b) has not been employed within the last three 
years in any executive capacity by the company or any other group member; (c) is not retained as a professional 
adviser to the company or any other group member or a principal of a firm or company so retained;  (d) is not a 
significant supplier or customer of the company or any other group member or an officer of or otherwise 
associated directly or indirectly with a significant supplier or customer; (e) has no significant contractual 
relationship with the company or any other group member other than as a director of the company; and (f) 
otherwise free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could or could reasonably be 
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Given the unique position of ASX being a profit-making entity yet performing a quasi-public 
service function in the execution of its services, Mr Newman’s view that the optimal 
composition of ASX’s board is unknown is a reasonable comment. Further, the legislated 
limit on the proportion of shares any entity may own so as to prevent ASX being controlled 
by a single entity lower the incentive to monitor management closely and thus make the 
appointment of outside directors more attractive than usual for stock companies. In fact, ASX 
is not obviously anomalous in the composition of its board.  The proportion of independent 
directors is consistent with theoretical and empirical literature that shows a board comprising 
between 40-55% independent directors should help create shareholder wealth. Further, the 
new composition conforms to current Australian practices. In 1996, the average proportion of 
independent directors on boards of the top-100 ASX listed companies was 43% [Stapledon 
and Lawrence (1996)].  
 
In closing, one other ASX departure from recommended practice in relation to board 
appointments is worth noting.  Traditionally, the chairman of the board selects non-executive 
directors of listed Australian companies.
86
 Stapledon (1996) argues this can be problematic if 
the chairman is either an affiliated non-executive or an executive director. The AIMA 
recommends that boards should have a nomination committee that has the responsibility of 
nominating new board members. An independent director should chair the committee with 
the majority of the members being non-executive directors. ASX has ignored this 
recommendation. An affiliated non-executive director still chairs both the board of directors 
and the nomination committee. 
 
5.2 The relationship between board size and company performance 
Section 221 (2) of the Corporations Law states that a publicly listed company must have at 
least three company directors.  This, however, does not give any indication as to the optimum 
size of a board. There is a trade-off between the board’s capacity for monitoring and the costs 
associated with large groups. Examples of these costs include communication difficulties and 
less timely decision making. Jensen (1993) posits that by limiting the size of the board there 
are efficiency gains that can be made. He states “keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance. When boards get beyond seven or eight they are less likely to function 
                                                                                                                                                        
perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act with a view to the best interests of the 
company. 
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effectively and are easier for the CEO to control”. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also endorse this 
theory. They argue that when “a board is greater than ten members, it becomes difficult for 
them all to express their ideas and opinions in the limited time available”.  
 
Yermack (1996) empirically tests this hypothesis and concludes that there is a statistically 
significant inverse relationship between board size and company performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q). The coefficients imply that if a board increases its size by 50%, Tobin’s Q will 
fall by 0.13.
87
 If an eight member board expands by one, it is expected that Tobin’s Q will 
fall 0.04.
88
 These results are robust to various controls that include company size, industry, 
inside stock ownership, past performance and alternative governance mechanisms such as 
board composition. The results also hold under different methodology (OLS regression and 
fixed effects model) and various measures of performance (sales/assets, return on assets and 
return on sales). Further, the stock market perceives a reduction in board size to be positive. 
For six companies that announce significant reductions in board size, shareholders realise a 
2.5% abnormal return for the three days surrounding the announcement. 
 
However, there is a possibility that Yermack’s results might not apply to smaller companies 
or companies that operate in a different regulatory and economic environment. Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells (1998) examine a sample selected in 1996 of 900 small to medium 
Finnish companies. The authors also find a negative correlation between board size and 
company profitability after controlling for the size of the company, age of the company and 
the industry classification. Unlike Yermack, Eisenberg et al. (1998) measures company 
performance by industry adjusted-return on assets. This is because a majority of the 
companies in the sample are not publicly traded. This may not be a major problem as 
Yermack’s results are robust to several variations in accounting profitability measures. The 
study also confirms the direction of the causation. That is, board size influences company 
performance rather than past performance determines the board size.  
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 Under ASX listing rule 3L(1), the initial appointment must then be confirmed by an ordinary resolution at the 
AGM. 
87
 As mentioned in section 5.1.1.1, this empirical investigation is based on a sample of 452 companies over an 
eight year period (1984-1991). The sample of companies is drawn from the annual Forbes 500 largest US 
companies list. 
88
 A 0.01 change in Tobin’s Q equates to a US$25 million reduction in company value for the median company. 
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Mayers et al. (1997) finds that for a sample of 50 property-casualty insurers that demutualise 
the mean and median board size remains the same.
89
 This is surprising considering the 
common argument that mutuals are inefficient. If this were the case, it would be expected that 
the board size would decrease after demutualisation.  
 
5.2.2 ASX’s board size pre- and post demutualisation 
At the AGM in October 1999,
90
 the composition of ASX’s board changed substantially.  The 
number of directors was reduced from 11 to nine members with 45% of the board being 
independent.  The board has retained its size and composition at these levels since 1999. In 
support of the efficiency argument, there was a consensus among the former members and 
current directors who were interviewed that the reduction in the board size is a positive move. 
They agreed that a larger board is inefficient and ineffective. One current ASX director 
commented “the reduction in the board size and the elimination of a number of committees 
has meant that decisions can now be made on a much timelier basis”. The change is also 
consistent with current Australian practices.
91
 
The revised ASX board is in line with changes that occurred at the SSE (already 
demutualised) and Toronto Stock Exchange (in the process of demutualisation). When the 
SSE became a stock-based company in 1993, the board was reduced from 22 directors to 
nine. Only three of the remaining directors are from stockbroking companies with the balance 
representing SSE listed companies and investors.
92
 The Toronto Stock Exchange (‘TSE’) 
proposes to change the composition of its board to having 50% of the directors elected from 
outside the stockbroking community. 
 
5.3 Managerial remuneration and company performance: Theory and evidence 
Managerial remuneration is an important component of ‘good’ corporate governance. If 
properly used, it has the ability to motivate, retain and align the interests of management – 
both executives and directors. We do not attempt to identify whether ASX appropriately 
remunerated its management under the mutual structure or if it has adopted an optimal 
remuneration strategy post-demutualisation. Our objective is to identify whether executive 
and director remuneration levels change as a result of demutualisation. 
                                                 
89
 See section 5.1.1.3 for details on the sample and methodology.   
90
 The AGM was held on 25 October 1999. 
91
 Stapledon and Lawrence (1996) document that the average board size of Australia’s largest 100 companies is 
8.89. 
92
 Credit Suisse First Boston (1998), “The Toronto Stock Exchange – a blueprint for success”. 
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Based on the agency perspective, Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994) argue 
that mutual organisations should perform better in areas that require less managerial 
discretion. This is a direct result of the higher costs associated with monitoring management 
in a mutual structure. Mayers and Smith (1992) posit that mutual organisation CEO’s will be 
paid lower wages and less incentive remuneration compared to stock-based company CEO’s. 
They find, based on a sample of 515 companies, that mutual CEO’s are compensated at a 
significantly lower level. The estimated difference in remuneration between two identical 
companies that have different ownership structures is approximately 18%.  
 
Mayers and Smith (1992) also hypothesize that remuneration should be more responsive to 
performance for stock-based companies than for mutuals.
93
 The authors estimate pooled 
cross-section and time-series regressions for the growth rate in CEO remuneration on 
performance.
94
 Their time-series evidence, from a sample of 48 companies comprising 27 
stock-based companies and 21 mutual organisations drawn from the period 1974 to 1988, 
indicates stock-based company CEO remuneration is significantly more responsive to 
company performance than mutual CEO remuneration. The results indicate that a 1% 
increase in the net premiums written for a stock-based company in the previous year leads to 
a 0.7% increase in the level of CEO remuneration.
95
. No relationship between pay and 
performance was found for the mutual organisations.  
 
5.3.1 Upper echelon remuneration at ASX pre- and post-demutualisation 
As the discussion in section 3.0 indicated, ASX has been operating in an increasing 
competitive environment that requires its managers to exercise substantial levels of initiative 
and discretion to ensure an effective response.  Examples of initiatives include the (failed) 
proposals to takeover the SFE and introduce ‘BLOX’, the establishment of global alliances 
through the development of ‘ASX World-Link,’ and the launching of a trading platform for 
ETFs. Contentious decisions such as extending trading hours can now be resolved solely by 
management without the need for direct recourse to other stakeholders. No longer is 
management required to gain agreement from at least 75% of the members to implement 
                                                 
93
 As mutual organisations are restricted to accounting-based remuneration schemes, the analysis is focused on 
the responsiveness of remuneration to company performance. As noted by the authors, this could lead to a 
potential bias as equity-based compensation is an important component of executive remuneration packages. 
94
 Performance is measured by net premiums written, income before tax, total revenue and dividends to the 
policyholders. 
95
 No other statistically significant results were reported for any of the other performance variables. 
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substantive reform.  The questions of interest are whether the upper echelon management of 
ASX has been compensated for the higher risk now inherent in their work and whether their 
pay is, at least in part, performance based.  
 
ASX managerial remuneration levels pre and post-demutualisation are examined at three 
different levels: executive, managing director and director. Data were collected from ASX 
Annual Reports for the period 1990 to 2001. Earnings before interest and tax (‘EBIT’) is used 
as management’s performance benchmark. EBIT was preferred to operating profit after tax 




Until the insertion of Section 300A in the Corporations Law in the 1999 financial year,
97
 
companies were only required to disclose director and executive remuneration levels in 
$10,000 bands. While no names were associated with a specific band, this analysis assumes 
the Managing Director is the highest paid employee. This is a reasonable assumption as for 
each year there is only one executive on the board of ASX and for each year the highest paid 
individual is on the board and is an executive. For each director and executive, the lower 
bands were used to aggregate the total remuneration paid to directors and executives. This 
reduces the accuracy of the testing.  
 
The investigation is also restricted by the lack of information on the retirement of 
directors/executives. The Annual Reports only identify a band where termination/retirement 
payments are made for the relevant financial year. It is not possible to quantify the value of 
any one-off payments which reduces effectiveness of the pay for performance sensitivity 
analysis. ASX only started to disclose the performance-based components of the 
remuneration packages in 1999 and so the pay for performance sensitivity analysis is based 
on casual observations. The only exception is for the Managing Director, in which some 
empirical analysis is undertaken.  
 
                                                 
96
 In unreported results, sensitivity analysis was conducted using OPAT as the performance benchmark. The 
results were qualitatively the same. 
97
  Section 300A of the Corporations Law requires details of the nature and amount of each element of the 
remuneration of each director and each of the five named officers of the company receiving the highest 
remuneration. 
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5.3.2 Executive Remuneration 
Despite the shortcomings in available data, there is strong evidence to suggest that ASX 
changed its remuneration structure for its executives prior to the demutualisation. Between 
1990 and 1994, ASX was dominated by a high number of executives earning, on average, a 
significantly lower remuneration package. Further, the rate of increase in the average 
executive remuneration level was low and fairly monotonic [refer to Table C1 and Figure 
C1].  
 
On face value, it appears that the structure of executive remuneration may have changed 
either during 1994 or 1995. However, in 1994 and 1995 the high number of senior executive 
retirement and/or termination payments distorts the figures provided in Table C1. In 1994, 
seven executives left ASX including those executives who held the top three positions. While 
in 1995 four executives either retired or were retrenched, none held roles within the top four 
posts. This means that the average remuneration level for 1994 would have been biased 
upwards by a greater amount than 1995. 
 
The substantial changes in pay structure actually occurred in 1996. At this time, it is evident 
that there was a 60%% decline in the number of executives (17 people) and a 45% increase in 
the average executive remuneration package. Between 1997 and 1999 there was a further 
27% increase. During this period, there also appears to have been an increase in the level of 
performance related remuneration. Table C5(i) shows that in 1999, the performance based 
component of the top six executives was, on average, 27% of their total remuneration 
package.  By 2001 however, this pay/performance ratio has been reduced to 22.5% [Table 
C5(iii)]. However we cannot infer conclusively that performance based compensation 
incentives have decreased over these last two years.  Rather, the lower proportion of 
performance based pay may be due to ASX’s decline in operating profit from the previous 
year, hence the lower levels of performance pay bonuses claimed by senior executives. 
Interestingly, the majority of the changes occurred in the year prior to the demutualisation 
decision and four years prior to the official change in structure. In support, it is stated in the 
1996 Annual Report “a new remuneration structure was introduced in October 1995, with a 
greater emphasis on pay and performance. All senior executives now have a proportion of 
their remuneration linked to achievement of results”.  
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In 1999, the increase in the average executive remuneration was relatively insignificant.
98
 
One possible interpretation of these results is that mutual organisations, in the first instance, 
adopt characteristics of a stock-based company in an attempt to remain competitive. If this is 
unsuccessful, management will then seek to change the organisational structure.   
 
5.3.3 Managing Director Remuneration 
Between 1990 and 1993, the Managing Director received small, though relatively constant 
increases in remuneration levels that were unrelated to the performance of the business [refer 
to Table C2 and Figure C2]. For example, in 1993 despite an 87% improvement in EBIT, the 
Managing Director received a mere 3.33% increase in remuneration. On face value, the 
amount paid to the Managing Director in 1994 and 1995 increased significantly (22.58%) and 
became more responsive to performance. However, once again a one-off retirement payment 
to the Managing Director distorts the 1994 figure.  
 
It was not until the 1996 financial year that the Managing Director’s remuneration package 
underwent significant change in composition. Between 1996 and 1999, the Managing 
Director experienced a 100% rise in the level of remuneration. This provides further evidence 
to suggest that the changes occurred prior to the demutualisation decision in 1996 (1997 
financial year) and actual conversion to a stock-based company in 1998 (1999 financial year). 
Since demutualisation, the Managing Director’s remuneration has continued to grow 
strongly, increasing 21% in 2000 and 8.76% in 2001, despite the fall in earnings.   It is also 
observed that the level of pay has become more responsive to performance. Table C6 
indicates that in the 1999 financial year, 34% of the Managing Director’s remuneration 
package is based on operational performance of the business. This was 3.5% higher that any 
of the other top six executives.  Further, in following years, this gap has been widened with 
the Managing Director receiving 8.77% higher performance related remuneration than any 
other of the other top six executives in the 2001 financial year.99 
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 It is reported in Table C1 that executive remuneration levels, on average, increased by 5.65%. However, it is 
likely that this figure was actually higher. The 1998 figures were biased upwards as three of the top four 
executives received retirement/termination payments.  
99
 The mean (median) total remuneration package for CEO’s in the top-100 Australian ASX listed companies 
for the 1999 financial year is $1,497,000 ($977,000). Using this as a benchmark, Richard Humphry is fairly 
remunerated with a total package worth $850,388.   
 51  
5.3.4 Directors’ Remuneration 
In contrast to the executive and managing director remuneration, Table C3 and Figure C3 
show that the level of directors’ remuneration increased after the demutualisation decision in 
1996. Between 1997 and 1999, the average director remuneration level increased by 67%. 
This compares with a 13% increase between 1992 and 1996. Continued increases in director 
remuneration have been observed in the 2000 and 2001 financial years, however the rate of 
increase has been at a much lower level. These observations are supported by the calculations 
for the average non-executive director remuneration level [refer to table C4 and Figure C4].  
During the 1997-1999 period after the demutualisation decision, the average non-executive 
director remuneration package increased by 38%.  For the same period prior to 
demutualisation, the increase was relatively insignificant (3.5%).  
 
It is surprising to observe that director remuneration has moved inversely to changes in 
ASX’s earnings since demutualisation. For example, average director remuneration declined 
4% with a 76% increase in EBIT in 2000, while in 2001, remuneration rose by 29% despite 
the 10% decrease in EBIT. While such a result is unexpected, it is not confounding, given 
that ASX annual reports state that no non-executive director receives any performance-pay 
related remuneration. Given the large proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
following demutualisation, changes in director remuneration are evidently explained by 
factors other than ASX’s performance.   
 
Interestingly, the majority of the changes occurred for the lower paid non-executive directors.  
For example, the three highest paid non-executive directors experienced a decline in their pay 
between 1997 and 1999 (-3%). Similar to the executives, the three highest paid non-executive 




5.4.2.1 Management Share Ownership Levels 
Given that granting executives options has similar incentive effects as granting executives 
shares in the company, it is appropriate to review ASX’s managers’ share ownership levels in 
this section. 
 
                                                 
100
 For the full list of names and corresponding remuneration packages for the 1999 financial year refer to Table 
C6. 
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Until August 2001, the Corporations Act limited voting power in a public company to 5%.  
This limit restricted ASX from providing its executives with an optimal level of managerial 
equity investment and thus weakened the link between pay and performance.  Article 9 of the 
Constitution provided that where a person had more than 5% of the voting shares, the shares 
above 5% were classified as “default shares” which meant they were not counted for voting 
purposes.   
 
Empirical analysis conducted by Cole and Mehran (1998) supports the argument that 
shareholder restrictions interfere with executive remuneration packages. For a sample of 94 
companies from the thrift industry that converted from a mutual to a stock-based structure 
between 1983 and 1987,
101
 the lifting of ownership restrictions caused the mean insider 
ownership level to increase significantly.
102
 The difference between the pre and post-inside 
ownership levels is statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the authors report a 
significant improvement in company performance, based on industry-adjusted market 
return,
103
 for the three years after the anti-takeover rule expires. This is particularly evident 
for the companies where insider ownership is greater than the median amount. In this case, 
the difference between the pre and post-performance is 9.87%, significant at the 10% level. 
 
Clearly, the 5% restriction on voting power was an example of where political restraints 
served to adversely affect company performance and hence shareholder wealth. Inevitably, in 
August 2001, the Senate agreed to approve a new regime whereby the voting power 
limitation was lifted to 15%.  The adoption of this new regime in the ASX constitution was 
subsequently proposed and accepted at the Annual General Meeting in October 2001. 
However it is still too early to investigate the effect of this modification to voting power 
limits due to no executive actually increasing their shareholdings above 5% since the 
legislative amendment. 
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 Each of the companies in the sample is traded on either the NYSE, AMEX or an OTC market for at least 
eight years. 
102
 In 1976, US Congress adopted a post-conversion anti-takeover rule for the thrift industry. The rule prohibits 
any person directly or indirectly acquiring more than 10% of the beneficial ownership of any class of equity 
issued by the savings institution during the three to five years post-conversion to a stock-based company.  
103
 The authors calculate the median annual return for a control group of 76 savings and loans companies that 
are unaffected by the legal restrictions. This is then subtracted from the annual stock return for each of the 
sample observations.  
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Similarly, with regard to non-executive directors’ remuneration, Bhagat, Carey and Elson 
(1999) argue that without direct economic incentive they will not engage in active monitoring 
of the company. The authors posit that this would have a negative effect on the company’s 
performance. In support, the authors report that for a sample of 449  (including 200 of the 
largest) US companies,
104
 the dollar value of the median non-executive directors’ stock 
holding is positively related to the company’s growth in sales and operating income.
105
 
Further, there is a positive relationship between a company’s previous performance and the 
value of the non-executive directors’ share holdings. The relationship is significant when 
company performance is measured by three year growth in sales, return on equity and stock 
returns. 
 
Bhagat et al. (1999) also investigates whether non-executive director ownership influences 
CEO turnover for the 449 companies during 1991 to 1997. During this period, 162 of the 
companies in the sample experienced CEO turnover. Using a logit regression the authors 
report, given poor company performance, that there is a negative relationship between the 
dollar value of the median director’s share ownership levels and the probability that there will 
be a disciplinary CEO turnover, i.e., companies that are performing poorly have boards with 
large equity holdings that are more willing to take corrective action. This result is statistically 




Under Article 12.10 of ASX’s Articles of Association, a director is not required to hold any 
shares in the company. Table C7 shows that six of the ten non-executive directors were 
members of ASX and therefore received 166,000 shares each at the time of demutualisation. 
All of these directors subsequently reduced their holding in three years following the listing 
of ASX. Of the four independent non-executive directors, all purchased shares in ASX 
subsequent to demutualisation, however the average number of shares purchased was very 
low, with each independent director holding an average of 2,000 shares in June 2001.  
 
In an interview in 1999 with Maurice Newman, the Chairman of ASX, he did not rule out the 
possibility of establishing a link between non-executive pay and performance via share 
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 Share ownership data is obtained for 4,874 directors from the 1994 proxy statements for the 449 companies. 
105
 Regression results using return on equity and stock returns as the performance measure are mixed. 
106
 Company performance is measured for the year prior to the CEO turnover by the following: three year 
growth in earnings per share, five year growth in earnings per share, one year stock return, three year stock 
return and five year stock return. 
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ownership. He said, “our first priority (after demutualisation) was to properly remunerate our 
staff and executives. We will now consider whether there should be a link between non-
executive remuneration and the company’s performance.” However, to date the link between 
non-executive remuneration and performance appears to have weakened, despite the increase 
in voting power limits. 
 
5.3.5 Summary 
Overall, despite the limitations in the analysis, there is evidence to suggest that managerial 
remuneration levels have changed. Interestingly, the results indicate that executive 
remuneration and specifically the Managing Director’s remuneration changed in the years 
prior to the demutualisation decision. This implies that mutuals adopt some of the 
characteristics of a stock-based company. One interpretation of this is that management 
attempts to adapt to the changes in circumstances and if this is unsuccessful will then change 
the organisational structure appropriately. In contrast, the majority of changes in the 
remuneration packages for non-executive directors have occurred after the decision to 
demutualise in the 1997 financial year. While both the executive and director remuneration 
has increased since 1998, there is no evidence to indicate that the board waits until the actual 
conversion to a stock based company before implementing remuneration changes. 
 
5.4 Ownership structure and management monitoring 
Agency theory implies that where ownership in a company is diffuse the expected costs of a 
shareholder monitoring management are likely to be greater than the expected benefits. As a 
result, management has the freedom to pursue their interests, which is likely to take the form 
of excessive perquisite consumption. However, where a shareholder holds a relatively large 
portion of the issued shares in a company, the shareholder becomes more willing to monitor 
management because he will receive a greater share of the benefits from detecting 
inefficiencies.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, the connection between ownership structure and firm 
performance is not necessarily straightforward. Ramsay and Blair (1993) are among several 
authors who point out that the effectiveness of other corporate governance mechanisms such 
as the market for corporate control and the independence of the board of directors influence 
the relative value of large shareholders or concentrated shareholdings. Further, there are other 
reasons why large shareholders may not wish to engage in active monitoring of management. 
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Coffee (1991) argues that some institutional investors will avoid monitoring if it means that 
their investment is no longer liquid. In support, Maug (1998) argues that if stock markets are 
less liquid, large shareholders will avoid any commitment to monitor management by 
diversifying their portfolio and buying smaller stakes in companies. Given the conflicting 
implications from theory, we rely on empirical evidence to establish the connection between 
shareholder structure and managerial monitoring.  
 
5.4.1 Ownership Concentration 
Studies that examine the relationship between company performance and the degree of 
ownership concentration report mixed results. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) analyse 511 
companies from the major sectors of the US economy, including the regulated and financial 
sectors.
107
 Their results indicate that there is no linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance measured by accounting rates of return.
108
  In a similar study, 
Murali and Welch (1989) use Value Line surveys to identify a sample of 43 companies whose 
shares are more than 50% owned by a small group of investors. They compare the 
profitability of the sample over the period 1977 through to 1981 with 83 widely held 
companies matched on industry with the experimental sample but otherwise randomly 
selected. Again, the results indicate no significant difference in the level of profitability 
between the two samples.  
 
It is possible that ownership concentration matters more early in the life of a company when 
effective monitoring might be more crucial in establishing profitability. Goergen (1997) tests 
this hypothesis using a sample of UK and German IPOs from the period of 1981 to 1988.
109
 
The author then matches the German IPOs with UK IPOs based on size and industry. The 
final sample comprises 124 companies. Goergen’s analysis shows that listed German and UK 
companies, despite their ownership concentration differences, are not characterised by 
different levels of performance. Further, significant reductions in ownership concentration 
did not cause any changes in performance for either the UK or German companies.  
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 The authors also analyse a sub-sample of 406 manufacturing and mining companies.  
108
 Accounting profitability is measured by accounting profit after tax expressed as a percentage of book equity 
value. 
109
 Goergen (1997) uses three different measures of performance: annual cash flow divided by the sum of equity 
and debt, annual cash flow divided by the market value of equity and the book value of debt and the annual 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated by the end of month share prices. 
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In contrast, Belkaoui and Pavlik (1992) find that there is a positive relationship between 
shareholder concentration and performance of a company. However, the relationship is only 
present when shareholder concentration increases above 25%, calculated as the percentage of 
outside shareholders that own more than 5% of issued shares. Approaching the 25% level, the 
relationship was negative. Belkaoui and Pavlik argue that this is consistent with agency 
theory that states that a large concentration of shares allows shareholders to “coordinate 
action, demand information … and influence management’s actions towards value 
maximisation”.  
 
Weiss and Nikitin (1998) report that ownership concentration in the Czech Republic is 
associated with improvements in the performance of companies for a sample of 755 company 
year observations between 1993 and 1996.
110
 This relationship holds for all the performance 
measures used in the study.
111
 In contrast to previous studies, the authors review the 
relationship between annual changes in performance and changes in ownership concentration 
rather than the level of performance and the level of ownership concentration.  
 
5.4.2 Institutional Shareholders 
Not all shareholders are alike. Pound (1988) posits that institutional investors
112
 have greater 
expertise and can monitor management at a lower cost than small investors and as a result 
create more shareholder wealth. In support, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a significant 
positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and the fraction of shares owned by institutional 
investors in a sample of 1,173 companies for 1976 and 1,093 companies for 1986. All the 
companies are listed on either the NYSE or AMEX. The direction of causation, though, 
remains unclear. That is, do institutional investors add value through the monitoring of 
management or do they just buy good performing stocks?  
 
                                                 
110
 However, the authors note that the relationship does not hold if the ownership is concentrated with 
investment funds. Investment funds in the Czech Republic are close-ended fund structures. Units in the funds 
can only be sold to another shareholder (rather than being redeemed) therefore providing little incentives for 
managers to maximise the value of the investment fund. Poor performance has only a relatively small affect on 
funds under management and the level of fees charged. 
111
 Performance is measured by the change in value added by each employee, the change in value added per unit 
of capital, the change in operating profit per worker and the change in operating profit per unit of capital. A 
Solow residual (using an OLS estimation of the production function) is also used to measure the contribution of 
management expertise to company performance.  
112
 Institutional investors refer to organisations that invest money on the behalf of others. They include pension 
funds, superannuation funds and other fund managers.   
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Brunner (1999) uses a case study approach to examine the effects of institutional activism in 
the attempted merger of Volvo and Renault in 1993. Based on interviews of 20 individuals
113
 
and an analysis of abnormal returns throughout the period of the proposal, the author 
concludes that institutional monitoring can create shareholder value. Brunner shows that 
‘institutional voice’ can take many different forms. In this particular case, institutions 
demanded more information, communicated directly with the board of directors, issued 
threats to sue the directors, announced opposition to specific proposals as well as demanding 
for a renegotiation of the merger terms and the resignation of the entire board of directors.  
 
In Australia, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) examine the relationship between the 
distribution of equity ownership and company performance for two sub-samples of ASX 
listed companies. The 1986 sample consists of 95 large companies and 91 small companies 
while the 1989 sample comprises 82 large and 81 small. Craswell et al find no evidence of a 
relationship between institutional ownership and performance measured by a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q.
114
 The results are qualitatively the same when the proxy for Tobin’s Q is modified 





5.4.3 Large Outside Blockholders 
Schleifer and Vishney (1986) use a theoretical model to predict that, all else being equal, the 
presence of a large blockholder
116
 will increase the market value of the company. They 
observe that blockholders are commonly linked to increased management turnover when a 
company is performing sub-optimally. In testing Schleifer and Vishney’s hypothesis, Barclay 
and Holderness (1991) examine management turnover and market reaction to 106 block 
trades where at least 5% of the common stock of a NYSE or AMEX listed company is 
traded.
117
 Any block trades that are announced simultaneously with an offer to purchase the 
remaining amount of the company are excluded. 
 
                                                 
113
 The interviews were held with senior managers at Volvo and Renault, investment bankers, institutional 
investors and the two CEO’s who founded the alliance. 
114
 In Australia, replacement cost information is unavailable and there is no active market for corporate debt. 
Thus, the authors use a proxy for Tobin’s Q. The measure equals the market value of equity over the book value 
of net assets. 
115
 The accounting performance measure is OPAT divided by the book value of equity. 
116
 A blockholder is defined as a company that holds a substantial portion of shares in another company, which 
is not in the business of managing funds.  
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In line with Schleifer and Vishney (1986), Barclay and Holderness (1991) report that 
following a block trade, 33% of the CEO’s depart in the subsequent 12 months and an 
additional 19% in the following year. Similarly, 43% of the number two and three executives 
leave in the year after a block trade.  Further, Barclay and Holderness find that the initial 
public announcement of a block trade is followed by an average abnormal stock return of 
16.5% for the 12 month period after the announcement. The stock price changes are larger 
when the shares pass to a new blockholder, when management cooperates and allows the 
blockholder to influence corporate policy and when the blockholder eventually purchases the 
company. In the situation when the company is not acquired, the stock prices decline over a 
40 day period before stabilising. However, the average cumulative abnormal return over a 12 
month period remains positive and significant at 5.6%. This evidence suggests that large 
shareholders are perceived in the stock market to increase the wealth of all shareholders. 
 
However, when Holderness and Sheenan (1988) compare the performance of a company with 
a blockholder to a sample of companies with widely distributed ownership, the authors find 
no statistical difference in their Tobin’s Q or accounting profitability measures. Similarly, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) also find no relationship between Tobin’s Q and the presence 
of a blockholder or the fraction of equity held by a blockholder. This result holds for both the 




In sum, the literature provides little substantial evidence of a causal link between absolute 
levels of shareholder concentration and firm performance.  This  is not to say that 
concentrated shareholders do not have strong incentives to monitor managers; the positive 
market reaction to trades that result in a blockholder being created suggests that ownership 
concentration is viewed positively by the market. A possible explanation is provided by Kahn 
and Winton (1998).  
 
Kahn and Winton (1998) develop a theoretical model to show that, all else being equal, 
monitoring of management will occur in companies that are publicly perceived as poor 
performers, and weakest for the companies that are perceived to be good performers. They 
also show that monitoring would be more likely to occur in situations that are relatively 
                                                                                                                                                        
117
 The book value of assets of the companies in the sample varies from US$2 million to US$1.7 billion. The 
mean (median) is US$247 million (US$85 million). 
118
 Refer to section 5.4.1.2 for details regarding sample size and methodology. 
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accessible from well-informed outsiders and in situations where management is clearly 
performing below expectations. In contrast, the model indicates that monitoring is less likely 
in companies that specialise in new technology, where the business relies heavily on 
intangible assets and/or they conduct business in a relatively young industry. Kahn and 
Winton’s theory suggests that the positive market reaction found by Barclay and Holderness 
(1991) in response to blockholder trades occurs because the companies in which the trades 
occur are in particular need of the disciplinary oversight provided by the blockholder. 
 
In closing this brief review of ownership concentration and managerial monitoring, it is worth 
noting Zeckhauser and Pound’s (1990) hypothesis that monitoring of management is 
commonly undertaken in well understood industries such as retailing, textiles and publishing. 
They predict that monitoring of management is less likely in technology-based industries. To 
test their conjectures, the authors sort each industry based on the ease of monitoring, and 
examine the effects of a single outside shareholder with a holding greater than 15% of the 
issued shares. Using a sample of 286 companies, the authors report that large shareholders are 
associated with significantly higher earnings growth rates in the industries where monitoring 
is readily undertaken. Further, there is no relationship between the large shareholder and 
expected earnings growth rates for the industries where it is hypothesised that monitoring of 
management would be difficult. 
 
5.4.4 ASX’s Experience 
At demutualisation the ASX Act 1997 provided for a maximum shareholding in ASX of 5% 
by any individual or entity. On October 2001, ASX Act 1997 was amended to increase the 
shareholding ceiling to 15%. Why did the government choose a 5% shareholding limit? And, 
what were the reasons that prompted the revision?  
 
To answer the first question, perhaps the government believed that ownership composition is 
not an important determinant of company performance in the Australian environment and the 
political and economic risks in having ASX controlled by a single entity were too high to 
bear. The assumption that ownership composition does not matter to performance is 
consistent with the empirical results of Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997). The view that 
political concerns coloured the government’s policy is also consistent with the evidence. A 
director of ASX stated that while the limit was restrictive from a strategic point of view, it 
was the government’s belief that no one should have the ability to influence the decision 
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making process of ASX due to its significant role in the Australian economy. Others shared 
the government’s view. For instance, Rob Thomas stated, “I don’t think that anyone should 
be able to gain control of the exchange. For example, if Computershare was to gain control it 
is likely that they would reduce the amount of intermediation so that they could increase their 
own profitability”. 
 
It is debateable whether there is a significant risk of substantial adverse consequences if one 
party were to gain control of ASX. In particular, it is not obvious why a profit maximising 
controlling shareholder would implement reforms that constrain or reduce market activities. 
The experience of the Swedish Stock Exchange, discussed in section 3.3, shows that a having 
controlling shareholder is entirely compatible with improved efficiency. 
 
While the merits of the 5% ceiling are debateable, there has been broad agreement of the 
costs entailed. Among them was the inability to implement significant capital restructurings 
such as a share buyback or issue of convertible debt. The 5% shareholding limit also reduced 
ASX’s ability to forge relationships with other international exchanges or technology 
companies; relationships that are typically cemented by each party holding of substantial 
equity stakes in the other.   These links are likely to become increasingly important as ASX 
seeks to reduce the proportion of the market held by the largest companies. At 31 December 
2000, the top ten and 50 stocks by market capitalisation accounted for 42.21% and 70.03% of 
the total value of trades respectively.
119
  
The relatively short period before the ownership ceiling was lifted from 5% to 15% suggests 
that costs described above became quickly evident to the government. In any event, all of the 
former members and ASX directors who were interviewed prior to the increase in voting 
power indicated their support for the revision. One ASX director commented “we were 
certainly pushing for a 15% limit at the time of demutualisation. It would certainly provide 
management with greater flexibility. For example, it would allow NASDAQ or some other 
exchange to buy a strategic stake in our company”. Similarly, Maurice Newman said, “we 
never wanted a limit in the first place. We said, ‘if we are required to have a limit then we 
would prefer a limit similar to the Banks (Shareholding) Act 1972’. It is undoubtedly a 
restriction from a strategic point of view”.  
 
                                                 
119
 Australian Stock Exchange Fact Book (2001). 
 61  
Even through the limitation has been increased to 15%, some of the former members have 
argued that the limit should be removed completely. For example, John McIntosh at the time 
of demutualisation said, “initially I was concerned that an individual or company would be 
able to control ASX. However, my attitude has changed. I now view ASX as a technology 
company. I think there would be significant benefits if a company such as Computershare 
gained control of ASX”. Notwithstanding Mr McIntosh’s point, there are grounds for 
believing the 15% shareholding limit represents a significant improvement in the quality of 
corporate governance at ASX.  As the discussion in the preceding section indicates, a 
blockholding of 15% is probably enough to provide sufficient incentive for the holder to 
monitor management closely and take action when appropriate.  
 
The 15% ceiling also allows ASX to link non-executive directors’ remuneration to 
performance through the adoption of an equity-based incentive plan. This would create a 
greater financial incentive for the non-executive directors to be active in their managerial 





However, even after approving the increase to 15% of voting power, there are a number of 
interrelated questions. Does the share register consist of a majority of retail investors? If there 
are any institutions or blockholders on the share register, will they have an incentive to 
monitor management? From Table C8 it is difficult to determine exactly what effect either 
the 5% or more recent 15% shareholding ceiling has had on the composition of the share 
register. Although it appears that no individual or institution owns more than a 6.68% as at 
August 2001, the large number of nominee and trustee companies makes it impossible to 
determine the exact composition of ASX’s share ownership structure. These questions can 
only be answered if the beneficial shareholders were traced under Section 723A of the 
Corporations Law. 
 
If ASX’s CHESS records were made available for research purposes, it would have been 
possible to examine the changes in shareholder concentration since ASX’s listing.
121
 This 
analysis could have been extended by comparing ASX with a sample of other companies with 
                                                 
120
 Refer to section 5.3.3 for further discussion.  
121
 Shareholder concentration could be measured by the percentage of common stock held by the largest five, ten 
and 20 stockholders in addition to a Herfindahl index. 
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5% ownership restrictions, e.g, AMP Limited and Telstra Limited. Alternatively, research 
could be conducted which examined ASX ownership structures and performance pre and post 
October 2001 when the legislative amendments were approved by ASX. The provision of 
settlement information would also have allowed for an examination of ownership 
concentration and its effect on the performance of ASX’s share price. These are areas for 
future research. 
 
6.0 ASX Stakeholders and Demutualisation 
6.1 Efficiency Ratio Analysis 
This section evaluates whether in the 12 months since the change of organisational structure 
ASX has benefited from an increase in efficiency. The analysis compares ASX with four 
other exchanges from the Asia-Pacific region across a range of efficiency ratios. The control 
sample of exchanges include the SES, SEHK, New Zealand Stock Exchange (‘NZSE’) and 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (‘KLSE’). The calculations are based over an eight year 
period from 1994 to 2001.
122
 The information to calculate the ratios was obtained from the 




All exchanges analysed have an automated order driven market. For the majority of the 
sample period, all exchanges that constitute the control sample were mutual organizations.    
However, both the Singapore and Hong Kong Stock exchanges demutualised in 2000.
124
  
Table B10 and B11 compare the size of the exchanges based upon the value of trading and 
market capitalization.
125
  ASX was approximately the same size as SEHK and KLSE for both 
measures until the end of the 1996 financial year. In the following four years, the SEHK is 
the only exchange in the sample of similar size in terms of both market capitalization and 
trading volume, due to substantial declines in the size and trading volumes of control 
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 It was not possible to gain the 1999 Annual Reports for KLSE or SES. The figures for SEHK are estimates 
based on the interim financial results for the six months to 31 December 1999.  
123
 The exchange rates were obtained from Westpac Banking Corporation for June 30 of each year. If this day 
was not available the nearest available day was used. The exchange rate equated to the mid-point of the buy and 
sell quotes for the specific day. 
124
 Singapore integrated it’s derivatives and equity exchanges on the 1
st
 December 1999 and the merged entity 
listed on the 23
rd
 November 2000. Hong Kong integrated the futures and stock exchanges to listed under the 
name, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd in June 2000. 
125
 This information was gained from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges Annual Reports. To 
ensure the validity of the comparisons all the exchanges included in the sample count turnover only as the 
transactions that pass through their trading systems. It should be noted that all the figures are based on a 31 
December balance date. This method was chosen due to the lack of consistency between the different exchanges 
when disclosing the level of market activity in their Annual Reports.  
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markets.  This suggests greater weight should be given to the comparison between ASX and 
SEHK.   
 
There is no obvious “right” accounting performance measure to use when undertaking this 
type of assessment. A collection of ratios that reflect efficiency is used so as to provide a 
clearer picture. Trends are investigated over time to determine whether there are any obvious 
changes that may be directly linked to the change in organisational structure. 
 
The asset utilisation ratio (defined as operating income divided by average assets)
126
 reflects 
how efficiently a company’s assets are employed. The higher the ratio, the greater the 
contribution the assets are making to the company’s profitability. The results in Table B12 
and Figure B6 provide some support for the expectation that ASX benefited from an increase 
in efficiency as a result of demutualisation.  In the three years prior to the decision (1994-
1996), the asset utilisation ratio declined from 50.2% to 35.7%. Since the end of 1997, ASX’s 
ratio increased from 33.5% to 77.4%. A significant proportion of the improvement occurred 
after the change in organisational structure. Critics may argue that this is purely a result of the 
increasing volume of transactions.  However, Table B7 indicates that the number of equity 
trades has increased steadily between 1995 and 2000, dropping slightly from its record high 
in the most recent period. Moreover, during the entire sample period all four international 
exchanges experienced a decline in their asset utilisation ratio.  
 
However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the SEHK experienced an improvement 
in the ratio between 1995 to 1998 before a substantial decline in the following financial years. 
A reasonable interpretation of this result is that the SEHK suffered from the Asian financial 
crisis.
127
 In support of this interpretation, Table B10 shows that the value of trading (the main 
revenue driver for stock exchanges) declined on all the Asian stock exchanges between 1 
January and 31 December 1998. In the SEHK’s interim financial report for the six months to 
31 December 1998 it stated “the economic downturn continued to affect our markets. The 
credit squeeze normally seen in a bear economy added difficulties to the commercial sector 
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 Average assets are used instead of total assets so as not to bias results against growing organisations. This is 
consistent with the method used by O’Hara (1981). 
127
 The Asian crisis began in June 1997 with large falls in all the Asian currencies. The second stage of the crisis 
began in October 1997 when the effects spread to the stock markets. For example, over a four day period the 
SEHK lost approximately 25% of its total valuation [“Crisis or opportunity?”, Asiasphere  KPMG 
International Monthly Newsletter, March 1998]. Stock market volatility, corporate collapses and other related 
problems were still being experienced at the end of 1998. 
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and led to a number of corporate collapses.” However it must be noted that despite recent 
improvements in the value of trading on all exchanges, Asian exchanges have continued to 
exhibit low and declining asset utilisation ratios. 
 
The operating expense/operating income ratio also supports the hypothesis that 
demutualisation improved ASX’s efficiency [refer to Table B13 and Figure B7]. This 
particular ratio follows a similar pattern to the asset utilisation ratio. In the three years prior to 
the demutualisation decision, ASX suffered from a reduction in efficiency. This continued 
into 1997. Over this four year period, the ratio increased from 71% to 89%. The ratio then 
declined from the 1997 high of 89% to 63% in 2001. Importantly, a significant portion of the 
improvement came in the 1999 financial year. During the same period, three of the four 
overseas exchanges experienced a decrease in their cost-effectiveness based on the operating 
expense/operating income ratio. The SEHK followed a similar direction to ASX. Apart from 
the direct year following demutualisation of ASX, SEHK has experienced gradual increases 
in efficiency consistent with the experience of ASX. A combination of the Asian financial 
crisis, the demutualisation of ASX or the merger and demutualisation of the Hong Kong 
Futures and Stock exchanges could explain this result. 
 
Another ratio reviewed is operating expenses over average assets (management expense 
ratio). Based on this ratio, ASX has performed poorly both relative to the other exchanges 
and on an individual basis [refer to Table B14 and Figure B8]. Three of the four control 
exchanges showed a gradual improvement over the specified time frame. ASX, on the other 
hand, suffered from a decline in the ratio post-1996. Further, demutualisation does not appear 
to have had any impact on the efficiency with which managers manage the exchange’s assets. 
However, this ratio is generally a crude measure of managerial expense behaviour. This ratio 
may have been more appropriate in previous years when exchanges produced a homogeneous 
product. In more recent years, with the globalisation of world’s financial markets, exchanges 
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 For example, ASX has introduced a number of innovative products in recent years. These include low 
exercise price options, capped call warrants, call and put warrants over currencies, barrier index warrants and 
premium income warrants. This trend has continued in 1999 with management deciding to establish an interest 
rate market and ASX index derivatives. 
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Another crude measure of managerial expense behaviour is fixed assets/total assets. 
However, this ratio is unlikely to be applicable to stock exchanges as a high percentage of 
fixed assets relate to computer software and equipment which are central to the markets 
operating effectively. This notion is supported by the fact that for the majority of exchanges, 
the ratio increased over the sample period.  However the behaviour of the ratio for most 
exchanges is highly variable, again placing doubts as to the soundness of this measure as a 
proxy for managerial expense behaviour. [refer to Table B15, Figure B9] 
 
Perhaps a more appropriate measure to capture managerial expense behaviour would be total 
staff costs divided by the average number of employees. The results reported in Table B16 
and Figure B10 show that between 1996 and 1999 the average remuneration package per 
ASX employee increased from $63,380 to $80,560 (a 27% increase). However, ASX’s ratio 
has increased at a slower rate than the New Zealand and Hong Kong exchanges despite being 




The final measure of cost-effectiveness is operating income/average number of employees. 
Table B17 and Figure B11 show that between 1997 and 1999 ASX employees improved their 
productivity by 37%. The NZSE followed a very similar pattern except for 1999. One 
explanation for this is that ASX benefited from the change in organisational structure. In 
support of this argument, ASX’s 1999 financial year was characterised by a 17% 
improvement in operating revenue and a 5.7% reduction in the number of employees (or 34 
employees). Although the SEHK experienced significant gains in both 1997 and 1998,
130
 on 
investigation, the improvement appears to have originated from unprecedented gains in 




Overall, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that organisations experience 
efficiency gains from the conversion process. Any evidence that is found to support the 
efficiency hypothesis is generally observable in the year prior to the change as well as the 
year of conversion. Perhaps this is because ASX’s demutualisation was approved and 
announced in the 1997 financial year. Management may have sought change in preparation 
for the listing of the exchange and, in doing so, was able to maximise the members and their 
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 No other comparisons could be undertaken as the other exchanges failed to disseminate the required 
information in their Annual Reports.  
130
 The improvement equated to a 227% increase between 1996 and 1998. 
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own wealth. This was supported by comments made by Maurice Newman. He stated “as soon 
as the board and the members approved the proposal, management set out to change the 
culture. We identified the inefficient practices and provided ways for which we could 
improve our efficiency and hence our profitability”. The results are also consistent with 
Thomson’s (1997) study that analyses the conversion of mutual building societies to banks 
using similar efficiency ratios. She finds evidence that some behavioural changes occur after 
the announcement date and prior to the demutualisation. 
 
There are a number of limitations that may restrict the validity of this analysis. Firstly, three 
years is not a very long time to implement change and review the consequences. Further, the 
short time frame means that macroeconomic factors (for example the Asian crisis) have an 
even greater effect on the results. This could be overcome in future research by including 
international exchanges from different geographical areas in the control sample, and further 
extending analysis over a longer period of time.
 132
  The last problem specific to our sample is 
that two of the control sample exchanges demutualised shortly after the ASX demutualised. 
Such initiatives by foreign exchanges were likely to bias the effectiveness of the control 
sample in recent years following demutualisation of these foreign exchanges. 
 
Another potential problem is that accounting information is prone to manipulation and 
distortion. Also, consideration should be given when interpreting the results that accounting 
standards can differ between countries which may produce different classifications of asset, 
liability, revenue and expense items. This may make it difficult to obtain accurate 
comparisons between various exchanges. However, it should be noted that in producing the 
ratios, adjustments were made if there were any obvious discrepancies between the 
exchanges accounting classifications. For example, since 1997 the SEHK’s balance sheet and 
accounts included the Options Clearing Members’ margin fund as a current asset. No other 
exchange used this approach.  
 
6.2 Members 
It is obvious that former members of ASX benefited financially, in the short term, from the 
demutualisation process. Figure D1 demonstrates that after the initial 178 days of trading, the 
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 The Hong Kong options market opened on 8 September 1995. 
132
 The task of increasing the sample size may be quite difficult. All the other international stock exchanges 
either have a 31 December or 31 March balance date. This means that either ASX’s or the control sample’s 
financial accounts would have be adjusted to ensure the accuracy of the results. 
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buy and hold abnormal returns for ASX were 117%. This compares favourably with the 
average buy and hold abnormal return of 12.8% for all the other Australian companies that 
have also demutualised and listed on ASX’s market.
133
 Over this period, ASX is the most 
successful Australian demutualisation measured by share price performance. The only other 
demutualisation that has realised a buy and hold abnormal return of greater than 50% in the 
first 178 days of trading is Adelaide Bank (90.6%).  
 
However, there were mixed views as to whether the stockbroking industry has benefited from 
ASX’s change in organisational structure. The Chairman of ASX, Maurice Newman, stated 
in an interview “I believe that the stockbroking industry has benefited from ASX’s 
improvement in efficiency and ability to provide services at a lower cost. The stockbroking 
industry will also benefit from a number of our new initiatives including the NASDAQ 
alliance, Bloomberg agreement, third party clearing and the BLOX trading system
134
 ... 
While it is true that we have increased our variable trading costs, we still remain one of the 
cheapest international exchanges. This will become even more obvious with the introduction 
of volume discounts for the large stockbroking organisations”. 
 
However, some former members held contrasting views. One former member argued that the 
real beneficiaries from the demutualisation were the natural person members. He noted that 
“the majority of members who benefited were on the verge of retirement”. The former 
member argued that “demutualisation has not provided any significant benefits for the 
stockbroking industry”. Similarly, another former member commented “only the members 
benefited from the demutualisation through the financial windfall. The stockbroking industry 
has actually suffered from the demutualisation. For example, variable trading costs have 
increased seven times for trades over $750,000. The ASX argues that despite the increases it 
has remained internationally competitive. However, ASX seem to forget that to execute large 
transactions stockbrokers will usually spit the trades into 50 small parcels. In contrast, in the 
US there is the necessary liquidity for these trades to be executed in one parcel”.  
 
Rob Thomas also agreed that apart from the initial financial windfall, the stockbroking 
industry has failed to realise many other benefits. Although he did say “I suppose one other 
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 The sample consists of AMP, National Mutual Holdings, St George Bank, Colonial, Adelaide Bank, Bank of 
Melbourne, Challenger Bank, Advance Bank and Metway Bank. 
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benefit is that the exchange can now make strategic decisions on a more timely basis. It has 
meant that initiatives such as third party clearing have been allowed to proceed”. However, 
he also said, “the increase in trading costs has certainly influenced the profitability of 
Salomon Smith Barney. For a trade over $750,000 the exchange now charges $15. Previously 
the same trade would have cost $2.19. It has meant that our costs are up by about 50% in the 
current financial year”. Although, Rob Thomas did note that, in part, the increases in cost 
levels could be attributed to the new method of dealing with institutions. He said, 
“institutions now demand that (in respect to shares sold) they receive the average price over 
the day which has meant that many large trades need to be broken into lots of small parcels”. 
 
6.3 Listed Companies 
Companies listed on the exchange are one of the three major stakeholders in ASX’s business. 
At the year ended 30 June 1999, listing fees from companies totalled $32.5 million (or 21.3% 
of total operating revenue). While in recent years, listing fees revenue has decreased (as a 
proportion to total operating revenue),
135
 listing revenue remains an important source of 
revenue and thus it is vital that the exchange remains internationally competitive based on 




While it is obvious that lower listing fees will provide economic benefits to ASX listed 
companies, the effect of market efficiency is more obscure. A more efficient market is able to 
reduce the costs and risks associated with trading. As a direct consequence investors (both 
international and domestic) are more likely to invest in ASX listed companies. In turn, this 
will reduce the costs of raising equity – an important source of funding for many publicly 
traded companies. In support, Harris (1990) states that “investors who must move quickly 
move funds between cash and securities  for whatever reason  therefore value liquidity and 
are willing to pay for it. The costs of acquiring capital will therefore be lowest for firms 
whose securities trade in liquid markets”. Hence, if the ASX listed companies have benefited 
from the demutualisation there will have been a reduction in listing fees and an improvement 
in market efficiency in the period after the change in structure. 
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 The Bloomberg agreement and BLOX trading system were not implemented due to the failure of regulatory 
approval by ASIC. 
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 At the year ended 30 June 2001, listing fees from companies totalled $34.1 million (or 17.7% of total 
operating revenue)   
136
 Aitken (1993) states that market efficiency is a function of liquidity, transparency, volatility and transaction 
costs. 
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Table D1 provides mixed evidence as to whether ASX listed companies benefited from the 
change in ASX’s organisational structure.  With the exception of 1994, listing fees increased 
at a constant rate from 1990 up to the demutualisation year. However, in the first year 
following demutualisation, listing fees declined from $27,930 to $26,520 per listed company. 
Further  declines in listing fees were observed for the following two years with revenue per 
listed company declining by 15% between 1999 and 2001. However it remains questionable 
whether this is considered economically significant.  A more noticeable change occurred in 
the immediate period after the demutualisation decision in 1996, where listing  fees increased 
from $23,200 to $27,930 (a 20.4% increase).  
 
To gain a more accurate assessment of whether ASX listed companies have benefited from 
demutualisation, ASX listing fees are compared against a sample of international stock 
exchanges. The comparison is made with nine other international exchanges: NZSE, NYSE, 
NASDAQ, TSE, CSE, LSE, SSE, Tokyo Stock Exchange and SEHK.
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 Table D2 and Table 
D3 demonstrate that ASX, despite the constant increases in listing fees since 1990, has 
improved its international competitiveness post-demutualisation [also refer to Figure D2 and 
Figure D3].
138
 The only two exchanges that have lower listing fees are the NZSE and CSE. 
However, these exchanges are considerably smaller exchanges than ASX based on market 
capitalisation and the value of transactions. Importantly, Table D3 and Figure D3 show that 
ASX has remained a cheaper stock exchange for companies to list than its major competitors 




6.4 Stock Market Investor  
It is difficult to quantify whether investors have benefited from ASX’s demutualisation. This 
problem is compounded by the short time frame post-demutualisation.  Despite this, two 
areas have been identified where investors may have benefited indirectly from the 
demutualisation process. They are a reduction in ASX’s trading charges and an improvement 
in market efficiency. However, as documented in section 6.2 ASX trading charges have 
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 All the figures are from each of the exchanges Annual Reports. The pre-demutualisation period refers to the 
listing fees for 1996. The post-demutualisation period refers to the listing fees using the most recent Annual 
Report available. The balance dates are either 31 December 1998, 31 March 1999 or 30 June 1999.  
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 The listing revenue has been adjusted for currency differences at the end of each exchanges financial year. 
The exchange rates were obtained from Westpac Banking Corporation. The exchange rate equated to the mid-
point of the buy and sell quotes for the specific day. 
 70  
remained relatively constant between 1991 and 2001. Evidence with respect to market 
efficiency is presented below.  
 
To provide an optimal level of market efficiency, ASX needs to minimise transaction costs 
and maximise liquidity. The relevance of liquidity has been discussed earlier. The importance 
of minimising transaction costs is evident in Block, French and McInish’s (1995) finding that 
the bid-ask spread is a major component of indirect transaction costs, being 35% of total 
transaction costs. Similarly, Aitken and Swan (1995) demonstrate that the bid-ask spread 
represents 36% of the cost of transacting on ASX’s market. Aitken and Swan also conclude 
that a 1% reduction in transaction costs will translate into a 1.2% increase in trading volume. 
 
To see whether any changes have occurred in ASX’s market efficiency as a result of 
demutualisation, both liquidity and transaction costs are measured for a ten month period 
surrounding ASX’s conversion to a stock-based company. The following measures are used 
to proxy for liquidity and transaction costs: 
 
a) Liquidity: 
We use market depth as a measure of liquidity. Many microstructure research papers proxy 
market depth by the quantity quoted at the best bid and ask. However, Aitken, Brown and 
Walter (1995) show that this method is flawed as it only captures approximately 17% of all 
trades recorded on SEATS. Using the methodology from Aitken and Comerton-Forde (1999), 
this study defines market depth as the value of orders in the bid-ask schedule between the 
best bid (ask) and the price 5% below (above) the midpoint. The orders are weighted linearly 
where heavier weights are placed on orders closer to the midpoint.  
 





LIQDOWN  =   (bid order price)(bid order quantity)(bid order  
weighting) 
LIQUP   =   (ask order price)(ask order quantity)(ask order  
weighting) 
 
Bid order weighting =  bid order price – price 5% above midpoint 
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 As at 31 December 1998, ASX had a total market capitalisation of $536,285 million. At the same point in 
time, the total market capitalisation for TSE, SEHK and SSE ranged between $456,734 million and $885,902 
million. 
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            mid point price – price 5% above midpoint 
 
Ask order weighting  =   price 5% above midpoint – ask order price 
    price 5% above midpoint – midpoint price 
 
b) Transaction costs: 
Relative spread is used to measure the bid-ask spread because it controls for the positive 
relationship between bid-ask spreads and stock prices [Aitken and Frino (1994)]. By using 
the midpoint of the spread for the stock price, RELSPREAD also is able to avoid the effects of 
bid-ask bounce. 
 




Ask = best ask 
Bid = best bid 
 
The data to implement the above measures are trading data from the SEATS database 
maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (‘SIRCA’). The 
SEATS database provides a record detailing the price, volume, date, time and broker for 
every order and trade submitted and executed. 
 
The initial sample includes all the companies that were included in the All Ordinaries index 
between the 7 January 1998 and 23 July 1999. The pre-demutualisation period extends from 
7 January 1998 to 13 October 1998. The post-demutualisation period includes all the trading 
days between 15 October 1998 and 23 July 1999. Any stocks that are included in or excluded 
from the index during these periods are eliminated from the sample. Companies are also 
excluded if they had undertaken a stock split or a reverse stock split during the specified time 
frame or if they had missing observations. The final sample includes 173 companies for the 
market depth measure and 189 for the transaction cost measure.  
 
For both the liquidity and transaction cost proxies data were collected at every hour, except 
for the opening and closing periods, for each day of trading during the specified time frame. 
A daily average was provided for each company. Each daily company average in the sample 
was then used to produce a daily All Ordinaries index average.  
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There is evidence to suggest that liquidity has improved in the time period post-
demutualisation. Using a pooled variance t test, the mean for the pre-demutualisation period 
is $241,372. In comparison, the mean for the post-demutualisation period is $310,595. The 
difference between the means for the two sample periods is significant at the 1% level (t 
statistic = -12.38). These results can be seen graphically in Figure D4, Figure D5 and Figure 
D6]. Similarly, a pooled variance t test shows the decline in the relative bid-ask spread 
variable in the post-demutualisation period is significant at the 1% level (t statistic = 7.10). In 
support, Figure D7 identifies a clear downward trend in the relative bid-ask spread in the 
post-demutualisation period [also refer to Figure D8 and Figure D9]. 
 
While there is evidence to suggest market efficiency has improved since the demutualisation 
of ASX, it is questionable whether this is a direct result of the demutualisation process. More 
than likely, it is a consequence of the increased trading volumes that were experienced in the 
‘bull’ market observed in the immediate period following demutualisation. Again, a longer 
time frame post-demutualisation would allow for a more accurate analysis, as it would reduce 
the effect of the cyclical nature of the securities industry. 
 
Interestingly, the three ASX directors interviewed all argued that the greatest beneficiaries of 
the demutualisation were investors in the stock market. One ASX director commented “I 
would say that investors have gained the most from the demutualisation. In the future, they 
will benefit from the new initiatives such as the alliance with NASDAQ, the introduction of 
BLOX and third party clearing… I believe that there are many more benefits still to be 
realised”. Maurice Newman also stated that investors have been the major beneficiaries of the 
demutualisation process.  
 
7.0 Evaluation of ASX’s Model 
All former members who were interviewed agreed change needed to occur if ASX was going 
to be able to compete with other exchanges on a global basis in the future. Rob Thomas stated 
“in order to compete internationally ASX had to change its structure – it needed to get away 
from the club mentality”. So the question is not whether change needed to occur but rather 
whether the model used by ASX was the most effective way to adapt to the changes in the 
world’s equity markets. To answer this question, all the reform proposals canvassed at the 
time of the demutualisation decision are identified and analysed. A critique of the model 
adopted by ASX is also provided. Finally, the future direction of ASX is assessed. 
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7.1 Options for Reform  
In 1995, the board of ASX decided to reconsider its organisational structure. As discussed in 
section 2.4, part of this process involved establishing a Governance Task Force to investigate 
all options available. Excluding demutualisation, Hogan Stokes (who participated in 12 of the 
Governance Task Force meetings) canvassed ten different options that were available to 
ASX.
140
 Each of the following options were considered whereby ASX would: 
 
a) Eliminate the natural person members or create a separate membership class for the 
natural person members which would have restricted voting rights.  
 
Under this proposal, ASX would have been brought under the control of the corporate 
members. This was very similar to the 1994 proposal discussed in detail in section 2.3. 
Hogan Stokes argued that the potential advantage of this option would have been to place 
ownership and control in the hands of the principal users of ASX services. However, 
Hogan Stokes noted that this proposal would have failed to overcome all of the problems 




This particular option did have some support among the former members who were 
interviewed. One stated “it is my belief that the most effective structure would have seen 
ASX remain as a mutual and remove the natural person membership. Individual 
membership of stock exchanges had certainly become an anachronism”. This is 
contrasted with the view shared by the current directors. One director commented “some 
may argue that the adoption of the 1994 proposal would have achieved the same result. 
However, I believe that the new structure gives ASX greater flexibility and the ability to 
make decisions on a more timely basis. We would still have had the problem of collective 
decision making under the 1994 proposal, something that I believe would have limited 
our development”. 
 
b) Allow non-stockbrokers membership to a mutual ASX. Possible inclusions to 
membership were listed companies, institutional investors and financial institutions.  
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 No other alternatives were identified by any of the former members during the interview process. 
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At the time, it was argued that wider ownership of a mutual ASX would have had the 
advantage of providing the board with a larger group of stakeholders who could be levied 
if ASX required further capital. However, this approach would have caused an even 
greater divergence of the members’ interests. In this situation, the collective decision 
making process would have become even more time-consuming and cumbersome. In the 
view of Hogan Stokes, this proposal would have had difficulty gaining the necessary 
support from the members and making new membership attractive enough to non-
stockbrokers. 
 
c) Alter the board structure to allow for more independent, non-stockbroker directors and/or 
more directors who would represent other ASX stakeholders, such as listed companies 
and institutional investors.  
 
Hogan Stokes was concerned that a board without a majority of stockbroker directors 
would raise member concerns about their liability created by the levy obligation under 
Article 7 of the Articles of Association. They also stated that a “parliamentary-type board 
representing various constituencies may have even greater difficulty making timely 
strategic decisions under future competition”.  
 
In isolation, it is difficult to see how this proposal would have significantly improved the 
competitiveness of ASX as a business. More than likely, this proposal was considered 
combined with other reforms such as the abolishment of the natural members.  
 
d) Separate ownership of ASX from market access.  
 
Under this proposal, the mutual ownership structure would have been retained. At the 
same time, market access would have been granted through contractual agreements with 
non-member participants.   
 
The benefits of this proposal were limited. It is widely recognised in the organisational 
structure literature that the major benefit of a mutual structure is that it provides some 
assurance to the customers that the company will not charge inappropriate prices for use 
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of their services.
142
 The question arose  what would the incentives be for someone to 
become a member of ASX? Further, Hogan Stokes argued that gaining support from the 
members could have been difficult to achieve. 
 
e) Remove Article 80 from the Articles of Association thereby allowing the payment of 
dividends to the members.  
 
Hogan Stokes identified that the payment of dividends could increase the ability of ASX 
to reward its members and provide returns which offset their liability. It was thought that 
this proposal would help realign the interests of the members and ASX by giving the 
members a greater incentive to agree to proposals that would benefit ASX as a business. 
While this proposal may have lessened the divergence of interests between ASX and the 
members, it was highly questionable whether it would have overcome the problem. If the 
situation arose where ASX put forward a proposal that would greatly improve its 
competitiveness yet would impose substantial costs for the members to implement the 
required technology, ASX would still have had difficulties implementing the changes. In 
addition, the problem of the divergence of interests within the membership would have 
remained. Any decision made by ASX would not necessarily provide equal benefits or 
costs to the members therefore making it difficult to gain 75% of the members approval. 
 
Another potential problem with this proposal was that dividend payments would run 
down ASX cash reserves. Reserves are a particularly important element of mutuals as 
they have difficulty raising external finance. In these circumstances, the probability of 
ASX levying its members would have increased substantially. There could also have been 
potential problems in deciding on a fair dividend policy. 
 
f) Allow members to have limited rights to sell their ownership interest.  
 
It was proposed that retiring members would be able to sell their rights to new members 
or ASX would be able to repurchase ownership rights from the retiring members. This 
option would have failed to help improve the competitiveness of ASX. The only benefit 
of this reform would have been that members could realise the value of their interests.  
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 Refer to Hansmann (1985) and Kay (1991).  
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g) Provide the members with limited liability by removing Article 7 from the Articles of 
Association.  
 
The implementation of this plan could have severely restricted the development of ASX. 
As a mutual without the ability to raise internal finance, ASX would have had difficulty 
remaining competitive in the new global environment.  
 
h) Adopt a formula for the payment of levies issued by ASX to its members.  
 
This option would have provided members with some certainty about their liability. 
However, in isolation this option would have had difficulty countering any of ASX’s 
major problems. ASX would still have lacked the necessary flexibility to raise finance 
promptly. For example, ASX would have had difficulty revising its takeover bid for the 
SFE if it had been limited to internally generated funds. Hogan Stokes also noted that it 
would have been difficult to determine the appropriate formula.  
 
i) Amend the Articles of Association to provide ASX management with greater scope to use 
their own business judgment without gaining approval from 75% of the members.  
 
This reform would have enabled ASX to strengthen as a business by improving the 
timeliness and flexibility of the decision making process. However, Hogan Stokes argued 
that this would have increased the risk associated with the unlimited liability of members 
and therefore would have been unlikely to gain approval of the members. 
 
j) Review the functions and structure of ASX’s committees, advisory boards in order to 
simplify the decision-making processes.  
 
Hogan Stokes identified that a reform of the committees and advisory boards that 
dominated the mutual ASX operations would have streamlined the decision making 
process. However, gaining approval for this reform would most likely have been difficult. 
The members recognised that the committees were a useful mechanism to help balance 
the interests of the various constituencies within ASX’s membership.  
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Although Hogan Stokes considered each of the options outlined above individually, there 
were also a number of combinations that were considered when deciding which reform 
package would be the most beneficial to ASX and its stakeholders. For example, ASX could 
have introduced option a), c), e), h), i) and j) as one reform package. If this package had been 
adopted it would have substantially refined the decision making process. It would have 
allowed management to use its own business judgement, reduced the number of committees 
and improved the independence of the board. At the same time, the members would have had 
a greater understanding of their liability and would have had their interests more closely 
aligned to the interests of ASX through the payment of dividends.  
 
On face value, this combination of reform proposals may have overcome several of the 
problems confronted by ASX. However, on a closer examination, the underlying problems of 
a mutual structure attempting to compete in a competitive environment would have remained. 
ASX would still have had the problem of the collective decision making process and the 
capital inadequacy that characterises a mutual organisation. While ASX did not require 
further capital, a stock-based company provides the added flexibility for management, i.e., 
funds can be raised more promptly and more easily.  
 
In contrast, one former member stated “I do not believe in the capital argument. As a mutual, 
100% of ASX’s profits were retained. There were no dividends or tax paid. Furthermore, a 
mutual ASX had the advantage of having access to the National Guarantee Fund for capital 
raising purposes. Even if a situation arose where ASX was required to levy its members, 
there is little doubt that the stockbroking organisations would have paid on behalf of the 
natural person members”. While this may be true, this argument is significantly weakened if, 
as stated by Maurice Newman, ASX was not going to have access to SIDA to fund future 
capital requirements. Furthermore, this argument also fails to consider the possibility that the 
smaller corporate members would have been unable to pay any levies on behalf of the 
individual members. 
 
One former member questioned whether the collective decision making process was a 
problem. He said, “the collective decision making process may have affected the timeliness 
of proposals being implemented. However, I can’t remember a situation where it was serious 
problem”. However, as noted by Hogan Stokes, the case for demutualisation is not that a 
mutual cannot make strategic decisions. Rather as competition increases the need for timely 
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decisions increases, which means the collective decision making process becomes inefficient. 
This is even more evident in situations where the interests of the members diverge. 
 
Some of the former members who were interviewed raised their concerns about the 
consequences of ASX transforming to a for-profit organisation. John McIntosh stated “in my 
opinion, ASX should be a market that facilitates trades as cheaply as possible … by 
increasing the costs of trading to extract shareholder wealth, opportunities are provided for 
other companies to enter the market”. He argued that the fragmentation of the Australian 
equities market would have serious ramifications for liquidity. Based on this argument, a 
mutual structure would have best served the needs of ASX stakeholders.  
 
However, after discussions with three of the directors, it was quite clear that they recognised 
that ASX could not afford to increase the fees for its services above internationally 
competitive standards. One director commented “with today’s technology investors will 
choose to carry out their trades in the cheapest market available. There is certainly no loyalty 
among investors”. As shown in section 6.2.1 and section 6.3, there is no evidence to suggest 
that ASX has increased its fees, on average, for either the ASX listed companies or investors 
in the period after demutualisation. 
 
Another reform option considered by ASX was to demutualise but limit the trading of the 
members’ shares to an exempt stock market. This would have prevented any conflict of 
interest arising as a result of ASX being listed on its own market while still fulfilling its role 
as market supervisor. In support of ASX’s decision, Doonan (1999) concludes that the 
demutualisation and listing of ASX on its own market is “not incompatible with self-
regulation”. The author argues that the move will be successful as long as ASX continues to 
meet its obligations under the ASX Act 1997. There is no evidence to the contrary. In fact, one 
of the major concerns of the former members who were interviewed was that ASX might 




A problem with exempt markets is that they tend to be illiquid. ASX’s board decided that it 
would be more beneficial if a liquid and transparent market were formed. Hogan Stokes 
considered that this would ensure that analysts, institutional investors and the media closely 
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followed ASX. It would also provide ASX members with the opportunity to obtain the full 
value of their shares and the most effective method of widening the ownership base.  
 
Consistent with Hogan Stokes’ conclusion, no individual or combination of reforms could 
have overcome, in full, the underlying problems associated with a mutual structure 
attempting to compete in a competitive market. A stock-based company, on the other hand, 
has all the necessary characteristics to provide ASX with the appropriate structure to compete 
on a global basis. In support of this argument, Securities Exchange Commission Chairman, 
Arthur Levitt, has recently stated “in my judgement, if they (NASDAQ and NYSE) rely on 




7.2 Limitations to ASX’s Model 
This monograph has identified some limitations to the model adopted by ASX. Some of the 
limitations are a direct result of political intervention in the open market. Other limitations 
are a result of ASX failing to adopt ‘good’ corporate governance practices. If the 
shortcomings to ASX’s model are not overcome in the near term, there may be a reduction in 
shareholder wealth. In support of this argument, Felton, Hudnut and van Heeckeren (1996) 
survey 50 of the largest US institutional investors with a total of US$840 billion under 
management. For the purpose of the survey, the authors define ‘good’ corporate governance 
as having a clear majority of independent directors who hold significant stock holdings and 
who are, to a large extent, remunerated in stock. The results show that institutional investors, 
on average, are willing to pay a 11% premium for companies that have ‘good’ corporate 
governance. Felton et al. (1996) note “consider the scope and intensity of the effort that 
would be required to earn a similar increase through measures such as cost cutting and higher 
productivity”. 
 
7.3 Supervisory Concerns 
The majority of former members who were interviewed expressed concern that ASX would 
offload their supervisory role to a third party in search of shareholder wealth. One former 
member stated “in order for ASX to maximise profitability there is the possibility that 
management will offload this (supervisory) duty to a third party. More than likely, it would 
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be ASIC. If this were the case, serious problems would be created. Any disputes would be 
easily caught up in the bureaucracy of a government agency”. 
 
Interestingly, in an article published in The Australian Financial Review, Richard Humphry 
suggested that ASX was considering options to transfer its investigative, enforcement and 
surveillance functions to a separate company. He believed that supervision had become an 
issue when Computershare decided to produce a competing bid for the SFE. Richard 




When questioned about the possibility of ASX offloading its supervisory responsibilities and 
how the concerns of some of the largest stockbroking organisations in Australia would be 
alleviated, Maurice Newman responded by stressing the importance of market integrity for 
ASX as a stock-based company. He said, “integrity of the market is our number one, two and 
three priority. It is absolutely imperative that we maintain the integrity of the market. We will 
not offload any part of our supervisory functions that jeopardises the integrity of the market. 
We believe that it is a competitive edge that we hold over our rivals. While I won’t rule out 
the possibility of ASX delegating some of its supervisory role to another entity, I will assure 
you that we will do everything in our powers to retain our role as market supervisors”. 
 
7.4 Future direction of ASX 
Securities markets will continue to transform. While it is not possible to predict the future 
with any degree of certainty, there is no doubt that ASX will have to deal with continual 
change within the coming years. In interviews held with former members and current 
directors of ASX, some interesting views were expressed about the future direction of ASX 
and the world equity markets. 
 
One view expressed involves the emergence of ‘super’ regional exchanges through the 
merger of different national exchanges within the same time zones. This would lead to a 
situation where there were perhaps three major markets – European, Asia-Pacific and North 
America. This scenario has become even more likely with the introduction of a common 
currency in Europe.  One former member said, “there may be a two or three major markets. 
Given the time zones, I imagine that they would be London and the US. This may lead to a 
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situation where Australia’s top-50 stocks may be ‘cherry picked’ with ASX taking the role of 
a regional exchange for small to medium sized companies”. A similar point of view is held 
Frank Zarb, CEO of NASDAQ. He has been quoted in saying “the world is not likely to 
move to a consolidated market, but rather a collection of markets, some strictly domestic, 




Maurice Newman put forward some slightly different scenarios. He stated  “in my opinion, 
the number of exchanges will continue to decrease. I could imagine a situation where in the 
future there are ten major exchanges. Perhaps there will be one major exchange which would 
trade Australia’s top-50 companies with ASX serving more as a regional exchange”.  
 
However, some former members had more extreme views about the future role of ASX in the 
world equity markets.  One commented “the world is evolving so quickly that ASX’s may not 
even exist in the future”. Another former member stated “potentially, the world’s equity 
markets could end up in the same form as the currency markets – in the dealing rooms of the 
major investment banks”.  
 
Another plausible alternative is that exchanges will continue forming alliances and trading 
systems that each offer the trading of securities from a variety of countries. In this regard, 
ASX has already negotiated memorandums of understanding with the stock exchanges in 
Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia and Philippines. ASX has also established an 
alliance with NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX and SGX which allows cross border trading between 
alliance markets.  Perhaps exchanges will start buying strategic stakes in the exchanges with 
which they have formed alliances. For example, the SSE is the largest shareholder in the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange with 15% ownership.
147
 This initiative is part of the SSE’s strategy 
to establish a common Nordic securities market in 2000.
148
 It should be noted that the 
increase in shareholding limits now facilitates international exchanges buying a strategic 
stake in ASX, consistent with our predictions. 
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There is no doubt that world equity markets will continue to evolve. Technology is changing 
the way business is done and the types of products offered by stock exchanges. For ASX this 
may involve initiatives such as the introduction of 20 hour trading and/or the establishment of 
a partnership with a world wide trading network. The changes that confront ASX provide 
both threats and opportunities. Threats from the perspective that easier access to international 
markets afforded by on-line technology may divert investors to overseas markets. Yet, at the 
same time, opportunities will arise for ASX to attract more overseas investors and listed 
companies by maintaining internationally competitive transaction costs, a high level of 
market integrity and market efficiency.  
 
Rob Thomas has observed that “if ASX became less competitive either due to a decline in 
liquidity or increases in trading costs both investors and ASX listed companies could go 
elsewhere as electronic markets develop”. 
 
Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) report that the relative transaction costs are an important 
factor in determining the division of trading volume between the NYSE and a home market 
for those companies that are co-listed. Based on data collected for 254 NYSE listed non-US 
stocks from 48 different countries, the authors conclude that a ten basis point increase in 
home market trading costs, all else being equal, increases the NYSE’s market share by nine 
basis points.
149
 Aitken and Swan (1995) also noted in their discussion of the impact of stamp 
duty that transaction costs are an important consideration when investors are deciding on 
which stock exchange to trade.  
 
International trading cost comparisons are not undertaken in this study as comparisons can be 
misleading due to fundamental differences in the organization of equity markets (i.e., dealer 
versus order driven markets). Instead, we examine if demutualisation has influenced the fee 
that the stockbrokers are charged for using ASX’s services.
150
 Based on Aitken and Swan’s 
(1995) methodology, trading and settlement revenue as a percentage of the value of securities 
traded is used to measure the cost of trading on ASX’s market [refer to Table B3]. While 
ASX’s charges have fluctuated in recent years from 0.019% in 1997, to 0.025% in 2000, and 
then 0.02% in the year ended June 2001, the charges have remained relatively constant when 
compared against the entire sample period (1991-2001). When we use trading and settlement 
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revenue per trade as an alternative measure of trading costs, [refer to table B4] we observe 
that trading costs have decreased marginally since 1997. However again we must recognize 
that trading costs have remained relatively stable over the entire period examined.”   
 
The stabilization of trading revenues per equity trade in 1999 and subsequent decrease in the 
following two periods may at first glance be surprising, however these observations must be 
viewed in the context of recent amendments which ASX has made to order charges.  
Specifically, ASX increased the variable trading costs for large orders at the beginning of the 
1999 financial year to $0.19 per order and 0.002% of the value of trade capped at 
$750,000.
151
  Then in July 2000, ASX introduced volume linked price reductions. It is 
assumed that even absent official volume discounts revenue per trade will diminish to a 
certain extent with corresponding increases volumes.  For this reason, the increase in trading 
costs implemented by ASX in 1999 may have been dampened by trading cost reductions 
associated with the abnormally higher volumes observed (32% increase in trades), resulting 
in similar trading revenue per trade being accrued by ASX in 1998 and 1999 financial years. 
However, the volume discounts introduced in the following periods had the effect of actually 
reducing revenue received per trade thereby explaining the decade’s lowest ever levels of 
revenue per equity trade in 2000 and 2001. [See table B4] 
 
A conceptual examination of the initial listing decision is provided by Foucault and Parlour 
(1999). The authors develop a model where there are two exchanges that compete for the 
listing of companies based on listing fees and trading costs. Their results suggest that large 
initial public offerings (‘IPOs’) will list on the exchange with the lower trading costs and 
higher listing fees. Conversely, the smaller companies will list on the exchange with lower 
listing fees and higher trading costs. 
 
Corwin and Harris (1999) empirically test the model provided by Foucault and Parlour 
(1999). They examine a sample of 590 IPOs in an attempt to ascertain the reasons for the 
initial listing decision. The sample consists of companies that either listed on the NYSE or 
met the NYSE’s minimum listing requirements and decided to list on NASDAQ. The fact 
that 43% of the sample continued to list on NASDAQ implies that the costs and benefits of 
                                                                                                                                                        
150
 These fees are generally not observable by investors as they are reflected in brokerage charges. 
 84  
listing on a particular exchange vary across companies. The authors estimate a probit model 
for the initial listing decision to identify the relative importance of potential listing decision 
criteria.
152
 The positive coefficient on the company size variable is consistent with Foucault 
and Parlour’s (1999) model. Larger companies will list on the market that has lower 
execution costs and higher listing fees. However, the results also indicate that there are other 
criteria that are considered by a company when deciding on which exchange to list. For 
example, the authors find companies tend to list on the exchange where their industry peers 
are listed.  
 
Post-demutualisation, ASX has instigated two major initiatives to respond to the rapid 
globalisation of securities markets.  The first involves the development of international 
alliances with US and Singapore markets.  The ‘ASX World Link’ initiative differs for each 
link: 
 a)The US alliance is a one-way link which enables Australian investors to trade, settle 
and hold a selection of securities and ETFs traded on NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX.  The 
scheme effectively allows investors to trade US securities in a manner which gives them the 
same appearance as securities listed on ASX. 
 b)The Singapore alliance is a reciprocal trading link allows companies to raise 
capital, either in the form of an IPO or add-on offering, in both markets. This reduces the 
need for Australian companies to seek a co-listing in Singapore.  Orders are routed to the 
most liquid market for any security, thus maintaining the sovereignty of each market while 
facilitating order flow between the markets.  ASX has plans to replicate this model to 
establish linkages with other markets.   
 
The second strategic initiative was the launch of a platform for listing and trading exchange 
traded funds (ETFs).This initiative is in conjunction with the development of the Listed 
Investment Fund Exchange (LIFE) which allows trading of managed funds just like 
securities.  In addition to allowing investors to diversify their portfolios, ASX believes this 
trading platform will complement its ASX World Link program and benefit ASX listed 
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Both ASX and the former members interviewed considered that the Internet and development 
of other technology could threaten the viability of ASX in the future. It was thought that on-
line services would stimulate and facilitate an interest in international stocks. The Members’ 
Information Package states that “the impact of technology on the information driven financial 
industry has unarguably led to immediate access to data and almost instantaneous transaction 
capabilities”. The development of the Internet has meant that it is now possible to trade 
companies listed on exchanges throughout the world at low cost. For example, it is possible 
to trade shares listed on NASDAQ for a $20 flat fee (excluding brokerage).
154
 All the current 
directors and former members interviewed unanimously supported the view that investors 
will invest in other markets if ASX become less competitive. 
 
In January 2000, analysts estimated that there were 242 million Internet user worldwide and 
some analysts expect that there will be over one billion users by 2005.
 155
  More importantly, 
on-line trading volume has surged.  In the US, 25-30% of retail trades were made over the 
Internet during 1998. In the first six months of the same year, the number of active on-line 
accounts increased from three million to six million. By the end 2002, Deutsche Bank 
Securities estimate 51% of stock trading to be online.  Currently there are 18 million online 
which are expected to balloon to 28.7 million by 2003.  World developments in Internet use 
have certainly been observed in Australia with the rate of growth of online accounts being 
between 1-2% a day [Semaan 1999].   
 
In addition, Weil (1998) believes there is the potential for exchanges to adopt an Internet-
based market system that would make their market even more accessible to market 
participants. The author states that NASDAQ is planning to move to an Internet-based market 
linking investors to a wide range of exchanges and trading systems. The Managing Director 
of ASX, Richard Humphry, has been quoted as saying “the Internet is not only a potential 
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Thus far, the ASX World Link and ETF trading platform initiatives are the only ventures that 
have been put forward by ASX to overcome the continual danger that the Internet poses to 
the Australian market. As mentioned earlier, cross-border alliances will allow both investors 
and ASX listed companies to have access to foreign markets via SEATS.  In support of this 
agreement, one ASX director said, “I believe that the agreement (cross border trading) will 
provide numerous benefits to ASX some of which may be unforeseen.” 
 
In the United States, alternative trading systems, (‘ATS’)
 157
 have secured an appreciable 
share in the market by enabling cost-effective, order driven, electronic screen trading which 
circumvents the usual intermediaries and avoids high spreads in some established markets.   
 
By October 28 1999, 47 private companies in the US had started to offer these services.  
Most of the operators are formally regulated as stockbrokers. These included Instinet (owned 
by Reuters), POSIT (owned by ITG) and Lattice Trading (owned by State Street).  The 
Arizona Stock Exchange and Tradepoint are formally classified by their respective regulators 
as an exchange.  However, they basically operate in an identical manner.  These proprietary 
systems have steadily increased their market share from 12% in the first quarter of 1998 to 
29% of the trading volume on the NASDAQ in June 2001 [Degryse et al 2001].   The 
systems have also gained a 4% market share of the NYSE trading volume [Dornau 1999].  
In a domestic setting ATS have had a minimal impact on ASX, only accounting for less than 
2% of ASX trading volume.
158
 At the moment, there are only two ATS currently operating – 
POSIT and Instinet. In 1996, when the members were asked to vote on the demutualisation of 
ASX, it was realised that one of the reasons why ATS have had a substantial impact in the 
US equity markets is that they introduced an electronic order book into a dealer based market 
structure. Based on this, it was considered unlikely that ATS would gain a market share in 
Australia similar to the US markets. As John McIntosh
159
 noted “ASX is basically one big 
electronic communication network (‘ECN’)”. Due to the market structure in Australia, ASX 
expects that any proprietary network will work in conjunction with the national exchange 
rather than in competition. 
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In 1999, ASX attempted to counter any threat posed by alternative trading systems by 
proposing a trading facility, BLOX, which was intended to deliver lower block trading costs 
and increased block trading efficiency, and at the same time, complement and enhance 
liquidity on SEATS, ASX’s central order book.  Despite Maurice Newman stating that the 
intiative was necessary in order to counter the threats of ECN’s, BLOX was not implemented 
due to failed regulatory approval.   
 
Despite BLOX failing to be implemented, there is indirect evidence to suggest that the ATS 
may not develop at the rate expected by many commentators. Modigliani and Perotti (1998) 
believe that an “unreliable enforcement regime” results in investors’ rights being poorly 
protected. This reduces the ability of companies to raise equity capital. They state that 
“unreliable legal enforcement ultimately wears out the thread of public confidence in the 
legal process and destroys the necessary sphere of contractual autonomy of the private 
sector”. The authors argue that the recent experience of many companies from less developed 
countries deciding to list in either the US or UK supports this claim. Through the 
Corporations Law and listing rules, ASX is able to facilitate informed and transparent 
trading. By maintaining the confidence of investors and companies ASX may be able to 
survive the threat from alternative systems - although it may be with reduced economic rent. 
 
The CHESS system provides virtually all the clearing and settlement for ASX quoted 
securities. At the time of demutualisation, ASX Settlement and Transfer Corporation 
(‘ASTC’)
160
 was the only approved securities clearing house under the Corporations Law.
161
 
However, Hogan Stokes identified that ASX may be confronted with competition in the 
future from organisations that specialise in clearing and settlement.  
 
Consistent with Hogan Stokes prediction, on 5 August 1998 the Australian Competition and 
Consumers Commission (‘ACCC’) authorised the ASTC and ASX to change their Business 
Rules to explicitly permit stockbrokers to use alternative clearing and settlement procedures. 
At the same time, the ACCC gave authorisation for the ASTC to operate on a commercial 
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basis which would allow the company to transfer any profits to ASX. However, at this stage 
it is unclear whether competition will arise in this area of ASX’s business in the near term. 
While the company’s behaviour is restricted by the Trade Practices Act 1975, at this stage it 
is still able to exhibit monopoly power. 
 
In the derivatives market, there are two clearing organisations – one is operated by ASX and 
the other by the SFE. For underlying financial instruments, each of the clearing organisations 
has specialised in a particular segment of the market. Austraclear Limited (‘Austraclear’) 
provides clearing and settlement services for Australian fixed interest and money markets and 
the Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System specialises in Commonwealth 
government securities. In June 1999, ASX bought a 13% stake in Austraclear.
162
 However, it 
is uncertain whether other companies will attempt to compete with the current clearing 
organisations or whether rationalisation will become prevalent.  
 
Based on the theoretical, empirical and anecdotal evidence provided from the insurance, 
banking and financial services industries it is predicted that ASX will have encountered rising 
levels of competition in the years prior to demutualisation. If this is the case, it is likely that 
management will have endorsed the change in structure in order to remain competitive. Past 
literature recognises that a mutual structure is limited in methods it can adopt to remain 
competitive. This is not to say that all mutual structures need to convert to a stock-based 
company if competition arises. However, it is clear that there is a greater chance of survival. 
 
For many years, the mutual structure provided an appropriate governance mechanism, which 
allowed ASX to operate efficiently. In 1996, ASX gained international recognition for its 
efficiency rating in the top three exchanges in the area of operational risk, settlement 
performance and value for money assessed by Global Securities Consulting Service (UK).
163
 
Furthermore, ASX between 1991 and 1995 achieved overall reductions in its fees to the users 
of the exchange.
164
 By June 1998, ASX had created a balance sheet with net assets totalling 
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Interestingly, ASX has launched two new index option contracts to counter the threat of the 
SFE drawing custom away. One of the index contracts is in the form of a low exercise price 
option and, hence, will directly compete with the SFE’s share price index (‘SPI’) futures 
contract. Both new derivative products are aimed towards the retail investors.
166
 ASX has 
also established an interest rate market that is accessible to both institutional and retail 
investors.
167
 There are four different classes of securities: Commonwealth government 
securities, semi-government securities, corporate bonds and other debt securities. In ASX’s 
1999 Annual Report, it is stated that one of the reasons for the establishment of the interest 
rate market is to exploit the growing interest that “large AAA-rated international borrowers 
have shown in ‘kangaroo bonds’
168
 … that are currently traded over the counter”. At the same 
time, this initiative will give retail investors “a convenient and economical way to diversify 
into liquid fixed-interest securities”.
169
  
7.5 Future Direction of the Stockbroking Industry 
The role of stockbrokers is changing rapidly. The Internet revolution, technological changes 
and demutualisation of stock exchanges have all contributed to the transformation of the 
stockbroking industry. Deutsche Bank Securities estimate that by the end of 2002, 51% of all 
stock trading will be online.  Moreover, Semaan (1999) predicts that up to 80% of trading in 
Australia and the US will be done via internet by 2004.  The transition from the traditional 





All former members who were interviewed stated that transaction revenues (e.g., 
commissions) and assets driven revenues (e.g., funds management and custody) are becoming 
highly commoditised. Each former member predicted that the successful stockbroking 
organisations in Australia would follow a similar model to Charles Schwab & Co.
171
 Not only 
would stockbroking organisations offer services and advice in connection with equities but 
also banking, insurance, superannuation, and debt instruments through multiple channels (i.e., 
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traditional and on-line). In Japan, casualty insurers and discount travel agencies are 
investigating the possibility of adding on-line stockbroking to their business. For example, 





The same former members also expect that stockbrokers will soon be paid based on the level 
of funds under management rather than on the number of transactions undertaken. One of the 
leading stockbroking organisations in the US, Merrill Lynch, has already adopted this 
approach. For an annual fee, a client can receive financial advice and the ability to trade on-
line. This new style of account has attracted between US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion per 
week.
173
 Approximately 20% of the money is new to the company with the remaining 80% 
being transferred from other Merrill Lynch accounts.  
 
One former member had a more extreme view. He predicted that in the future, execution of 
trades would be undertaken free of charge in an attempt to gain greater order flow. In support, 
American Express already offers free on-line execution of trades to customers with more than 
US$100,000 in their brokerage account. Similarly, another on-line stockbroking organisation, 





In a report commissioned by the SEHK, Weil (1998) states several trends will combine to 
reinforce the changes that are transpiring in the stockbroking industry. The author emphasises 
the continued penetration of personal computers throughout the world and that concerns 
about the security and reliability of on-line services will prove to be unfounded. He also 
believes that the convergence of telecommunications, cable and satellite television and 
intense competition will drive down the cost of on-line access. 
 
However, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the volume of on-line trading may not 
increase at a rate expected by many commentators.  Barber and Odean (1999) examine the 
changes in stock trading behaviour and trading performance of a sample of 1,607 investors 
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who switch from phone-based trading to on-line trading during the period of 1991 to 1996. 
Using a control sample of 1,607 investors who do not trade on-line,
175
 the authors find that 
investors who switch to on-line trading are more active and undertake more risks. More 
importantly, those who switch to on-line trading perform poorly. Prior to switching to on-line 
trading the sample of investors, on average, outperform the market by 2.4% annually and the 
matched pair group by 1.7% annually.
176
 In the years after the change to on-line trading the 
sample of investors experiences a decline in performance both relative to the market (-4%) 
and the control group (-1.6%). It is argued that these results are due to overconfidence that is 
enhanced by self-attribution bias, the illusion of knowledge and the illusion of control.  
 
There are other instances of how technology may affect the way stockbroking will be 
conducted in Australia in the future. For example, in Singapore retail investors have the 
ability to trade shares, transfer funds, apply for initial public offerings and check their share 
allotments via a bank’s automated teller machine. Another example is the new wireless 
investment services produced by Reuters. It provides wireless access to real time quotes, 
company fundamentals, market alerts, charts (both historical and intraday) and news 
headlines [Weil (1998)]. How will the stockbroking organisations react to such changes? Rob 
Thomas stated that many stockbroking organisations would follow the US and establish 
formal partnerships with a number of different market participants. He said that the 
institutional banks will have an active interest in discount stockbroking, Internet and 
technology companies and other alternative trading systems such as POSIT and Insitnet. 
These arrangements would allow companies to cope more easily with 24-hour trading and 
take advantage of further advances in technology. 
 
The question arises – what role has demutualisation had in the changing nature of the 
stockbroking industry? Many of the former members believe that change in the industry has 
been partly a result of the demutualisation process and partly due to technological 
advancements and globalisation of world markets. As one former member said, “it was a bit 
of a wake up call for most of the stockbroking organisations. In the past, ASX subsidised its 
services for the benefit of its (corporate) members. However, as a for-profit organisation 
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ASX’s priority is to improve shareholder wealth. This will mean that proposals will only be 
implemented if they benefit ASX as a business”. Under the mutual structure, members were 
able to resist innovations that would reduce their own profitability. As one ASX director 
stated “the members did not like change. They usually felt that change would mean that they 
would have to outlay some capital”. 
 
Over the last three years, the ASX have announced a number of initiatives that may affect the 
direction and/or the profitability of stockbroking organizations.  In particular, the broadening 
of the range of products and services offered, and the introduction of third party clearing will 
have profound implications on stockbroking organizations.”  
 
In May 1999, changes to the rules of ASX and Securities Clearing House (‘SCH’) were 
introduced to separate the trading and settlement functions. As a result of the changes, stock 
market participants will now have a number of choices. They will provide the full range of 
services including trading, settlement and clearing or offer specialised services in either 
execution or clearing. It is proposed that qualified corporations or individuals will be able to 




Smith (1999) postulates that the introduction of third party clearing will increase the number 
of stockbroking organisations and specialist companies. He states that investors will benefit 
from lower dealing costs and a wider range of products. The author also believes that this 
initiative will make the Australian market more attractive for market participants to enter. For 
example, a stockbroking organisation will no longer be required to maintain capital for the 
purpose of clearing and counter-party risk.
178
 In addition, clearing companies are likely to 
have an information technology background that would not have normally been described as 
a stockbroking organisation. Smith argues that this boost to the market should increase 
turnover and liquidity. From the industry perspective, it is expected that the smaller 
organisations will attempt to gain a niche market in a specific financial product. It is unlikely 
that the smaller companies will be able to offer all services – trading, clearing and settlement. 
The author argues that any stockbroking organisation that is slow to react to the changes may 
encounter serious financial difficulties. 
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Interestingly, the demutualisation of the SSE may have affected the profitability of local 
stockbroking organisations in Sweden. Following the change in organisational structure, the 
exchange was able to introduce initiatives such as direct electronic entry for institutional 
investors and remote cross-border access. The local members were unable to block the 
proposal as they no longer had a controlling interest [Domowitz and Steil (1998)]. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the Swedish stockbroking organisations suffered from the entry of the 
remote cross-border stockbroking organisations. In 1999, 20 out of the total of 53 
stockbroking companies in Sweden were remote members of the SSE. Between 1995 and 
1998 the remote members gained a 12.1% market share of turnover. At the same time, the 





8.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The 1990s have been characterised by technological advances, the Internet revolution and 
improved capital mobility. Each of these factors has made a significant contribution to the 
globalisation of the world’s equity markets. Consequently, exchanges are now forced to 
compete against each other for trading volume and company listings. In response to the 
changes, the members of ASX ratified a special resolution on 18 October 1996 that allowed 
ASX to change from a mutual organisation to a stock-based company. On 14 October 1998, 
ASX became the first stock exchange in the world to list on its own market.  
 
This study uses a unique data source to investigate the reasons for and economic 
consequences of the demutualisation process. The data source includes ten interviews with 
individuals involved in the demutualisation process. The interviewees included current and 
former ASX directors, management and former members. These interviews were 
supplemented by extensive access to a range of ASX documents and reports.  
 
The results suggest that ASX’s reasons for the demutualisation are consistent with prior 
research on the insurance and banking industries. One of the major reasons identified for the 
change was the increasing level of international competition. If ASX had remained as a 
mutual structure, it was believed that ASX would have been unable to respond appropriately 
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to changes in its business environment. However, at this point there is no evidence to indicate 
that the increasing levels of competition have impacted on ASX’s profitability.  
 
The other major reason for the decision to demutualise was the inefficiencies that resulted 
from the collective decision making process. This problem was exacerbated by the 
divergence of interests among the members. Since demutualisation, there is some evidence to 
suggest that ASX has improved its efficiency relative to other international exchanges in the 
Asia-Pacific. This result is consistent with the agency perspective. This theory suggests that 
an organisation will change its structure when there are economic efficiency gains to be 
made. 
 
With regard to corporate governance mechanisms, prior literature provides some guidance as 
to what mechanisms companies need to establish in order to help maximise shareholder 
wealth. This study provides strong evidence to suggest that corporate governance 
mechanisms adapt in ways predicted by the prior literature as a result of changes in 
organisational structure. However, there is no support for Williamson’s (1983) substitution 
hypothesis.  It should also be noted that the changes tend to occur gradually. This was 
particularly evident for ASX’s board composition and board size. This implies that abrupt 
changes to corporate governance mechanisms are costly to implement. Consistent with this 
argument, an interview with Maurice Newman revealed “you need to remember that 
corporate governance mechanisms can’t adapt immediately. It takes time to change from one 
organisational structure to another. Attitudes and culture  it all takes time”. 
 
While changes in board composition and board size did not occur until the actual conversion 
to a stock-based company, an analysis of managerial remuneration indicated that changes 
occurred much earlier. In the case of executive and managing director remuneration 
packages, changes actually occurred in the year prior to the decision to demutualise. One 
interpretation of this result is that mutuals adopt some characteristics of a stock-based 
company in an attempt to improve their competitiveness and reduce inefficiencies. If this 
fails, management will then seek to change the organisational structure.  
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If ASX is going to provide the ‘demutualisation model’ for other stock exchanges to follow, 
ASX needs to improve some areas of its corporate governance practices. Specifically, ASX 
should increase the proportion of its independent directors to above 50%, appoint an 
independent director as chairman of the nomination committee, link non-executive 
remuneration with shareholder wealth, and possible even lobby the government to remove the 
share ownership limit. In doing so, ASX may create further shareholder wealth and also 
become a ‘role model’ for other ASX listed companies. 
 
8.2 Directions for Future Research  
Several aspects of this study could be developed in future research. Certain results cited in 
this study are limited due to the short time frame post-demutualisation. A longer time frame 
would allow for a more comprehensive examination of the effects of the demutualisation on 
ASX as a business and its stakeholders. While there is some evidence to suggest that ASX 
has benefited from an improvement in its efficiency, it is not possible to provide conclusive 
results using the specified time period. The efficiency section could also be improved by 
including a larger number of international exchanges in the control sample. It is also slightly 
premature to measure the changes in market efficiency. At this stage, ASX has announced a 
number of new initiatives which might impact on the market efficiency measures. However, 
the majority of these initiatives are not being implemented until the next calendar year.  
 
A longer sample period would also allow for a more thorough investigation of ASX’s 
corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, it would improve the empirical analysis on 
the pay to performance sensitivity of executives and the Managing Director. Furthermore, 
this investigation would be enhanced if it were possible to identify the exact amount of the 
one-off retirement and termination payments. In addition, this study provides evidence to 
suggest that rapid implementation of new corporate governance mechanisms after a change in 
organisational structure may prove costly. However, it fails to identify the magnitude or 
determinants of these costs. This remains an area for future research.  
 
Another potential area for future research is the examination of the impact on shareholder 
wealth of political interference in the open market. This is an important research question 
which has not been tested in this study. This is particularly relevant for ASX as it may help 
ASX management determine the effect of the recent increase in voting power limits and 
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further identify whether ASX should lobby the government for the complete removal of any 
limitation. 
 
Finally, if (as expected) a large number of stock exchanges do choose to demutualise, this 
may create an opportunity to analyse the reasons for and economic consequences of the 
demutualisation process at an empirical level. Only at this point will it be possible to provide 
conclusive evidence as to whether or not changing from a mutual organisation to a stock-
based company will benefit stock exchanges and their stakeholders.  
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Table A1 Membership Composition 
 
 Natural Persons Organisations Total 
Total – 1 April 1987 627 66 693 
Admissions 97 69 166 
Cessations 202 37 239 
Total – 5 July 1996 522 98 620 
 
 
Table A2 Time Line of Demutualisation Process 
 
Date Event Description 
31 July 1993 ASX’s board rejected proposal of floating 
the exchange. 
July 1995 ASX’s board decided to re-examine the 
governance structure. It established a 
Governance Task Force and Reference 
Panel to outline the issues and options 
available. At the same time, the board 
appointed Hogan Stokes as external 
consultant. 
July 1996 Hogan Stokes’ report was completed. 
24 September 1996 ASX distributed the Members’ 
Information Package to the members. 
18 October 1996 Members voted on a special resolution 
that sought to alter the Articles of 
Association. As a result of the vote, 
Article 83 was inserted giving the board a 
mandate to approach the government to 
change the legislation and allow ASX to 
convert to a stock-based company. 
6 August 1997 Corporations Law (ASX) Amendments 
Bill was released for public comment. 
September 1997 An explanatory package concerning the 
new Articles and Rules of ASX were 
distributed to the members. 
27 November 1997 Corporations Law (ASX) Amendments 
Bill was approved by parliament. 
16 December 1997 Amendments to the Corporations Law 
(ASX Act 1997) were given the royal 
assent and came into effect. 
28 August 1998 Information Memorandum was 
distributed. 
13 October 1998 ASX demutualised. 
14 October 1998 ASX listed on its own market for trading. 
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Appendix B 
 
Reasons for and Outcomes of Demutualisation of ASX 














1991 10,250 13,332 
1992 8,390 11,691 
1993 7,270 10,698 
1994 11,600 16,681 
1995 8,940 12,535 
1996 9,850 14,570 
1997 10,240 17,312 
1998 8,110 19,344 
1999 9,043 24,800 
2000 9,750 28,159 
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Table B2 Trading in ASX Listed Companies on Overseas Exchanges 
 
Panel A  
($‘000,000) 
 
Years Ending 31 December 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(f) 2000 2001 
           
NASDAQ
1
  39 277 414 399 1,573 1,773 1,550 1,000   
NYSE  (News Corp)
2 
3,500 5,964 3,343 7,354 6,503 8,913 14,500 15,300   
NYSE (Other)
3 
500 726 1,109 863 1,002 2,342 1,700 1,700   
LSE
4
  3,500 5,018 4,284 4,415 4,299 7,497 5,310 4,000   
NZSE
5 
224 337 230 180 251 590 3,650 3,000   
 7,763 12,322 9,380 13,211 13,628 21,115 26,710 25,000   
           
Other Exchanges
6 
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500   
OTC
7
   2,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,000 4,500   
Overseas Turnover 10,263 15,822 12,880 16,711 17,628 25,615 31,210 30,000   
           
ASX Turnover 
8 
62,248 99,553 129,386 132,795 184,806 229,498 256,471 300,000   
Total Turnover 72,511 115,375 142,266 149,506 202,434 255,113 287,681 330,000   
 
1
 The 1999 forecast is based on available data received to June 1999. No allowance has been made for new listings of   ASX 
listed Internet stocks in late 1999. All figures have been adjusted for 50% double counting. 
2
 The 1992 amount is an estimate that was provided by ASX. The 1999 forecast is based on data received to August 1999. 
3
 The 1992 amount is an estimate that was provided by ASX. The 1999 forecast is based on data received to August 1999. No 
allowance has been made for the new listings of ASX listed Internet stocks in late 1999. 
4
 The 1992 amount is an estimate that was provided by ASX. The 1999 forecast is based on data received to September 1999. All 
figures have been adjusted for 100% double counting. 
5
 The 1999 forecast is based on data received to September 1999. 
6
 All figures are estimates provided by ASX. 
7
 All figures are estimates provided by ASX.  
8 





Years Ending 31 
December 
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f) 
  
Overseas Turnover as a % 
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This refers to the percentage of trades on ASX that have an overseas condition code. This means that a small percentage of 
trades are recorded by both ASX and an international exchange. No adjustments have been made to Panel A of Table B2 to take 
this into account.  
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Table B3 ASX Trading Revenue as a Percentage of the Value of Shares Traded 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Trading and Settlement ($‘000,000) 14.803 18.043 18.786 28.699 25.905 33.084 40.117 49.674 65.281 90.7 84.4 
Value of Trading ($‘000,000) 54,507 63,054 72,691 128,393 117,973 158,802 211,318 243,146 281,890 361,506 417,600 
Trading Costs (%) 0.02716 0.02862 0.02584 0.02235 0.02196 0.02083 0.01898 0.02043 0.02316 0.0251 0.0202 
 
 
Table B4 ASX Trading Revenue per Equity Trade 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Trading and Settlement ($‘000,000) 14.803 18.043 18.786 28.699 25.905 33.084 40.117 49.674 65.281 90.7 84.4 
Number of Trades (‘000,000) 1.5310 1.9260 1.3150 3.9370 3.0430 3.9740 5.2750 6.3110 8.2940 13.85 12.95 
Trading Costs ($) 9.67 9.37 14.29 7.29 8.51 8.33 7.61 7.87 7.87 6.55 6.52 
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Graphical Analysis of International Competition 
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Liability of Members 
 
 
Table B5 Capital Expenditure 
 
Year Capital Expenditure  
($‘000) 
Four Year  
Rolling Average  
($‘000) 
1989 26,745 - 
1990 20,766 - 
1991 7,488 - 
1992 5,939 15,235 
1993 16,937 12,783 
1994 22,009 13,093 
1995 14,623 14,877 
1996 31,271 21,210 
1997 32,158 25,015 
1998 22,423 25,119 
1999 33,037 29,722 
2000 25,634 28,313 
2001 29,489 27,645 
 
 


























Table B6 Sensitivity of ASX Revenue Drivers 
 
Revenue Driver 1999 
Actual 




Number of New Listings 70 65 8% 
Number of Listed Companies 1,144 1,230 7% 
Equities – Annual Trades (‘000) 8,294 6,072 37% 
Equities – Fee per Trade ($) 6.07 6.30 4% 
Derivatives – Annual Trades (‘000)  9,043 7,590 19% 
Derivatives – Fee per Trade ($) 1.82 1.78 2% 
Warrants – Number of New Series 391 220 78% 
Warrants – Total Warrant Series 426 400 7% 
 
     
1
 Information obtained from ASX Listing Memorandum 
 
 
Table B7 Ten Year Summary of ASX 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
OPAT ($‘000,000) 9.542 -23.736 -8.043 1.809 7.383 24.013 14.647 19.385 15.674 16.669 37.727 53.618 51.018 
Equity Trading              
Value ($‘000,000) 49,331 56,728 54,507 63,054 72,691 128,39
3 
117,973 158,802 211,318 243,146 281,890 361506 417600 
No. Transactions (‘000,000) 1.836 1.720 1.531 1.926 2.315 3.937 3.043 3.974 5.275 6.311 8.294 13.85 12.95 
Equity Capital Raisings 
$‘000,000) 
10.960 9.147 6.966 11.975 10.651 22.892 11.801 15.320 16.403 28.843 27.417 36.339 24.451 
Listed Companies 1,446 1,318 1,151 1,116 1,067 1,163 1,186 1,184 1,198 1,227 1,226 1333 1422 
New Listings 73 35 18 169 43 159 68 53 83 83 65 183 156 
Derivatives Trading              
Value ($‘000,000) 2,929 3,609 2,764 2,256 1,812 3,700 2,793 3,311 3,919 4,099 6,008 9433 11191 
Volume (‘000,000) 9.502 11.527 10.246 8.389 7.269 11.603 8.943 9.854 10.239 8.110 9.042 9.75 11.649 
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Divergence of Members’ Interests 
 
 
Table B8 Distribution of Trading and Voting Power across Member 
Organisations 
 
 Top Ten Stockbrokers (%) Other Stockbrokers (%) 
 Market share Voting Power Market share  Voting Power   
1987 56.0 1.4 44.0 8.1 
1996 64.6 1.6 35.4 14.1 
 
 
Table B9 Distribution of Members across States 
(as at July 1996) 
 
  Natural Persons Organisations 
Adelaide  45 7 
Brisbane  28 8 
Hobart  9 3 
Melbourne  177 31 
Perth  42 10 
Sydney  221 38 
Total  522 97 
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Efficiency Ratio Analysis 
 
 
Table B10 Value of Trading  
($‘000) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
ASX 128,016 131,752 185,800 232,224 256,470 306,857 389,986 
SES 117,463 90,605 76,648 103,963 94,179 164,139 171,247 
SEHK 173,968 133,762 211,607 606,965 340,909 351,535 677,882 
NZSE 9,817 12,432 10,083 14,963 22,377 20,917 22,164 
KLSE 68,036 74,455 228,899 208,721 40,466 64,844 95,148 
 
 
Table B11 Total Market Capitalisation  
($‘000) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
ASX 279,532 327,303 392,014 453,397 536,285 653,543 670,918 
SES 180,134 213,873 193,432 168,614 154,746 198,039 155,126 
SEHK 372,294 423,776 571,442 553,361 568,220 609,090 623,398 
NZSE 34,532 45,984 35,378 47,733 38,729 27,827 18,197 
KLSE 258,068 306,705 395,631 192,833 143,923 139,908 113,155 
 
 
Table B12 Asset Utilisation  
(%) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 50.23 38.11 35.73 33.52 47.26 60.91 74.09 77.40 
SES
*
 37.59 18.97 13.93 12.80 15.76 9.74 3.71 6.14 
SEHK
* 
80.28 54.24 55.82 69.96 71.94 42.79 19.08 16.74 
NZSE 117.52 98.55 93.46 122.21 143.67 101.56 118.83 120.17 
KLSE
*
 107.60 49.95 53.21 63.05 21.12 25.19 29.26 11.44 
 
 
Table B13 Operating Expenses / Operating Income 
(%) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 71.46 78.57 78.38 89.82 80.95 70.03 61.17 62.65 
SES
*
 12.82 20.69 22.38 23.98 22.16 34.63 47.10 65.27 
SEHK
* 
46.88 88.09 94.69 63.41 48.29 60.60 57.64 58.85 
NZSE 81.63 97.57 98.31 125.22 84.99 91.80 88.39 86.32 
KLSE
*
 23.95 43.86 58.30 46.95 79.07 67.73 56.39 102.86 
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Table B14 Management Expenses 
(%) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 35.90 29.94 28.01 30.11 38.26 42.66 45.32 48.49 
SES
*
 4.82 3.93 3.12 3.07 3.49 2.62 1.75 4.01 
SEHK
* 
37.63 47.78 52.86 44.36 34.74 25.93 11.00 9.85 
NZSE 95.94 96.15 91.88 153.03 122.11 93.23 118.83 120.17 
KLSE
*
 25.76 21.91 31.02 29.61 16.70 16.60 16.50 11.77 
 
 
Table B15 Fixed Assets / Total Assets 
(%) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 15.17 21.39 21.11 21.62 20.74 22.05 24.82 30.27 
SES
*
 3.43 2.62 5.62 4.73 5.16 4.66 4.16 8.96 
SEHK
* 
18.57 42.68 38.84 30.31 23.12 22.86 5.77 6.59 
NZSE 17.34 14.37 13.16 16.40 12.64 27.78 6.17 5.36 
KLSE
*
 17.04 17.55 16.27 21.19 28.56 27.15 25.73 23.47 
 
 
Table B16 Total Staff Costs / Average Number of Employees 
($‘000) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 58.88 60.13 63.38 72.46 79.00 80.56 84.33 93.52 
SEHK
* 
68.92 74.26 74.35 97.85 118.72 121.47 121.96 160.71 
NZSE 24.78 22.13 20.66 29.16 78.62 83.89 - - 
 
 
Table B17 Operating Income / Average Number of Employees 
($‘000) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ASX 179.98 167.77 179.20 183.74 216.87 251.77 333.57 318.7 
SES
*
 269.94 264.09 264.15 263.80 326.06 254.63 183.19 277.27 
SEHK
* 
267.79 168.45 163.45 299.60 534.18 362.65 121.96 160.71 
NZSE 192.61 192.12 165.64 197.89 260.16 240.81 - - 
 













Graphical Analysis of Efficiency Ratios 
 





































Figure B8 Management Expenses (%) 
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Appendix C 
 





























1990 2,654 - 147.44 - 690 - 18 -13,346 - 
1991 3,381 27.39 147.00 -0.30 740 7.25 23 -6,253 - 
1992 3,618 7.01 157.30 7.01 770 4.05 23 2,816 - 
1993 4,015 10.97 160.60 2.10 840 9.09 25 5,275 87.32 
1994
1 
5,392 34.30 179.73 11.91 1,070 27.38 30 28,498 440.25 
1995
2 
4,487 -16.78 160.25 -10.8 860 -19.63 28 15,632 -45.15 
1996 2,557 -43.0 232.45 45.06 1,010 17.44 11 15,087 -3.49 
1997 3,965 55.06 233.24 0.34 1,220 20.79 17 7,589 -49.70 
1998
3 
5,617 41.66 280.85 20.41 1,590 30.3 20 17,996 137.1 
1999 5,341 -4.91 296.72 5.65 1,810 13.84 18 45,570 153.22 
2000 ? ? ? ? 1,855 2.49 ? 79,997 75.55 
2001 ? ? ? ? 2,136 15.15 ? 71,700 -10.37 
 
1
 Includes retirement and/or termination payments for seven executives. This included payments to the top three executives. 
2
 Includes retirement and/or termination payments for four executives. None of the executives held any of the top four positions. 
3
 Includes retirement and/or termination payments for three out of the top four executives. 
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Table C2 Managing Director Remuneration 
 
Year Total 








1990 280 - -13,346 - 
1991 290 3.57 -6,253 - 
1992 300 3.45 2,816 - 
1993 310 3.33 5,275 87.32 
1994
1 
380 22.58 28,498 440.25 
1995 340 -10.53 15,632 -45.15 
1996 420 23.53 15,087 -3.49 
1997 520 23.81 7,589 -49.70 
1998 600 15.38 17,996 137.13 
1999 850 41.67 45,570 153.22 
2000 1027 20.80 79997 76.55 
2001 1117 8.76 71700 -10.37 
       
     
        1
 Includes retirement payment for the Managing Director. 
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1990 809 - 44.94 - 310 - 18 -13,346 - 
1991 938 15.95 49.37 9.84 370 19.35 19 -6,253 - 
1992 1,112 18.55 69.50 40.78 420 13.51 16 2,816 - 
1993 1,267 13.94 70.39 1.28 440 4.76 18 5,275 87.32 
1994
1 
1,517 19.7 89.24 26.77 570 29.55 17 28,498 440.25 
1995 1,388 -8.50 77.11 -13.59 510 -10.53 18 15,632 -45.15 
1996 1,409 1.51 78.28 1.51 650 27.45 18 15,087 -3.49 
1997 1,632 15.83 102.00 30.31 780 20.00 16 7,589 -49.70 
1998 1,714 5.02 114.27 12.03 860 10.26 15 17,996 137.13 
1999
2 
1,870 9.10 170.00 48.77 1,090 26.74 11 45,570 153.22 
2000 1,793 -4.12 162.99 -4.12 1,292 18.56 11 79,997 76.55 
2001 1,898 5.85 210.86 29.37 1,430 10.63 9 71,700 -10.37 
 
1
 Includes retirement payment for the Managing Director. 
2
 Includes payment for services rendered for four non-executive directors who resigned during the year. The results are qualitatively 
the same when these payments are excluded from the analysis. 
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1990 529 - 31.12 - 50 - 17 -13,346 - 
1991 648 22.50 36.00 15.69 100 100.00 18 -6,253 - 
1992 812 25.31 54.13 50.37 150 50.00 15 2,816 - 
1993 957 17.86 56.29 3.99 160 6.67 17 5,275 87.32 
1994 1,137 18.81 71.06 26.2 270 68.7 16 28,498 440.2 
1995 1,048 -7.8 61.65 -13.25 220 -18.52 17 15,632 -45.15 
1996 989 -5.63 58.18 -5.63 330 50.00 17 15,087 -3.49 
1997 1,112 12.44 74.13 27.43 340 3.0 15 7,589 -49.7 
1998 1,114 0.18 79.57 7.34 340 0.00 14 17,996 137.13 
1999
1 
1,020 -8.44 102.00 28.19 330 -2.94 10 45,570 153.22 
2000 766 -24.89 76.61 -24.89 353 6.84 10 79997 76.55 
2001 781 1.95 97.63 27.43 414 17.29 8 71700 -10.37 
 
1
 Includes payment for services rendered for four non-executive directors who resigned during the year. The results are 
qualitatively the same when these payments are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table C5(i) Executive Remuneration for 1999  
($) 
 







R Nottle 262,600 148,000 5,678 70,625 486,903 
A Richards 263,868 135,000 11,147 69,357 479,372 
M Costello 326,591 133,000 14,930 6,634 481,155 
C Scully 223,831 40,000 11,147 13,008 287,986 




Table C5(ii) Executive Remuneration for 2000 
($) 
 







C Hamilton 231,515 63,500 - 11,293 306,308 
J Hayes 237,681 50,000 2,097 61,732 351,510 
J McMurtrie 277,804 - - 6,523 284,327 
A Richards 291,515 100,000 - 74,624 466,139 




Table C5(iii) Executive Remuneration for 2001 
($) 
 
Executive Name Base 
Remuneration 
Bonuses Total 
J Hayes 387,201 100,000 487,201 
J McMurtrie 386,684 100,000 486,684 
A Richards 411,684 120,000 531,684 
M Roche 300,000 75,000 375,000 




















Table C6(i) Director Remuneration for 1999 ($) 
 







M Newman 125,858 - - 6,856 132,714 
R Humphry 540,932 289,500 13,322 6,634 850,388 
C Batroney 88,143 - 1,517 1,501 91,161 
M Shepherd 58,036 - 11,147 47,670 116,853 
B Egan 53,775 - 1,711 3,710 59,196 
M Fowles 51,421 - 3,716 3,549 58,686 
J Fraser 17,583 - - 29,444 47,027 
J Kennedy 39,738 - 194 2,731 42,663 
J Parncutt 40,867 - - 3,222 44,089 
M Sharpe 68,049 - - 22,173 90,222 
C Walter 47,805 - - 3,287 51,092 
P Chisholm
* 
27,196 - - 1,881 29,077 
T Lewis
* 
11,682 - 1,979 818 14,479 
R Petfied
* 
14,786 - - 1,631 16,417 
P Schudmak
* 
- - - 17,000 17,000 
*
 Resigned during the year. 
 
Table C6(ii) Director Remuneration for 2000 ($) 
 







M Newman 131,000 - - 7,068 138,068 
R Humphry 624,353 325,500 2,184 75,276 1,026,813 
C Batroney 69,083 - - 6,153 75,236 
M Shepherd 121,144 - - 6,308 127,452 
B Egan* 17,500 - 1,194 41,145 59,839 
M Fowles 51,833 - - 3,358 54,691 
J Fraser 54,833 - - 3,587 58,420 
J Kennedy 49,000 - - 3,206 52,206 
J Parncutt 51,875 - - 777 52,652 
M Sharpe 81,136 - - 6,212 87,348 
C Walter 56,500 - - 3,969 60,196 
*
 Resigned during the year. 
 
Table C6(iii) Director Remuneration for 2001 ($) 
 
Director Name Base 
Remuneration 
Bonuses Total 
M Newman 178,201 - 178,535 
R Humphry 766,728 350,000 1,116,728 
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C Batroney 100,641 - 100,641 
M Shepherd 134,447 - 134,447 
M Fowles 66,056 - 66,056 
J Fraser 71,426 - 71,426 
J Kennedy 63,370 - 63,370 
M Sharpe 95,126 - 95,126 
C Walter 71,426 - 71,426 
            *
 Resigned during the year.
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Table C7(i) Director Share Ownership 
 
Director Name Initial 
Holding 
Purchases Sales Holding at 30 
June 1999 
M Newman 166,000 - 41,000 125,000 
R Humphry - - - - 
C Batroney 166,000 - - 166,000 
M Shepherd 166,000 - 36,000 130,000 
B Egan 166,000 - 7,500 158,500 
M Fowles 166,000 - 149,500 16,500 
J Fraser - - - - 
J Kennedy - 10,000 9,000 1,000 
J Parncutt 166,000 - 40,000 126,000 
M Sharpe - - - - 
C Walter - - - - 
 
 
Table C7(ii) Director Share Ownership for 2000 
 
Director Name Initial 
Holding 
Purchases Allocations Sales Holding at 
30 June 
1999 
M Newman 125,000 - - 42,000 83,000 
R Humphry - - 55,333 - - 
C Batroney 166,000 - - 46,000 53,333 
M Shepherd 130,000 - - 70,000 120,000 
B Egan 16,000 - - - 60,000 
M Fowles 166,000 - - - 16,500 
J Fraser - 2,000 - - 2,000 
J Kennedy 1,000 - - - 1,000 
M Sharpe - 2,000 - - 2,000 
C Walter - 1,000 - - 1,000 
 
 
Table C7(iii) Director Share Ownership for 2001 
 
Director Name Initial 
Holding 
Purchases Allocations Sales Holding at 
30 June 
1999 
M Newman 83,000 - - - 83,000 
R Humphry 53,333 - 55,333 - 110,666 
C Batroney 120,000 - - 40,000 80,000 
M Shepherd 60,000 - - - 60,000 
M Fowles 16,500 - - - 16,500 
J Fraser 2,000 - - - 2,000 
J Kennedy 1,000 - - - 1,000 
M Sharpe 2,000 - - - 2,000 
C Walter 1,000 2,000 - - 3,000 
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Graphical Analysis of Management Remuneration 
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Monitoring Management 
 
Table C8(i) List of 20 Largest Shareholders (as at 23 August 1999) 
 




Percentage of Total 
Issued Shares (%) 
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd 4,062,796 4.03 
Chase Manhatten Nominees  3,078,949 3.05 
AMP Nominees Pty Limited 2,089,351 2.07 
AMP Life Limited 1,832,014 1.82 
National Nominees 1,463,961 1.45 
AXA Nominees 1,129,841 1.12 
Westpac Custodian Nominees 848,675 0.84 
Commonwealth Securities 498,000 0.49 
Warnford Nominees Pty Limited 488,806 0.48 
BT Custodial Services Limited 401,808 0.40 
Commonwealth Custodial Services  382,975 0.38 
CSS Board 348,177 0.35 
ANZ Nominees Limited 341,320 0.34 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 306,730 0.30 
Queensland Local Government 300,571 0.30 
Colonial Portfolio Services Ltd 274,390 0.27 
Calex Nominees Pty Limited 267,903 0.27 
ASX Operations Pty Limited  246,834 0.24 
Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 245,782 0.24 
Transport Accident Commission 244,111 0.24 
Total 18,852,994 18.68 
 
Table C8(ii) List of 20 Largest Shareholders (as at 23 August 2000) 
  




Percentage of Total 
Issued Shares (%) 
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd 4,195,903 4.15 
Chase Manhatten Nominees 3,566,890 3.52 
Perpectual Nominees Ltd 2,543,951 2.51 
National Nominees 2,436,445 2.41 
AMP Life Limited 2,364,683 2.34 
Westpac Custodian Nominees 1,328,453 1.31 
AMP Nominees Pty Ltd 1,242,995 1.23 
Commonwealth Custodial Services 1,212,903 1.20 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 635,320 0.63 
Bainpro Nominees Pty Ltd 604,727 0.60 
CSS Board 415,247 0.42 
ASX Operations Pty Limited 352,722 0.35 
Perpectual Trustees Australia Ltd 309,497 0.31 
BT Custodial Services Pty Ltd 309,208 0.31 
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Caltex Nominees Pty Ltd 305,118 0.30 
Permanent Trustee Company Ltd 301,015 0.30 
PSS Board 293,020 0.29 
Bond Street Custodians 280,934 0.28 
ANZ Nominees Limited 245,293 0.24 
Transport Accident Commission 240,409 0.24 
Total 23,184,733 22.93 
 
 
Table C8(iii) List of 20 Largest Shareholders (as at 23 August 2001) 
 




Percentage of Total 
Issued Shares (%) 
Chase Manhatten Nominees 6,956,584 6.68 
National Nominees 3,591,646 3.54 
AMP Life Limited 2,582,440 2.55 
Westpac Custodian Nominees 2,138,083 2.11 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 2,096,681 2.07 
RBC Glob. Services Aust Nominees 
Pty Ltd 
1,845,497 1.82 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 1,300,023 1.28 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 1,256,973 1.24 
Cogent Nominees Pty Limited 978,717 0.97 
ANZ Nominees Limited 843,774 0.83 
Commonwealth Custodial Services 749,023 0.74 
Cogent Nominees Pty Limited 659,729 0.65 
ASX Operations Pty Limited 429,220 0.49 
Commonwealth Custodial Services 434,963 0.43 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 407,517 0.40 
MLC Limited 285,957 0.28 
CSS Board 281,747 0.28 
Commonwealth Custodial Services 277,531 0.27 
RBC Glob. Services Aust Nominees 
Pty Ltd 
276,520 0.27 
Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited 250,510 0.25 
Total 27,706,135 27.33 
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Appendix D 
 
ASX Stakeholders and Demutualisation 





















Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated using the 
daily closing price for ASX between 14 October 1998 and 30 June 
1999 (or 178 days of trading). The accumulated All Ordinaries index 
is used as the market benchmark. This is compared to the average 
BHAR for all other demutualisations that have occurred in Australia 
resulting in a market listing. The sample consists of AMP, National 
Mutual Holdings, St George Bank, Colonial, Adelaide Bank, Bank 
of Melbourne, Challenger Bank, Advance Bank and Metway Bank. 
For each company, the return calculation is based on the daily 





















































Table D1 Listing Fees for ASX Market 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Listing Fee Revenue ($‘000) 20,033 18,782 21,364 21,364 30,436 26,513 27,474 29,289 34,274 32,508 36,502 34,052 
Number of Listed Companies 1,254 1,096 1,116 1,067 1,163 1,186 1,184 1,198 1,227 1,226 1381 1499 
Revenue per Listed Company ($‘000) 15.98 17.14 19.14 20.02 26.17 22.35 23.20 24.45 27.93 26.52 26.43 22.72 
 
 
Table D2 Listing Fees for ASX and Overseas Exchanges Pre-Demutualisation 
 
 ASX NZSE NYSE NASDAQ TSE CSE LSE SSE
 
Listing Fee Revenue ($‘000) 27,474 1,731 291,042 216,375 37,041 4,125 52,947 14,257 
Number of Listed Companies  1,184 191 2,476 5,556 1,323 249 2,494 229 
Revenue per Listed Company ($‘000) 23.20 9.06 117.55 38.94 28.00 16.57 21.2 62.26 
 
 
Table D3 Listing Fees for ASX and Overseas Exchanges Post-Demutualisation 
 




Listing Fee Revenue ($‘000) 32,508 1,702 485,760 360,601 40,098 5,978 75,760 23,048 115,411 41,677 
Number of listed Companies 1,226 214 3,114 5,968 1,433 254 2,370 276 1,890 680 
Revenue per Listed Company ($‘000) 26.52 7.95 155.99 60.42 27.98 23.53 31.97 83.51 61.06 61.29 
 
1
 The Tokyo Stock Exchange 1996 Annual Report was unavailable. 
2
 Due to the unavailability of the 1999 Annual Report, the SEHK figures have been adjusted using interim financial reports. The figures are now 
based on a 31 December 1998 balance date. Also, the necessary information from the 1996 Annual Report was unavailable.
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Graphical Analysis of Listing Fees 
 
 






































































































Graphical Analysis of Market Efficiency 
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Figure D9 Relative Spread for Post-Demutualisation Period 
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